SUPPORT FOR JURY

Poverty Bay Herald, Volume LXIV, Issue 19374, 12 July 1937, Page 10

SUPPORT FOR JURY

APPEAL COURT DECISION DISAGREES WITH JUDGE AUCKLAND SLANDER CASE Reversing the judge's decision, the Court ..of. Appeal in Wellington on Thursday gave its decision in the Auckland case in which a plaintiff who had been awarded by a jury one-farthing damages on each of two causes of - action for slander was granted by the judge a new trial on the ground _ that the award was insufficient. Appellant was William John Bekker (de- ~ fendant in the original action), retired soap manufacturer, and respon- ~ dent Marguerite Metre Wrack (plainI tiff in the original action). Respondent proceeded against ap- ~ pellant for slander, claiming £4OO Z. damages for each of two statements. “ The iurv found that the words had uttered and Awarded one farthing damages in respect of each action. The question of costs was reserved. Plaintiff, who had received >d., then moved that the verdict be set aside and that a new trial be held upon the grounds that the damages awarded were too small and that the verdict, insofar as it related to the damages awarded, was against the weight of evidence. Mr. Justice Callan ordered a new trial. It was against this order that appeal was made.

l can wen unaersiaiiu un- ui&actttsfaction of the learned judge with the verdict considering the grossness of the slanders, and that is a matter of great weight in this courO said Mr. Justice Ostler. , “But the verdict of a jury can be set aside only if it is unreasonable. In my opinion the decision of the judge in the court below was erroneous and should be reversed with costs on the lowest scale and from a distance, and the case remitted to the Supreme Court so that the judge may deal with the costs of the trial and the mdtion for a new trial. Assessment of Damages Agreeing that the motion for a new trial should have been refused, Mr. Justice Kennedy said the amount of damages in a slander action, especially where there was no proof of special damage, was peculiarly within the province of the jury. While it was true that there was no invariable rule of practice by which the court was prohibited from granting a new trial on account of the smallness of the damages, the fact was that the court would very rarely interfere with the verdict of the jury on the ground that the damages were inadequate. The jury, he said, was the tribunal for the assessment of damages, and readily to interfere with the jury’s assessment might be to substitute the judgment of another tribunal for that of the jury; for damages were not assessed upon any clear and definite principle. The court must be satisfied of something more than that the damages were in its opinion very low. It must be satisfied that they were so low as to show that there had been what had been called misconduct of

tiie jury, such as compromising the issue or making a gross blunder in regarding matters which should not be taken into account. If there were any evidence which might mitigate the damages, the jury’s view as to the extent of that mitigation could practically be disregarded. If the jury concluded there had been no real or appreciable damage they were not in duty bound to award more than one farthing damages. Jury’s Action Mr. Justice Northcroft concurred with the other two members of the court, saying he could find nothing to indicate that the jury either misconceived the law or made any mistake or returned a verdict so defective as to constitute no real decision on the question of damages. The jury had been told, and he thought rightly, that they must find damages if the slander were proved, but that the damages might be “merely nominal." There was nothing in the case to indicate that the jury had acted mistakenly or misconducted themselves by neglecting to consider the true measure of damages. The trial judge, or the Court of Appeal, might disagree with the verdict and might think that instead of one farthing, the damages should have been 40s or some other sum, but such a view alone did not justify an interference with the decision of the jury who alone had the task of assessing damages. At. the hearing Mr. E. Thurlow Field. Auckland, appeared for appellant, and Mr. R. A. Singer, Auckland, for respondent.