LORD JELLICOE AND THE U-BOAT MENACE.

Poverty Bay Herald, Volume XLV, Issue 14572, 6 April 1918, Page 7

LORD JELLICOE AND THE U-BOAT MENACE.

■» ' : — "IT WILL BE KILLED BY AUGUST IF WE HOLD. OUT." LORD FISHER'S WARNING IN 1911. t y: LONDON, Feb. 12. Lord Jellieoe has prepared the nation for a bad time during, the next few months. He was speaking at a meeting of the Pacific Exchange at Hull. "But I have confidence," he added. "By about next August if the nation holds out, I think we shall really be able to say that the submarine menace is killed." .■;,'■;* At the present time, said Lord Jellieoe, we had a little difficulty in speaking on naval matters. He could only tell them that the navy was doing its best and had * done its best throughout tho war. Meinbers of the community in a certain sense connected with the sea warel better, able than those who lived far away from the sea to realise the difficulties with which the navy had had to contend during the war. Those, difficulties were simply and solely due to one cause, and that was the submarine. The methods of the submarine were sprung on the British navy in the way of a surprise. He .remembered Lord Fisher writing a memorandum to the Admiralty wh^n Lord'. Fisher and he were members of the Oil Fusl Committoe, in .1911, in which -^W; said that l— Tf Germany went to war 'with us, he was sure the Germans would use submarines against our merchant ships. He recollected tho memorandum going to the Board of Admiralty, after he joined it .as Second Sea Lord, and there was nobody in a responsible position who agreed that the German, navy would really do such a, thing as Lord Fisher exp3ct!d. Lord Fisher was right, as he had been right in many cases. (Cheers.) Thei navy, of course, Was unprepared to deal with the submarine, but that was not the fault of the navy. If Lord Fisher's words had been believied there would hare been time to adopt measures which would have effectually stopped the submarines from getting out, and that •was ths onlv way to deal with them. NAVY'S GREAT TASK. There was no royal road for saving merchant ships once the submarine got out of. harbor, and it was impossible to block them in, but since tho British navy had been faced with the task he thought they had tried to do their best. It was a super-human task, because the submarine was a cjaf t which . could go under water for 24 hours, and could lie at the bottom for 48 hours. People had asked Jiim recently how it was that our losses i ! n thia Irish Sea were heavy. The reason for that was that theii3 was shoal water on each side of the Irish Sea. at' 'the bottom of which sub* marines could sit. We got a craft on to her and that was the first intimation that she? was there. When she was hunted out she sat at the bottom until the trouble was over. That was when our craft had to go back to port to re-finl. Then the submarine came up again and continued her nefarious career. Tliat was one of the main difficulties in that particular locality. • The difficulty of keeping them in their own ports was accentuated by ths shoal wnter in ahd around the Heligoland Bight for a Tadius Of 150 miles. Tlie submarine could sit at the bottom of the sea, and if we 'patrolled that area, which stretched something like 300 niiles from Denmark to tha Dutch Islands, wo should still liave to meet that difficulty. Directly they tackled the submarine it dived to the bottom and waited until night, when she could continue her course without being seen. A submarine at night, even on tlie surface, could only be. seen at a distance of 200 yards, and, when they divided the 300 miles into 200 yards they wquld be able to work out how many patrol vessels would be required to watch a distance of that sort . "BAD TIME FOR FEW MONTHS." "I am afraid,"" continued Lord Jeßica?, "we" are in for a bad time for a few months; but I have confidence. I have nothing to do with the business now; but I know what is ready, aiid what is in preparation, and I have confidence that by the summer— the late summer, for I will not put it too soon — about August, if the nation hold out until them, I hope it will: I think by that time wis really shall be able< to say the 1 submarine menace is killed. (Cheers.) I will not put it until August, because I always notice that, whenever optimistic speeches are mada by the Prime Minister, or any othm* high "official, they result is a desperate disaster about the next day. (Laughter.) T have told the Prime Minister that, and asked him never to make optimistic speeches about subiriarines, because thai next morning I had to ■go down to the War Cabinet with a very long list of losses. I would lj,ke to ask them not to mako optimistic speeches until August, when they can make as many us. they .like, but not until then." In conclusion Lord Jellieoe said that tho fleet was always very near to Ahis heart. "I confess," he said, "I regret I ever left it. I went at the call of duty, and had I to make the decision again 1 should take the same course; but I left