COURT OF APPEAL.

Otago Witness, Issue 3865, 10 April 1928, Page 23

COURT OF APPEAL.

THE LICENSING LAW. SUPPLY OF LIQUOR TO GUESTS. WELLINGTON, April In dealing with the appeals O’Connel v. Claason and Burke v. Claason from the decisions of Mr E. Page, S.M., the Appeal Court upheld the magistrate’s con viction against O’Connell, the uarinan, but considered that the conviction' againsBurke, the hotel proprietor, should lot stand. No costs were allowed either party.

The facts as set out in the judgment of the magistrate are. briefly, as Allows:—The information against O’Con nell alleged that on -June 23, 1927, being a _ person other than 'he licensee in the City Hotel, he unlawfully supplied hquoi to Charles Middleditch, who was not ei> titled lawfully to be supplied with liquoi. The information against Burke Sieged that, being the holdei of a publican’.license issued in respect of the City Hotel, he unlawfully allowed liquor "o be consumed on such premises after closing hours. Trie evidence showed that at 6.22 p.m oil June 23 a sergeant and a constable of police entered the hotel In the public bar they found six men, three of them being barmen who were employed in the. hotel but who were off duty on this afternoon, and the it her three—Middleditch. Turner and An drews—-being friends of one of these barmen. In front of the various men were glasses containing liquor partly consumed, behind C •• bar, in his shirt sleeves, was the defendant O’Connell. Th- main door to the bar was locked, but the slide which looks from the passage into the bar was open, and the bar was lighted U P- The licensee (Burke) was upstairs. Mr Page added: “ The result of decisions relating to the right of a person living in an hotel to supply h’ouor during closed hours to a friend who is his bona fide guest appears to he that a person other than the licensee may lawfully supply honor to a guest of the licensee or to a guest of a lodger, but not to a guest of the wife nor to a guest of a servant m, the house. This result is not one at wmen I should have arrived unaided, and T am unable to find tp e Statute a satisfactory’ basis for the distinction of "ecent Supreme Cnart divisions, which, owever, are binding on this court.” MOTOR COLLISION CASE. BLACK AND WHITE CARS v. ANSON. WELLINGTON. April 2. In the case of the Black and White Cabs v. Anson, the nidges stated that the first question to be decided was whether the appellant was entitled to have judgment entered in its favour notwithstanding the verdict of the jury. I heir honours were of opinion that the judge in the court below was right in dismissing this motion, for the court had no power to make such an order. The other question was the motion for a new Their honours held that Mr Jusice MacGregor in dis-nissino- this motion in the court below had attached too much weight to the fact that the jury had viewed the scene of the collision.’ The •notion for a new trial was allowed, with costs on the highest scale. Leave to appeal to the Privy Council was granted on the motion'of counsel for the respondent, security being fixed at £5OO. , The facts are that on December 25, Anson, while proceeding home alon» the Hutt road on his motor cycle, was run down by a Black and White cab. and in consequence of the serious injuries he suffered it became necessary to amputate one of Anson’s legs. Anson then brought an action against the Black and White Cab Company, claiming £lBO7 6s 2d damages. The action was heard before Mr Justice MacGregor and a jury of 12, who found the defendant company guilty of negligence, and awarded £1157 6s 2d damages to plaintiff The Black and '•fiite Cab Company thereupon moved in the Supreme Court to have the above judgment set aside as being against the weight of evidence, and to have an order made for a new trial This motion was heard by Mr Justice MacGregor, who, after stating the law with regard to new trials, said he would not himself on the evidence have arrived at the same t x? 3 t - be Jury did - but he did not think the circumstances of the -case strong enough or clear enough to enable him to set aside the jury’s verdict as being against the weight of evidence. INCOME TAX ASSESSMENT. CHARGE AGAINST LAND PROFITS. WELLINGTON, April 2. In the case Tillard v. the Commissioner of Taxes- the appeal was dismissed, the

court allowing costs to the respondent on the highest scale as from a distance. lliis action concerned a case stated by zc' Commissioner of Taxes under section 35 of the Land and Income Tax Act, 1923, in connection with the assessment of income tax. For the purposes of assessment, which was for the yeai ended March 31, 1924, the sum of £2500. received by appellant from the estate of hei first husband (the late Henry Buckland), was treated as esse sable income. The fund out of wln.ii this sum was paid included profits made by the trustees of Buckland’s will in carrying on the business of sheep farming on Kaitoa Station Appellant claimed that these profits were exempt from taxation by virtue of section 78 (1) of the Land and Income Tax Act, 1923, and that she therefore was not liable to pay income tax in respect of so much uf- the £2500 as could be regarded as being part of these, profits. In giving judgment for the commissioner, his Honor said: “It is the legal owner who is primarily liable to pav land tax under section 48 of the Act. and the owner, in ciause (l) x of section 78. must mean, I think, the person who has been assessed for land tax In resnect of the land m question in the present case the trustees have been treated .as the'owners of the station, and have been assessed accordingly for the . land tax. and thev are the only persons entitled, in mv opinion to the benefit of exemption. The result is that the appellant is not entitled to it, and the assessment is correct.