THE CAMBRAI BATTLE.

Otago Witness, Issue 3339, 13 March 1918, Page 14

THE CAMBRAI BATTLE.

SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCH. ißy Cable). Sir Douglas Haig, in a despatch to the War Office dealing with the battle of Cambrai, mentions that it was proposed to ston the attack 48 hours after its com' mencementj or sooner if results did not justify its continuance. In detailing the reasons for its continuance after the expiry of this period, Sir D. Haig states that the positions we had captured north of Flesquieres were completely commanded by Bourlon Ridge miles west of Cambrai, extending north of the Bapaume road), and must be abandoned unless that ridge was gained. On the other hand, the enemy showed signs of withdrawing, and their loss of Bourlon Ridge would probably cause the Germans to abandon their carefully-pre-pared defence systems for a considerable distance northward. The enemy were not yet too strong in the Bourlon region to be overcome by the numbers at Sir D. Haig's disposal. An additional important argument for continuing the attack was the -enemy offensive then in progress in Italy. Moreover, two British divisions then under ordtrs for Italy were placed at Sir D. Haig's disposal ; therefore the prospect of securing Bourlon seemed good. Dealing with the enemy counter-attack on November '2l, the despatch says: "At the northern end of Bonair Ridge and in the Gonnelieu (or southern) sector, the swiftness of the enemy's advance after their opening bombardment appears to have overwhelmed those of our troops which were left in the front line, and in immediate support, almost before they realised that an attack had begun. The nature of the bombardment also contributed to the success"of the enemy's plans; no steadily advancing barrage gave warning of the approach of the German assault column, whose secret assembly was assisted by the formation of the ground and a morning mist. A great number of lowflying German aeroplanes rained machine gun fire upon our infantry, while the enemy's extensive -use of smoke shells and bombs made it difficult for our troops to see what was happening on other parts of the battlefield. There is little doubt that although the German ■ attacks extended generally, yet these were as part" of the general battle, while this assault effected a local surprise." Sir D. Haig says that the greatest credit is due to the troops at Masnieres, Bourlon, and Moeuvres for their gallant services on this day, for their steady courage and staunchness 6aved possible serious consequences. Dealing with the results of the Cambrai battle, Sir D. Haig says: " There is little doubt that it afforded considerable indirect assistance to the allied forces in Italy, where large demands were being made upon the available German reserves, just at a time when a great concentration of German divisions was being still maintained in Flanders. Evidence is available that German divisions intended for the Italian theatre were diverted to Cambrai. It is probable that a further concentration of German forces in Italy was necessary at that most critical period, when the Italians were making their first stand on the Piave. , " The partial success of the enemy's attack south of Cambrai may tend to show that our garrison on this front was insufficient, either showing want of numbers, or lack of training, or exhaustion." Sir D. Haig emphasises the point that captured maps and orders prove that the enemy aimed at achieving far greater results than they did achieve. , Three convergent German attacks were to be made on the salient formed oy the British advance. Two of these were delivered approximately simultaneously near Gonnelieu and Masnieres, followed by a still more powerful attack on Bourlon. The objectives of these attacks extend to the high ground at Beaucamp and Trescault (behind Flesquieres, on the Cambrai-Peronne road). The enemy hoped to capture or destroy the whole of the British forces on the Cambrai salient. This bold and ambitious plan was foiled over the greatest part of the front by the splendid defence of the British divisions engaged. Though their defence temporarily broke down, the recovery made by the weak forces still left there within immediate reach was most praiseworthy. After paying a tribute to the manner in which General Byng conducted operations, Sir D. Haig states: " The great offensive value of the tanks has been conclusively proved, and in view of this experience the enemy will hesitate to deplete any portion of their front in order to free troops for decisive action elsewhere."