NOTES ON THE WAR.

Otago Witness, Issue 2399, 22 February 1900, Page 24

NOTES ON THE WAR.

By Major Kennedy. February 13. The retreat of General Buller to Frere, some 14 miles south of Colenso, and the J advance of the eenmy's forces across the river and to within an hour's ride of Chieveley, as they folloAved up the retiiing British, give the situation in Natal a rather gloomy appearance. The advance of j the enemy across the Tugela, coupled Avith i ~ 'the news that a Jorce of Boers is march-! ing through .Zululand, shows that the ' enemy are about to try a flank movement | -from the north and east, via Greytown, j -so.as-to threaten Pietermaritzburg. - The' xoad running towards " GreytoAvn from the ' ■capital passes through many very nice A r il- ! lages, including Albert and Seven Oaks, ' > while it leaves Hanover on. the east and ,York on the west some distance aAvay. i There is little -doubt -that the object the I Boers have in view is to force Lord ' Roberts to send more troops to Natal, and ; thereby weaken the forces in Cape Colony, j ft is in a measure comforting to be told ' that a new forward movement is intended ' by General Buller, but we are left to guess where and Avhen this next moA r e will be m de. | ' 'he arrival of General French with ! ca ralry immediately after Lord Roberts on t.ac Modder would indicate that a forward move by the enemy is feared, and an attack on Lord Methuen. The continued bombardment of Kimberley points to the determination of the , ■enemy to bring Colonel KekeAvich to terms, and the faot that beef is exhausted and ■horseflesh is being eaten Avould seem to indicate that the garrison Avill be forced to capitulate by starvation unless Lord liloberts can raise the siege. I expect that •he will make a dash for it, and defeat Cronje before the latter knows Avho or what struck his camp. I look for a flank attack on the enemy before long on the •Modder, and AAiien it is done it will prove | ■a lesson "to all the other generals in our army. The situation is graA r e, but Aye can, trust Lord Roberts to do the best possible Avith the forces available. ' • The position of affairs in Natal may be •summed up as follows : —General White reports Ladysmith able -to hold out for several weeks yet, and it is very probable he' will have to do so, as there is little 'prospect of General Buller being able to relieve him, as the line of his retreat indicates that he found a frontal attack at this late date far beyond his strength. I am not surprised at his retreat, as I am of opinion that a body of troops Avell entrenched,, armed with modern quickfiring cannon and machine guns in sufficient numbers to sAveep their front, and protected on their flanks by a lai'ger mounted^ force than those opposed to them, can retain their position against ten times their number. Such being the case' on the Tugela, I consider that it is too late noAV to attempt to force a passage through the enemy's lines, and that, instead of a di- ■ rect attack in front, a neAV move will be attempted by General Buller, either from or from Weston, further south. I do not think he will abandon the railway south of Frere, but that his main body having fallen back he Avill hold Estcourt as his base, and mount every man that he possibly can, and divide his command so as to move to his right with the mounted forces for the purpose of meeting the ' enemy's flanking column which is now marching through Zululand. It is necessary to intercept this column, and either drive it back or destroy it, as its presence in Zululand will have a very bad effect on • the Zulus, as the enemy will try to raise these tribesmen against the British, and, unfortunately, all Kaffirs are alike, in so far that they are ahvays ready to fight for ..the winning side. It is, therefore, necessary that a strong British column should drive this Boer force out of Zululand at once. I presume that General Bui-

ler will see to it, and at the same time send the mounted division to intercept the enemy's supplies by moving up in to the Transvaal, past the enemy's left flank, as the only hope of his army being able to I assist General White until Lord Roberts j lias time and troops to defeat Cronje and I reach Bloemfontein seems to be by ati tempts to harass the enemy's rear by rapid flank movements, now here and again there, I thus drawing off a great number of the bej siegers from in front of Ladysmith. By i the destruction of the railway and, rolling , stock, together with all supplies they are I not able to carry off, they will make the ! maintenance of a large force' of besiegers , a difficult thing to-do. This seems to me to , be the only course left open to General i Buller now, as his mounted troops are not strong enough to move off and make a : march via Dundee and Laing's Nek on Pre- ! toria, and it is out of the question to at- [ tempt to abandon the line of railway with , so large an -infantry force, even if jbrans- ! port was available for such a movement. | Enough troops would have to be left behind to protect Southern Natal from the enemy. It seems to me that the enemy is now trying to reach Genei'al Buller's I rear, just as they did on November 23, ! when they succeeded in isolating General ! Hildyard at Estcourt by occupying Willow ■ Grange, where General Barton defeated them two days later. The organisation of a strong central column in the Cape and the formation of a 1 second strong column to form the western or flanking column for the relief of Kimberley is the only way to bring the war to a successful issue. Lord Roberts is evidently trying to organise two such columns, but time is pressing, as it is evident food supplies are running short in Kimberley, and perhaps this fact Avill compel Lord Roberts to risk an engagement before he otherAvise Avould if things were all right with Colonel KekeAvich. It is now time to give some thought to the forces that the Empire has available to r increase the forces in the field, and I will as briefly as possible place before my readers the strength of such, reserves as are not already employed. The British army on January 1, 1899, was made up *to a total strength of 229,987 officers and men, or about 20,000 men below the number alloAved by fcuv. During the year just closed the Imperial Parliament authorised an addition to this force to the extent of about 26,000 men, but there has been great difficulty experienced in finding recruits, and at the commencement of hostilities it is very doubtful if our entire army numbered 250,000 of all ranks and arms. These are at present distributed as folloAvs : — Regular garrisons in India, about 65,000 men ; troops in South Africa and on the Avay out, about 101,000 men ; troops at Gibraltar and other Mediterranean stations (including Egypt and Aden), about 15,000 men ; West Indies, Bermudas, and Canada, about 3500 men ; Asiatic stations outside of India, about 7500 men ; West Coast of Africa and Central Africa, about 2000 | men ; other outlying stations, about 1500 j men. United these make up a total of 195,500 men that are noAV on foreign service or placed outside the list of troops available for service, so that Aye have only 55,000 officers and men of all arms to draw from, if we alloAV that the army Avas recruited up to 250,000 men prior to the out■break of the Avar. To these must be added about 73,000 army reserve men and 30,000 militia reserve, or a grand total of 158,000 men. But at least 30,000 of these are unfit for South African service, being too young and otherwise medically unfit, so that, after deducting these, we find Aye have at present 128,000 of all ranks, including reserves of all classes, from which Aye can draw reinforcements for South Africa and provide garrisons for Home defences. It must be borne in mind that the forces in India are about 7000 men beloAv what has always been considered the minimum that

is consistent with safety. It may be necessaiy al any moment to raise the strength in India to the usual complement, and enough troops must be available at all times to incrca&e the garrisons at the Mediterranean stations by at least 5000 men, so that we may be called on for 12.000 of the 128,000 available at any time, thereby reducing our actual strength to 114,000 men to meet the demands made by the situation in youth Africa and man all the Home defences. The question now is, What proportion of this force is available at once, and ai hat additional forces are necessary to meet the lefjuirements of the Empire? For the purpose of airiving at the true condition of the military preparedness of the United Kingdom Aye have to mention 69,000 militia, 10.000 yeomanry, and 270,000 volunteers to arrive at the true strength of the country. But in order to be able to avail ourselves of the full value of these we must keep a fair proportion of regular tro jh at Home on which these auxiliary forces can be formed, consequently the balance of the eighth division and the ■whole of the ninth division as soon as mobilised — or a total of about 17,000 additional regular troops — 8000 yeomanry and 30,000 militia reserve are still waiting transports to take them to South Africa, or a grand total of about 53,000 men. These will all be required to bring the British forces up to the 194,000 as lecently cabled to be in the field by the end of this month. I am of opinion that the end of April will be nearei* the truth. Under extraordinary circumstances, of course, all of the 128,000 men of the army reserve and militia reserve would be despatched to the '■eat of war, leaving the defences of the United Kingdom to be looked after by the 30,000 young soldiers unfit for foreign service, assisted by the militia and volunteer forces ; but such a course would only be adopted as a last respurce. If followed out it would give us about 255,000 men of all arms in the field, after allowing for 33,000 colonial troops, or, in plain figures, the United Kingdom can place in the field a grand total of 222.000, after providing for all her garrisons in her dependencies. This grand total of 255,000 Imperial and colonial troops would have been more than enough had they taken the field three months ago. but I doubt the ability- of our generals to bring the war to a successful issue with that number of troops, shipped at the rate of 500U each week, for up to the present the killed, wounded, prisoners, and missing has taken fully 12,000, and deaths from disease and those unfitted for further service on account of sickness has reduced our army not a little, so that, after providing for garrisons and lines of communication out of the 255,000 men, we will find that it will be impossible to have 150,000 men actually at the front. And every mile the army moves to the north the fewer will be in the fighting lines. It is then Qf supreme -importance that the colonies send infantry battalions when their mounted forces are exhausted, and the sooner they are sent the sooner the war -will be over. February 14. There is absolute! y nothing to comment on in the cables save that Japan and other" Powers have consented to allow "Great Britain to acquire arms that were being manufactured to their order by British contractors. This marks a friendly feeling on the part of the nations concerned towards Great Britain. As a matter of fact the British Government have always retained the right to take possession of all ships and warlike stores, arms, etc., that were in course of construction within the confines of the Empire at any time for the use of her Majesty's forces if it Avere deemed advisable or necessary. The consent of the Power or Powers for which the weapons, ships, or munitions were being manufactured is only a matter of form, as the British Government would be justly entitled to take possession of such warlike material if the interests of the Empire required their retention for the use of our naval or military forces. The haste of the French Government in pushing the equipment of the French artillery with quick-firing cannon is a sign of the times that will need to be taken heed of, as it is very evident that France, like all other nations, has taken note of any points of British weakness. I am unable to form any correct views of the manoeuvres that are taking place in the Cape, as the news is too meagre to allow of any correct opinion being formed as to Lord Roberts's intentions. I am unable to say what portion of General French's division has been moved to support the western column until more definite information is available. I am of opinion, however, that every available mounted man has gone to the Modder River, and that Generals Kelly-Kenny and Gatacre are merely holding the enemy in check while Lord Roberts attempts to flank General Cronje and relieve Kimberley. The question of the hour is, Will it be another Kandahar? The writer has every reason to believe that the relief of Stewart was only second to the capture of Cabul, and that the renown of our " Bobs " will be increased tenfold by his defeat of the Boers at the Modder and the relief of Kimberley. The new military scheme as proposed by the Imperial Government seems to me to be altogether inadequate, and may be set down as merely playing with the question. The increase will give us a total of 924 field guns against the 5000 quick-firers of France or the 7000 quick-firers of Germany that are to be completed in 1902. I fiave been asked to believe that as a result of the lesson we are now receiving in the art of war that our statesmen would provide Mich additions and improvements in our military forces as would meet the conditions that exist to-day. But the proposals as outlined by the Right Hon. Secretary of War plainly indicate that the situation has not been grasped. The regulars are to be increased by 30,000 men, when we require an increase of at least 32,000 in our cavalry arm alone on a peace footing. Our horse artillery are to be increased by seven batteries, when 80 batteries should be added to bring our force up to a state of efficiency to enable us to hold our own in the event of war Avifck one of the Great Powers. Timiy-six

batteries of field artillery are to be added. T But the part of the scheme that is open to the seA^erest criticism is that relating to the yeomanry cir.d volunteer forces, as it is stated that they are to be hmted to train for periods of one and four months. ' Noav that Avorcl " invite " is not ({uite suitable for military organisation, as it does not convey to one the idea that the train- j ing can be enforced. It certainly leaves the , impression that men can choose for them- i selves Avhether they shall train or not, as ' may best mit their convenience. If this is all the improvement that is to result as the outcome of the avji- in South Africa, I must, hoAA-ever unwillingly I may be to own it, s-ay that I am greatly disappointed, as, j in common aa ith hundreds of other critics. ! I had hoped that the eyes of the blind would be opened, and tlmt the needs of the Empire for a properly-equipped and organised armj* on modern lines Avouid be recognised and provided for to uphold the dignity of our flag on land as our navy does on the &ci.=. ~ j February 15. ! The offer made by Canada to release the Fh&t Battalion of the Lehister Regiment (JOOth foot) from garrison duty at Hulifax, Nova Scotia, and to garrison the foitifications Avith Canadian militii", Avill giA'e about 900 additional troops for &en - ice in South Africa. The second battalion of this regiment (the 109 th Foot) is stationed at Barbadoes. The withdraAval of the Lein&ters would leave Canada -without a tingle battalion of British infantry, • an event that is worthy of note, ni it is the first time it has happened Mnce ihe coumry became a British possession. There vill be left in Canada three companies of dig Royal Garrision Artillery, tAvo companies of the Royal Engineers. Two companies of the artillery and tAvo of Engineers are at Halifax, and one company of the artillery at Escuiimault, Briti.-h Columbia. The withdraAval of the British forces from the vicinity of Coles-berg towards Rendsburg is probably caufed by the despatch of the cavalry of Central Fiench's division to the Modder; in fact. I expect the advanced portions of this division to fall back until they are in touch Avith the sixth division (General Kelly-Kenny's), as, ■ being Aveakened by the despatch of ,the cavalry, the diAdsion is in no condition to occupy an adA'ancad outpost. The number of offers of recruits for the army since Christmas is very gratifying. I hope the supply aaUI continue to be as good, as it speaks Avell for the patriotism of the young men of the United Kingdom. , It Avill be some months before the army is recruited up to the strength allowed by laAv, even if recruits keep on coining in at the same rate. It Avill be noticed that the Eight Hon. the Secretary of War stated on the 13th in&fr. that there Avere 109.000 regular troops still in the United Kingdom. These figures are tomeAvhat less than my estimate as given on the 14th inst., as I then gave the total number abroad at 195,000 men, and estimated the number at home at 128,000 men. or a grand total of 323,000 men, but in making this estimate I placed the regular army at 250,000 men. Taking the statement of the War Secretary, "hoAveA r er, it would mean that the actual strength of the regulars would be 239,000 men, or 11,000 less thin my estimate ; or, if the militia re c erA r e is added to the official estimate, I would then be some 21,000 below the actual strength. The War Secretary makes the total strength 239,000 men, exclusive of the army and militia reserves. If both of these are added the official figures make the three forces combined 19,000 in excess of my estimate. But my estimate of 270,000 volunteers and 66,000 militia exceeds by 8000 the official returns of 328,000 for the auxiliary forces. This shows that I under-estimated the total forces for offensiA-e and defensiA'e purposes by 11,000 men. In the official figures quoted, hoAveA r er, it Avill be rioted that no alloAvance is made for the medically unfit or for soldiers that are too young for seivice ; whereas my estimate allowed 30,000 men to be classed as such. The effectiA r eness of the proposed tAvo additional army corps must be largely judged from the standpoint of rapidity of mobilisation. It is absolutely necessary in these days to be able to strike quickly. During the late Avar betAveen Greece and Turkey the Turkish army surprised Europe by the rapidity j of its mobilisation, and its success may be traced directly to that feature of its organisation. It is only necessary to point out that it took 10 days after war AA'as de- 1 clared before the first division of Generol Buller's army corps was ready to embark for the Cape, and fully 50 days before the three full divisions embarked, although Aye had been assured that tAvo complete army corps Avere ahvays ready for active service whenever required. Noav, if such delay is necessary AA r ith our aimy corps, that are supposed to be on a Avar footing, lioav \ much longer Avill it take to get a corps j ready that is only on the peace establish- j ment? It matters little hoAV many army i corps we have on paper as a peace establishment if we have no transport Avaggons and animals to set m motion troops enough to hold the enemy in check until Aye can mobilise our reserve forces, and our reserves must be placed in such a state of efficiency to enable them to be fully equipped with all the necessary arms, munitions, stores, and transports, to take the field inside of seven days from the call to arms. It was all right in the fifties < of the nineteenth century to take months , to fit an army for the field, but hi these j days hours count for more than months < did under the old-time system in vogue inthe former great wars, in Avhich the British nation established itself as the foremost Power of the world. The call for more troops at the Cape is again heard. The correspondent at CapetoAvn of the Thunderer recommends that : 75,000 additional men be despatched. Blame the critics if you will, but Avhile you try to discredit the critics, slioav to the people if you can that their criticism has not been justified. February 17. The strength of the flanking force that the enemy are inovinjK through Zululaud^ i

judging by the number of guns with th<f column, must be at least 4000 -men. It is just possible that the main flanking force Avill come from the west, and try to obtain, , General Buller's rear by the Main road ' from Bethany towards Estcourt, but keeping off the latter place by Bushman's 1 RiA'er, striking into the Mooi Mountains by j way of Tabamhlope Mountain, and thence : south-east to Weston, on the north of the 1 raihvay. This position would giA r e the ' enemy control of the Avaggon roads leading from Pietermaiitzburg to Ladysmith, and the road from Weston to Greytown. So that holding Weston they Avould completely sever General Buller's lines of communi- ! cation Avith the sea, Aia Pietermaritzburg and Durban, and at the same time would enable General Joubert to threaten these two toAvns, as he did when he succeeded in occupying WilloAV Grange on November 23. This movement to flank General Buller may be looked for at the same time that the Boer column noAV in j Zululand reaches GreytoAvn. I am of opinion j that these flank attacks Avill not be made in a very strong force, but are only xmdertiken Avith the intention of Aveakening General Buller's forces and "drawing his attention to the south, while they once again attempt to reduce General White at Ladvsmith and force him to capitulate.. While this was evidently Joi berts intention, the change that has taken place on the" Avestern frontier may probably cause the Avhole plan to be abandoned. I have ulw.u s believed that if General White is oxmcated from the tight corner he is in his saviour must come as a A r ictor over the eiiuny in the Avest, for the key of the Avhole situ it ion is the Free State, the enemy's lire of retreat and base of supplies.-" ; This naturally brings us to look at the conditions that exist on the Modder and in the northern part of Cape Colony, and to ask what are the chances of success in that quarter? The presence of Fieldmarshal Lord Roberts gives a feeling of hope such as Avould scarcely be inspired if the chief command Avas held by any other officer in the service. We knoAV that British troops Avill do great things under any kina of leaders, but under " Bobs " they can and Avill do anything short of the impossible, consequently I look for the defeat of Cronje and the relief of Kekewich and his gallant troop at Kimberley, and in my opinion, based as it is on a. thorough knoAvledge of the enemy and their plans, I have no doubt regarding the raising of the siege of Ladys-mith if Cronje is defeated or forced to retire. > Zoutsspan Drift has once again been occupied b^ our troops. This is the drift that Avas seized by General Wood, of General French's division. This drift is situate on the Orange River, clo'-e to Ramah; about 30 miles east of the railvay. The occupation of this drift Avill enable the British troops Avho are guarding, the rai! r Avay to the south of the Orange River to move to their right and intercept any attempt of the' enemy's forces in the Gblesbnrg district from moving north and Avesfc to support Cronje in resisting Lord Roberts's attack. The cavalry under General French and tAvo brigades of Lord Roberts's army corps have moved to their right and effected >a. crossing of the Riet River some 20 miles to the east of its junction Avith the Modder. This Avould 2)] ace this body of our forces to the right of Jacob.~dal, in a country >v every way suitable for our forces ani in a position threatening the enemy's left flank and cutting his communications with Bloemfontein, thereby rendering Cronje's retreat nn that toAvn impossible if he should suffer a reverse. Judging from the position of affairs on the Modder I am of opinion that the whole of the troops availab!e from the lines of communication haA r e been hurried to the front and flanks, and that Lord Roberts intends to deliver one of those quick and decisiA - e bloAvs at the enemy that has marked him throughout his whole career. My advice is, Be of good cheer, and keep your eye on Roberts and his tactics on the Modder. His message to Mafeking promising speedy relief is a good omen for success, for Lord Roberts never boasted yet of anything he ever did or intended to do unless he Avas confident of the result. The Avithdravral of our troops from Colesberg is what Avas to be expected, as Avithoirt cavalry to "keep in touch with the ' enemy General Clements would find his 1 position untenable so far away from supports. It is all the more wise to retire in 1 vieAV of the great strength of the .enemy in. i the district. " There can be no doubt that ' recruits are rapidly -joining their- ranks, as the failure of General Buller to break the enemv's - cordon "about Ladysmith has given the Dutch rebels the lever they required to show their felloAV Dutch colonists how im- ■ potent England is to cope Avith the Boer armies. We are told that the passage of large bodies of troops through the Cape ' are impressing the Dutch. I should like ! to see more signs of this- in the actions of ; the Avhole Dutch population. I The criticisms of German and Austrian newspapers on die scheme to increase the

(British army point out that it is insufficient to meet the present crisis, and when they deem it below present requirements what tmusfc they think of our ability to meet the armies of a first-class Power. The advice they give regarding the necessity of a reorganisation of our forces is sound. Although I cannot agree that conscription is 1 desirable .or likely, yet I am of opinion that ■the whole forces of the Empire must be all funder the same regulations and subject to serve in any part of the globe, and that in- '] tetead of allowing war to come before we (prepare we must have everything ready, •not only for defence, but for attack if necessary. It is cheaper and certainly better in every way to carry a war into the enemy's 1 country so that the losses inflicted may fall ; iheaviest on the country with which we are at war. We have a taste of this in the Cape and Natal, and when the war is over .we will find the cost to be well up in the (millions for property destroyed and loss (through, the inability of the colonists to carry on their usual avocations. Had we carried the war into the enemy's territory from, the start there can be little doubt that the Orange Free Staters would have counted the ''cost of resistance too great and t desertions from their ranks would have been very numerous. ' I am well enough acquainted with the conditions that exist m the. Free State to say without fear of being, successfully contradicted that many rt/housands of the Free State burghers would Slave been on their farms now if our troops ihad entered that State at the start, as fully one-third of their number are opposed to the rule of the Transvaal. But as we gave them no chance to remain in quiet possession of their farms they were forced to fight us by their more hostile cotintrymen. Commandant De La Rey, of the Free State, who is now in command of the Republican forces in the Cole>berg district, is one of the most enlightened Boers the writer ever had the pleasure of meeting. I | spent a very pleasant; 48 hours in his home I in 1896, when on one of my visits to the i Free State. Mr De La Rev is of French i stock, and is very proud of it. He is a ' thorough gentleman. A graduate of Grey College, Bloemfoatein, he has occupied various positions of trust in the State, has represented Kronstadt in the Raad (i.e., Parliament), and has been a member of the Executive Council. February 18. The relief of Kimberley marks the beginning of the end of the war. The hand of the master, Field-marshal Lord Roberts, is plainly seen in the thorough oi'ganisation and rapidity of the movement that turned the enemy's position and cut off their retreat at the same time. From the little information we have we can form a very good idea of the position -of both •armies on the Modder, and I see little chance of Cronje being able to retreat, or still less that he can hold his present position, as o\ir troops hold the country to the east in such force that the enemy cannot retreat in that direction without coming into the veldt and risking an engagement with all the chances against them ; and to retreat to the westward is only to increase their difficulties tenfold, as every mile they travel to the wesfc means a mile nearer to destruction, as they cannot possibly carry off their guns and stores to the west. Lack of water would prevent them from doing so, even if they could exist without additional supplies of food and ammunition. I can now understand why Prieska Drift and all the drifts between that place and the enemy's right flank were seized by our troops, although at the time Prieska was occupied. I confess I did not understand the object of its seizure. It is now plain enough, however, as it shows that Lord Roberts was making arrangements to pre.vent the enemy from crossing to the south t>y way of any of these drifts that are between their right flank and Prieska on the Orange River to the west. In providing against the enemy retreating to the south and in flanking his position to the east Lord Roberts has shown the world once again that he is a master of his profession, for it may well be said that the masterly plans that brought about the fall of Kimoerly and the isolation of Cronje and his army from his capital is but another illustration of his ability to bring about the final overthrow of an enemy when everything seemed against success. It may be' well to note at this time that even the enemy, who have been well supplied with information regarding the movements of our troops, were unaware of the "withdrawal of Kelly-Kenny's sixth division from Rosmead' Junction and its presence on the Modder, and it is more than probable that the 45,000 troops said to be with Lord Roberts at that point are there, as lie has probably staked all on the success or failure of his efforts to beat and capture Cronje. What will Cronje try to do in the position he finds himself by reason of being cut off from support? Will he risk an engagement, or will he attempt to effect his escaj>e by moving to the north-west as rapidly as he can by abandoning his guns and stores? Or will he surrender? These are the three questions that the Boer general must have decided before Vih time; and, regardless of what he may determine to do, the case of South Africa for the 'Afrikanders has received a blow from which it will never recover, for whatever course he pursues he must leave or destroy his guns and stores, and even tf he should succeed in escaping with the bulk of his men .the moral effect of his defeat will be of immense importance to the British army, as the enemy will be disheartened beyond measure, and a disheartened army is an easily beaten one. With the relief of Kimberley must of necessity come the relief of Maf eking, as with Cronje's army either in retreat or captured the small forces of the enemy about Mafeking can easily be disposed of, even if they do not retire before a relief force reaches that part of the country. And ■with the raising of the sieges of Mafeking land Kimberley must come the relief of ■Ladysmith, as General Joubert's position on the Tugela cannot be maintained with a •victorious army, under Lord Roberts, advancing to capture Pretoria and the Boer arsenal. We may "expect to hear that General Joubert will try to collect all his available iorces to fall back and protect

his capital as soon as he hears that Lord Roberts has relieved Kimberley and is advancing through the Free State. The latest cables convey the intelligence that practically an understanding existed that the war was to be a fight between the Dutch and British in South Alrica. Thewords of warning that fell from the lips of Mr Balfour respecting the employment of natives by the enemy to fight in their trenches comes none too soon, and perhaps before long the restraining influence of Great Britain will be removed and Great Britain will advise and assist the natives to resist the Boers, who may raid their territories. This would let loose a horde of Zulus, Swazis, and Basutos on the Dutch. lam of opinion that this would be a dreadful state of affairs, but the Boers and their leaders are bringing it on themselves, and no other Power in existence, save Great Britain, would have tried to restrain these tribesmen from laying waste the enemy's country. Unfortunately these tribesmen, if once aroused, would be inclined to overstep all control, and massacres would likely result. I am, and always have been, a firm believer in the employment of Sikhs and Ghoorkas, not only in South Africa, but everywhere whenever the British flag is assailed' by our enemies. We should regard the employment of our- Indian soldiers as another link in the chain that binds the east to the west and the Empire in one common cause for one flag, one throne, and the advancement of civilisation. Crocodile Pools, where Colonel Plumer's Rhodesia Horse have been fighting the enemy, is situated between Gabevones and Ramontsa, on the Bulawayo railway, about 80 miles north of Mafeking, in Bathoen's country. This would place the Boers in the north between two British forces advancing for the relief of Colonel BadenPowell at Mafeking. The flying column for service in Zululand was despatched for the protection of Eshowe, and not as an expedition to cut the enemy's lines of communication. Eshowe is the seat of Government in Zululand, and there the commissioner resides and holds court. Eshowe has always been garrisoned by two or more companies of infantry from one of the battalions stationed in Natal, and as we are not informed what became of the garrison that held the place at the opening of the Avar, I presume they are still there, and that the flying column will reinforce them. The last news from Kimberley is very cheering, as it tells of little loss of life and the capture of the enemy's position, with his stores and ammunition. I can only add that the value of cavalry as an arm of the service has been well proved by the success of General French's advance. From the fir&t I have pointed this out. Well done, General French! I hope to chronicle your selection as a peer of the realm by our most gracious Queen. FeTSruary 19. Particulars concerning the advance of Lord Roberts's army state that the *troops experienced great difficulties from lack of water and want of transports, and the heavy marching necessary to carry out the movement successfully. Skirmishing between the retiring forces of the enemy and the British troops, resulted in considerable loss in the enemy's ranks by the fire of our artillery and infantry until General Kelly-Kenny's 6th Division occupied Jacobsdal, which was found to be full of wounded, including some British that had fallen into the enemy's hands at Rend&burg prior to General French's arrival. It seems strange that British wounded about Rend&burg should be moved to Jacobsdal by the enemy, as they must have suffered considerably on the road. The distance from Rendsburg to Jacobsdal is over 120 miles by waggon, or by rail to Edenburgh and thence by waggon it would be about 150 miles. Lieutenant-colonel H. A. Eagar, reported as having died of his wounds, was wounded and made prisoner during' the engagement at Stormberg on December 11, when General Gatacre's division was led into a Boer fr'ap. Colonel Eagar was in command of the 2nd Battalion of the Royal Irish Rifles — the old 86th Foot. It will be remembered that this regiment fought splendidly on that occasion. Colonel Eagar was born in 1853, and received his colonelcy in 1898. He had no previous war service. It is evident that the rapidity of General French's advance surprised the enenry at Rondesval Drift, and in their haste to get away they abandoned a large number of cattle and sheep, which fell into the hands of our troops. There is strong evidence that Cronje was preparing to retreat from Kimberley prior to the arrival of General French's troops at the place, as he found their trenches at Alexanderfontein evacuated, and of these the garrison of Kimberley, under Colonel Kekewich, took possession. The enemy evidently carried off their guns, and proba-bly a portion of their ammunition, but, either from lack of time or transport, they abandoned large quantities of stores and ammunition, which fell into the hands of the victors. From the information available it appears that in addition to General French's and KellyKenny's divisions General Tucker's seventh and General Colville's ninth divisions were engaged, General Kelly-Kenny's division flanking the enemy n'nd driving them across the Modder with great loss at Jacobsdal, where the Lord Mayor of London's Regiment of Volunteers took part in the fighting, while General Tucker, with liis seventh division, did a like service about 20 miles further south-east, in the vicinity of Komefontein, General Colville's ninth division folloAving up the advantage gained by General Tucker. The result of the relief of Kimberley and the breaking up of Cronje's army will very materially change the situation in South Africa. It will remove the interest that was centred in the doings of General Buller and his army to the west and cause the situation in the army under Lord Roberts to become the subject of discussion. Already it is asked what the next move of Lord Roberts will be, and what effect will the relief of Kimberley have on the situation in Natal. To these questions there appears to be but one answer, and that is that Mafeking will be relieved at once, and J that the mam body of our forces unjbv

Lord Roberts will move to the east and occupy Bloemfontein, some 90 miles east of Kimbcrley, capturing or driving before it such of the enemy's forces as may be overtaken en route, and at the same' time cutting off the Boers and their Cape allies from their base of supplies, thereby compelling them to retreat or surrender. Following the occupation of Bloemfontein by our Iroops, a retreat of the Boer army from Natal may be looked for, as the protection of Pretoria, with its stores of war-like material, foodstuffs, etc., will be of first importance to the enemy, and as a r&sult General Jouberfc will evacuate his position on the Tugelci and raise the siege of LadyMTliUl. Unfortunately for the British cause, our troops are not numerous enough to attempt to prevent a junction of the two retreating Boer armies that will be concentrated at or near Pretoria, for the first work that Lord Roberts will be called on to do will be the opening of the line of railway in his rear at Norvals Pont, and the defeat and capture of the enemy's forces in the northern districts of Gape Colony. He must despatch a relief column to raise the s-iege of jMafeking after providing troops to clear his rear and for the relief of Colonel Baden-Powell. It will be impossible for Lord Roberts to push north fast enough to prevent the junction of the enemy's forces under Cronje and Joubert, and we must zest content until reinforcements reach him both from England and Natal, via Van Reenen's and other passes, before he can proceed to attack Pretoria. It will require a great number of troops to hold the lines of railway open all the way from Capetown to the Vaal River and over the other lines that must, of necessity be held open for the conveyance of troops, stores, etc., before our army can attempt ; to enter the Transvaal. Had our troops j captured the enemy's artillery and de- i feated the Boer forces after a general engagement, the future would have been materially brighter. With Bloemfontein in his possession, Lord Roberts may be congratulated on having accomplished with little loss a work that has tried the best of all our other generals in the field, and the Empire as a whole may well rejoice that the campaign so unfortunately started has at last turned in our favour. Had we 75,000 more troops in South Africa, the war would probably be over inside of three weeks, as with that number of reinforcements our troops could follow Cronje and prevent Joubert from entering the Transvaal by seizing the railway anywhere north of Charleston in Natal. But with the forces at the disposal of Lord Roberts he will probably be unable to interfere -with Joubert's retreat until it is too late, and as a result the final act of the war will be the siege and capture of Pretoria. Taken altogether, the situation may be stated to be of the brightest. But that does not mean that our efforts to strengthen the British forces in the field should be relaxed, but to us it should act as a spur : to provide additional battalions, so that j no more delays may be necessary. It should be remembered that over 3000 miles of railway will have to be guarded, and that small detached bodies of the enemy will require to be hunted down and captured, and a regular watch will have to be | kepi on the rebels throughout the length and breadth of Mouth Africa. This will take a great many troops, not to mention j the numbers that will be required for the invasion of the Transvaal. In consequence of this the suggestion of the Spectator j regarding the inclusion of colonial and ; foreign legions in the Imperal army is one ' that deserves serious consideration. I Taking into account the fact that the several divisions of Lord Roberts's army ; have captured vast quantities of stores, j waggons, and munitions at various laager;-, the loss of 200 waggons by one of our < columns is of little importance, and it may ' be possible that these waggons will be re- j captured before they can be driven beyond the pursuing forces that are following the ; retreating enemy. Judging by the loss ex- i perienced by our troops that were escorting the convoy, they must have made a good stand-up' fight of it, and, although they lost, they deserve to be considered well of by Britons everywhere, as it is more then probable they fought overwhelming forces of the enemy at a great disadvantage. The retirement of our troops in the. Culesburg and all other districts in the north of Cape Colony may be looked for, ' as the departure of General French's ; cavalry and General Kelly-Kenny's division j has so* far weakened our troops in that part i of the country that Generals Gatacre and Clements Avill be forced to act on the defensive until Lord Roberts sends a force to assist them by occupying Norvals Pont, Bethulie, and Aliwal North, and then striking south, catching the enemy between two fires, after cutting all their lines of com- j munication. We may expect that ?s soon as Bloemfontein is in Lord Roberts's possession the trouble in Cape Colony will be easily settled, as in a week or two at most the enemy in the Cape will be out of ammunition. Many of the Cape Dutch j will probably now try to return to their _ farms, and claim to have remained loyal j subjects throughout the campaign. j The loss of horses by the Queenslanders is a very serious matter in itself, but it i also shows that the whole of our forces must be in a bad way for remounts. The sickness that is the cause of the loss may be expected to take place at this season owing to the great difference between the J temperature of the day and night. Unfortunately imported horses are more liable to suffer from this cause than the South African-bred animals, and consequently the enemy will not suffer nearly so heavily from this scourge as our mounted forces, the Boei horses being nearly all native bred. It is to be hoped the NeAV Zealand Contingent are not in the same condition as the Queenslanders. The capture of two companies of the j Wiltshire Regiment at Rendsburg and the j severe losses experienced by the Austra- j Hans show that the enemy in the Colesburg district are aware of the withdrawal of our forces, and that they mean to force our troops that are trying to hold the district out of it before other reinforcements arrive. The Wiltshires are the old 99tli

Foot. The 2nd Wiltshires, the old 62nd, is the first bfttalion of this regiment. The Worcestershire Regiment that held its ground against an attack of 4000 Boers lat Rendsburg is the old 36th Foot. The Ist battalion of the Worcesters is the 29th Foot. I MAJOR KENNEDY'S ARTICLES. '1O THE EDITOR. Sib, — Allow me to congratulate your valuable paper, and, through you, Major Kennedy, on the splendid articles by him on the South African war. I ha\e read every article, and, so far, everything this gentleman has prophesied has come true. He has said rex peatedly — and he voices the opinion of a great many people— that we should have sent a bigforce right through the Orange Free Slate to , Pretoria, when the Boers would have fallen away from Ladysmith and Kimberlev and • been compelled to fight us more in the open. \ We are simply whacking away at stronglyfortiSed positions at a great sacrifice of human 1 life without getting any " forrarder. It is time we attacked the Boers' weakest positions, which we can do in.ths Orange Free Stale. Mind, Ido not pretend to be an expert. I think, however, that this war is largely a game of mathematical skill, energy, and common sense—not forgetting mounted troops, — in which every citizen capable of doing- so has a right to express his honest opinion. But my object in writing is to heartily congratulate Major Kennedy on the prescience shown in his articles, and to express a hops that his strong 'appeal in 10-day's Times for even more men and more horses will be heartily responded to. The motherland with her daughters' aid, must win in the end. — I am, etc., Joseph Braitiiwaite. February 13.