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HISTORIC MEETING

By Winston S. Churchill XXVIII.

CHURCHILL MEMOIRS

Shaping Atlantic Charter

President Roosevelt told me at one of our first conversations that he thought it would be well if we could draw up a joint declaration laying down certain broad principles which should guide our policies along the same road. Wishing to follow up this most helpful suggestion, I gave him the next day, August 10, a tentative outline of such a declaration. My text was as follows: —

Joint Anglo-American Declaration of Principles

The President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister, Mr Churchill, representing his Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom, being met together to resolve and concert the means of providing for the safety of their respective countries in face of Nazi and German aggression and of the dangers to all peoples arising therefrom, deem it right to make known certain principles which they both accept for guidance in the framing of their policy, and on which they fiase their hopes for a better future for the world.

He would also add something to the effect that it was obvious that, the Soviet being a friendly Power, United States Government would be similarly interested in any similar conflict in the North-west Pacific.

First, their countries seek no aggrandisement, territorial or other. Second, they desire to see n 6 territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned. s '

Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live. They are only concerned to defend the rights of freedom of speech and thought, without which such choice must be illusory. • Fourth, they will strive to bring about a fair and equitable distribution of essential produce, not only within their territorial boundaries, but between the nations of the world. Fifth, they seek a peace which will not only cast down forever the Nazi tyranny, but by effective international organisation will afford to all States and peoples the means of dwelling in security within their own bounds and traversing the seas and oceans without fear of lawless assault or the need of maintaining burdensome armaments. Considering all the tales of my reactionary Old World outlook and the pain this is said to have caused the President, I am glad it should be on record that the substance and spirit of what came to be called the “Atlantic Charter ” was in its first draft a British production cast in my own words. August 11 promised to be a day of intense business. At our meeting in the morning the President gave me a revised draft, which we took as a basis for discussion. The only serious difference from what I had written was about the fourth point (access to raw materials). The President wished to insert the words “ without discrimination and on equal terms.” The President also proposed two extra paragraphs. Sixth, they desire such a peace to establish for all, safety on the high seas and oceans.

5. I think this is entirely good, and that we should associate ourselves therewith and endeavour to get the Dutch to join in full agreement, because either the Japanese will refuse the conditions the President prescribes —namely, continuance of the economic sanctions and no movement on the Japanese part and no invasion of Siam —or alternatively they will go on with their military action while lying about it diplomatically. In this case the conditions indicated by the final passage just quoted Lin paragraph 4J would come into play with great force, and tne full effect of parallel declarations could be re- ' alised. The Soviet Government should also be kept informed. it might be dangerous to tell the Chinese what we are doing'for them, though they might be assured m general terms that we have had their security in mind in all that we have done. . . .

To Mr Attlee 1 sent a comprehensive summary of ail the mam points under discbssion.

I had only finished dictating the telegrams about 2 p.m., and that I should have had in my hands witmn the next 12 hours the War Cabinet's most helpful reply reflects credit on all concerned. Support From Cabinet

I subsequently learned that my telegrams had not reached London until after midnight, and that many of the Ministers had already gone to bed. Nevertheless, a War cabinet mc.eting was summoned for 1.45 a.m., and there was a full attendance, including Mr Peter Fraser, Prime Minister of New Zealand, who was in England at-the time. As a result of a full discussion they sent me a telegram just after 4 a.m., welcoming the [Atlantic CharterJ proposal, and suggesting a further version of Point 4 (non-discrimination in world trade) and the insertion' of a new paragraph dealing with social security. Meanwhile I had heard that the President had accepted ail the amendments I had suggested to him on August 11. r * * * *

Seventh, they believe that all the nations of the world must be guided in spirit to the abandonment of the use of force. Because no future peace can be maintained if land, sea or air armament continue to be employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten, to use force outside of their frontiers, they believe that the disarmament of such nations is essential. They will further the adoption of all other practicable measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments. Completing the Draft

On August 12, about noon, if went to see the President to agree with him the final form of the Declaration, l put to the President the cabinet’s revised version of Point 4, out he preferred to adhere to the phrasing already agreed, and I did not press mm further on this point. He readily accepted the insertion of the new paragraph about non-discrimination desir e<l by the Cabinet. A numoer of verbal alterations were agreed, and th« Declaration was then in its final shape. JOINT DECLARATION BY THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER. August 12, 1941.

There followed a detailed discussion of the revised text of the declaration. Several minor alterations were easily agreed. The chief difficulties were presented by Points 4 and 7, especially the former. With regard to this, I pointed out at once that the words ■ “ without discrimination ” might be held to call in question the Ottawa agreements, and I was in no position to accept them. Mr Sumner Welles indicated that this was the core of the matter, and that this paragraph embodied the ideal for which the State Department had striven for the past nine years. I could not help mentioning the British experience in adhering to Free Trade for 80 yeays in the face of ever-mounting American tariffs. Mr Welles seemed to be a little'taken hack. I then said that if the words “with due respect for their existing obligations” could be inserted, and if the words “without discrimination ” would disappear, and “ trade ” be substituted for “ markets,” I should be able to refer the text to his Majesty’s Government with some hope that they would be able to accept it. The President was obviously impressed. He never pressed the point again. As regards the generalities of Point 7, I pointed out that while I accepted this text, opinion in England would be disappointed at the absence of any intention to establish an international organisation for keeping peace after the war. I promised to try to find a suitable modification, and later’ in the day I suggested to the President the addition to the second sentence of the words “ pending the establishment of. a wider and more permanent system of general security.” * * * *

The President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister, Mr Churchill, representing, his Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom,' being met together, deem it right to make known certain common principles in the national policies of their respective countries on which they base them hopes for a better future

for the world. . First, their countries seek no aggrandisement, territorial or otherwise.

Secondly, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely-expressed wishes of the peoples concerned. Thirdly, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they? will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them. Fourthly, they will endeavour, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for- their economic prosperity. Fifthly, they desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field, with the object of securing for all improved labour standards, economic advancement and social security. Sixthly, after the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want.

We then, on the same day, turned to the Far East. The imposition of the economic sanctions on July 24 had caused a shock in Tokio. It had not perhaps been realised by any of us how powerful they were. Prince Konoye sought at once to renew diplomatic talks, and on August 6 Admiral Nomura, the Japanese special envoy in Washington, presented to the State Department a proposal for a general settlement. Japan would undertake not to advance farther into South-east Asia, and offered to evacuate Indochina on the settlement of “ the China incident.” (Such was the term by which they described their six-years war upon China.) In return the United States were to renew trade relations and help Japan to obtain all the raw materials she required from the Southwest Pacific. It was obvious that these were smoothly-worded offers by which Japan would take all she could for the moment and give nothing for the future. Around our conference table on the Augusta there was no need to argue the broad issues. Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary.

August 11, 1941.

President’s idea is to negotiate about these unacceptable conditions and thus procure a moratorium of, say, 30 days in which we may improve our position in Singapore area and the Japanese will have to stand still. But he will make it a condition that the Japanese meanwhile encroach no farther, and do not use Indo-China as a base for attack on China. He will also maintain in full force the economic measures directed against Japan. These negotiations show little chance of succeeding, but President considers that a month gained will be valuable. I pointed out. of course, that the Japanese would double-cross him and would try to attack China or cut the Burma co'mmunications.' However, you may take it that they consider it right to begin the negotiations on these lines, and in view of what has passed between United States and Japan it will be necessary to accept this fact. . . . 4. At the end of the Note which the President will hand to the Japanese Ambassador when he returns from his cruise in about a week’s time he will add the following passage, which is taken from my draft:— “Any further encroachment by Japan in the South-west Pacific would produce a situation in which the United States Government would be compelled to take counter-measures, even though these might lead to war between the United States and Japan.”

Seventhly, such a peace should enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance. Eighthly, they believe that all the nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons, must come to the abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea or air armaments continue to be employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential. They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments. The profound and far-reaching importance of this Joint Declaration was apparent. The fact alone of the United States, still technically neutral, joining with a belligerent Power in making such a declaration was astonishing. The inclusion in it of a reference to “ the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny” (this was based on a phrase appearing in my original draft) amounted to a challenge which _in ordinary times would have implied warlike action. Finally, not the least striking feature was the realism of the last paragraph, where there was a plain and bold intimation that after the war the United States would join with us in policing the world until the establishment of a better order.

Copyright. 1950, in USA by the New York Times Compahy and Time, Ing, (publisher of Time and Life): in the British Empire by the Daily Telegraph. Ltd.; elsewhere by International Cooperation Press Service, Inc. World rights reserved. Reproduction in full or in part in any language strictly prohibited. ,

Tomorrow: Mr Churchill replies to a Russian demand for a second front.

Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/ODT19500322.2.60

Bibliographic details

Otago Daily Times, Issue 27345, 22 March 1950, Page 5

Word Count
2,235

HISTORIC MEETING Otago Daily Times, Issue 27345, 22 March 1950, Page 5

HISTORIC MEETING Otago Daily Times, Issue 27345, 22 March 1950, Page 5

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