A “RAMSHACKLE CAMPAIGN”

Otago Daily Times, Issue 26774, 18 May 1948, Page 5

A “RAMSHACKLE CAMPAIGN”

CHURCHILL MEMOIRS

Delays in Norway Offensive

By WINSTON S. CHURCHILL.

For many generations Norway, with its homely, rugged population engaged in trade, shipping, fishing and agriculture. had stood outside the turmoi, of world politics. It had been the policy of Germany for many years to profess cordial sympathy and friendship for Norway. In the closing years of the previous war some thousands of German children had found food and shelter wi.h the Norwegians. These had now grown up in Germany and many of them were ardent Nazis. There was also a Major Quisling, who with a handful of young men had aped and reproduced in Norway on an insignificent scale the Fascist Movement. For some years past Nordic meetings had been arranged in Germany, to whicn large numbers of Norwegians had been invited. German lecturers, actors, singers and men of science had visited Norway in the promotion of a common culture. All this had been woven into the texture of the Hitlerite military plan, and a widely-scattered internal pro-German conspiracy set on foo„. In this every member of the German diplomatic or consular service, every German purchasing agency, played its part under directions from the German Legation in Oslo. The deed of infamy and treachery now performed may take its place with the Sicilian Vespers and the Massacre of St. Bartholomew. The King, the Government, the army and the people, as soon as they realised what was happening,' flamed into furious anger. But it was all too late. German infiltration and propaganda had hitherto clouded their vision and now sapped their powers of resistance. Major Quisling presented himself at the radio, now in German hands, as the pro-German ruler of the conquered land. Almost all Norwegian officials refused to serve him. The army was mobilised and at once began under General Ruge to fight the invaders pressing northwards from Oslo. Patriots who could find arms took to the mountains and forests. The King, the Ministry and the Parliament withdrew first to Hamar, 100 miles from Oslo. They were hotly pursued by German armoured cars, and ferocious attempts were made to exterminate them by bombing and machine-gun-ning from the air. They continued, however, to issue proclamations to the whole country, urging the most strenuous resistance. The rest of the population was overpowered and terrorised by bloody examples into stupefied or sullen submission. . The peninsula of Norway is nearly 1000 miles long. It is sparsely inhabited, and roads and railways are few, especially to the northward. The rapidity with which Hitler effected the domination of Norway was a remarkable feat of war and policy, and an enduring example of German thoroughness, wickedness and brutality. Appeal -for Aid The Norwegian Government, hitherto in their fear of Germany so frigid to us, now made vehement appeals for succour. It was from the beginning obviously impossible for us to rescue Southern Norway. Almost all our trained troops, and many only half trained, were in France. Our modest but growing air force was fully assigned to supporting the British Expeditionary Force, to home defence and vigorous training. All our antiaircraft guns were demanded 10 times pver for vulnerable points of the highest importance. Still, we felt bound to do our utmost to go to their aid, even at violent derangement of our own preparations and interests. Narvik, it seemed, could certainly be seized and defended with benefit to the whole Allied cause. Here the King of Norway might fly his flag' . unconquered.

Trondheim might be fought for, at any rate as a means of delaying the northward advance of the invaders until Narvik could be regained and made' the base of an army. This it seemed could be maintained from the sea at a strength superior to anything which could be brought against it by land through 500 miles of mountain country. The Cabinet heartily approved all possible measures for the rescue and defence of Narvik and Trondheim. The troops which had been released from the Finnish project, and a nucleus kept in hand for Narvik, could soon be ready. They lacked aircraft, anti-aircraft guns, anti-tank guns, tanks, transport and training. The whole of Northern Norway was covered by snow to depths which none of our soldiers had ever seen, felt or imagined. There were neither snow-shoes nor skis —still less skiers. We must do our best. Thus began this ramshackle campaign. It was easy to regather at short notice the small forces for a Narvik expedition which had been dispersed a few days earlier. One British brigade. and its ancillary troops began to embark immediately and the first convoy sailed for Narvik on April 12. This was to be followed in a week or two by three battalions of Chasseurs Alpins and other French troops. Theie were also Norwegian forces north of Narvik which would help our landings. Major - general Mackesy had been selected on April 5 to command any expedition which might be sent to Narvik. Lack of Liaison

ing. I consider that the main landing force need only be small . . Lord Cork therefore resolved to take 350 soldiers who had been embarked on the Southampton and to organise that very night, the 14th, an assault with the marines of the Warspite, Southampton, Aurora and Penelope, and some of our disabled destroyers. He could not, however, get in tbuch with the Southampton except after some delay through the Admiralty, whose reply contained the following sentence: “We think it imperative that you and the general should be together and act together and that no attack should be made except in concert.” He therefore turned the Aurora into Harstad and led the convoy carrying the 24th Brigade, which was now arriving, into the harbour there. His escorting destroyers sank U 49 which was prowling nearby. Narvik Landing Urged Lord Cork now urged General Mackesy to take advantage of the destruction of all the German naval force, and land troops at Narvik at daylight on April 15. In the evening the general replied that the harbour was strongly held by the enemy with machine-gun posts. He also pointed out that his transports had not been loaded for an assault, but only for ail unopposed landing. He opened his headquarters at the hotel of Harsted, and his troops began to land thereabouts. The next day he stated that on the information available landing at Narvik was not possible, nor would naval bombardment make it so. Lord Cork considered that with the help of overwhelming gun-fire troops could be landed in Narvik with little loss; but the general did not agree, and could find some cover in' his instructions. From the Admiralty we urged an immediate assault. A deadlock arose be-, tween the military and naval chiefs. At this time the weather greatly worsened, and dense falls of snow seemed to paralyse all movement by our troops, unequipped and untrained for such conditions; Meanwhile the Germans in Narvik held our evergrowing forces at bay with their machine guns. Here was a serious and unexpected check. Most of the business of our improvised campaign passed through my hands, and I prefer to record it as far as possible in my own words at the time. The Prime Minister had a strong desire, shared by the War Cabinet, to occupy Trondheim as well as Narvik. This operation “Maurice,” as it was called, promised to be a big undertaking. According to the records of our Military Co-ordination Committee of April 13, I was very apprehensive of any proposals which might tend to weaken our intention to seize Narvik. Nothing must be allowed to deflect us from making the capture of this place as certain as possible. Our plans against Narvik had been very carefully laid, and there seemed every chance that they would be successful if they were allowed to proceed without being tampered with. Trondheim was, on the other hand, a much more speculative affair, and I deprecated any suggestion which might lead to the diversion of toe Chasseurs Alnins until we bad definitely established ourselves at Narvik. Otherwise we might find ourselves committed to a number of ineffectual operations along the Norwegian coast, none of which would succeed. It was decided by the War Cabinet to attempt both the Narvik and Trondheim operations. The Secretary of State for War with foresight warned us that reinforcements for Norway might soon be required from our army in France, and suggested that we should address the French on the point at a very early date. I agreed with this, but thought it. premature to approach the French for a day or two. This was accepted. The War Cabinet approved a proposal to inform the Swedish and Norwegian Governments that we intended to recapture both Trondheim and Narvik; that we ‘ recognised . the supreme importance of Trondheim as a strategic centre; but that it was important to secure Narvik as a naval base. We added that we had no intention that our forces should proceed over the Swedish frontier.

We were at the same time to invite the French Government to give us liberty to use the Chasseurs Alpins for operations elsewhere than at Narvik, telling them what we were saying to the Swedish and Norwegian Governments. Neither I nor Mr Stanley liked the dispersion of our forces. We were still inclined to concentrate all on Narvik, except for diversions elsewhere. But we deferred to the general view, for which thei'e was no lack of good reasons. The Army's Obduracy

On the night of the 16th-17th disappointing news arrived from Narvik, General Mackesy had, it appeared, no intention of trying to seize the town by an immediate assault protected by the close-range bombardment of tha fleet; and Lord Cork could not movo him.

My contacts with Lord Cork and Orrery had become intimate in the long months during which the active discussions of Baltic strategy had proceeded. Admiral Pound and I were both agreed from slightly different angles that Lord Cork should command the naval forces in this amphibious adventure in the north. We both urged him not to hesitate to run risks, but to strike hard to seize Narvik. As we were all agreed and could talk things over together, we left him exceptional discretion, and did not give him any written orders. He knew exactly what we wanted. In his despatch he says, “My impression on leaving London was quite clear that it was desired by his Majesty’s Government to turn the enemy out of Narvik at the earliest possible moment, and that I was to act with all promptitude' in order to attain, this result.” Our staff work at this time had not been tempered by war experience, nor was the action of the service departments concerted except by the meetr ings of the Military Co-ordination Committee, over which I had just begun to preside. Neither I, as chairman of the committee, nor the Admiralty were made acquainted with the War Office instructions to General Mackesy, and as the Admiralty directions had been given orally to Lord Cork, there was no written text to communicate to the War Office. The instructions of the two departments, although animated by the same purpose, were somewhat different in tone and emphasis, and this may have helped to cause the divergences which presently developed between the military and naval commanders.

Lord Cork sailed from Rosyth at full speed in the Aurora on the night of April 12, and approached the West Fiord, which gave access to Narvik, in the afternon of the 14th. He had intended to meet General Mackesy at Harstad. However, he received a signal from Admiral Whitworth in the Warspite, who had exterminated all the German destroyers and supply ships the day before, saying: “ I am convinced that Narvik can be taken -by direct assault now without fear . of meeting serious opposition on land-

Nothing I or my colleagues or Cork could do or say produced the slightest effect on the general. He was resolved to wait till the snow melted. As for the bombardment, he could point to the paragraph in his instructions against endangering the civil population. When we contrast this spirit with the absolutely reckless gambling in lives and ships and the almost fren« zied vigour, based upon long and profound calculations, which had gained the Germans their brilliant success, the disadvantages under which we lay in waging this campaign are obvious. (World Copyright Reserved)