REASON FOR ATTACKS

Otago Daily Times, Issue 24944, 17 June 1942, Page 5

REASON FOR ATTACKS

PROBABLY A DIVERSION (.N.Z.P.A. Special Aust. Correspondent) (.Rec. 1 a.m.) SYDNEY, June 16. The renewed large-scale Japanese attacks on Darwin are designed to check the Allies' growing offensive strength in the north. Tnis is the opinion of some military observers here. Others believe that the failure of the Midway Island scheme, with its primary purpose of cutting the United States-Australia supply line, has forced Japan to alter her plans, and that a direct attack on the North Australian mainland is an early prospect. Others again believe that the enemy raids on Darwin are a diversion to cover other activities, and this appears to be the most widely accepted view. Japan, from the day her campaign against the Netherlands East Indies ended, has been committed to efforts to occupy the chain of islands screening Australia's east coast—the Solomons, the Hebrides, and New Caledonia. Only then would she be in a position to launch a menacing offensive against Australia's sea lanes, combined with raids on Australian industrial centres. The establishment of Rabaul as the enemy's main southward base and the fortification of Sohana Island and Queen Carola Harbour, in the northern Solomons, confirm this purpose. Since the Coral Sea battle heavy land and air forces have been sent to strengthen the garrison at Port Moresby, thus threatening the flank of any Japanese advance. If Japan has been diverted from her southward drive when she could ill-afford to ignore Port Moresby, then she must admit to having lost sea. supremacy in the South-west Pscilic Darwin is only 580 miles from the important naval base of Amboina, and about 400 miles from Koepang. A Japanese fleet, moving on Darwin from these bases, might fully exploit the element of surprise, and would be unlikely to encounter any powerful Allied naval task force. But even the successful occupation of Darwin at this stage of the Pacific war would not be of a strategic importance comparable with the occupation of Port Moresby and strongly-held New Caledonia. A direct attack on Darwin now would be an admission of comparative weakness, which the cunning enemy is unlikely to make. • In Australia, as well as in America, publication of the details of the Midway Battle is in danger of being followed by another drift towards complacency. Decrying ill-conceived statements that the initiative m the South-west Pacific has already passed to the Allies the Sydney Sun to-day says in an editorial: " The two latest Pacific naval battles have proved one thing alone—that land planes are superior to naval planes, for which reason the United States needs more island bases in the Pacific. Japan, owing to the foolish complacency which presented her with the Marshall and Caroline Islands in 1920 and to the initiative which gave her control of the Philippines, the East Indies, Guam, Wake Island, the Solomons, New Britain, the Malayan Archipelago, and even part of New Guinea, is now sitting pretty against an Allied offensive which has not yet bsgun. It.is surely premature to talk about the initiative. Australia is still very much on the defensive, but it is a defence becoming more and more powerful and bold. Continued enemy raids on Darwin, and even on other northern centres, can be expected in reprisal for the damage Allied aircraft have been doing to the enemy-occupied bases north-west of Australia. They may have an additional important purpose in diverting attention from more vital moves."