VALUE OF TURKEY

Otago Daily Times, Issue 23945, 21 October 1939, Page 12

VALUE OF TURKEY

IN BALKAN STRATEGY IMMOBILISING NEAR EAST NAVAL BASES FOR ALLIES Turkey’s position in the Peace Front is a topic of vital interest in Mediterranean strategy, stated a writer in the Melbourne Age recently. Assuming her adherence to the Peace Front, what part can she play in an AngloFrench scheme of defence against a thrust to the East by an Axis Power? Her real strength lies in her army, bred from incomparable fighting stock But the chief advantage to the Peace Front is a naval one. The British Navy can use the harbours of Asia Minor participate in the defence of the Dardanelles, and operate from an assured base in the /Egean Sea. After an interval of 19 years Turkey has linked herself by an alliance to Great Britain and France. Such alliance has, been possible not so much because of any subtlety in Western diplomacy as by reason of the logic of events. Turkey will not be fighting for this or that ideology, nor for the imperishable tradition of democracy. But Turkey needs years of peace for the reconstruction of Asia Minor and the restoration of Anatolia tc its forgotten place as homeland of the Turkish race. To achieve this end Turkey requires the help of older industralised countries, and. according to all available evidence, is resolutely determined not to be absorbed into the “ Lebensraum ” of a predatory empire. Harbours for Our Fleet It was Italy which forced upon Turkey her changed diplomatic role. Despite the blandishments of Germany, British experts believe that she is now firmly knit into the Western alliance system. The bombardment of Corfu in 1923 was a warning to the Ottoman Power of the “ Dynamism ” at work in the Mediterranean. Taking her first step away from isolation, Turkey concluded a 10-year pact of security with Great Britain in 1926. Italy’s reaction was a series of conciliatory moves, which culminated in a pact of friendship in 1930. The next phase in Turkey’s conversion opened with the Abysinnian war. Turkey (now a League of Nations member) joined in sanctions, and early in 1936 both she and Greece placed their harbours at the disposal of the British Navy. More recently the disquieting precedent of intervention in Spain increased the Turks’ distrust. The Spanish War also brought the forging of the Axis. Now, Turkey had grounds for fear on two fronts —in the Balkans from a predatory Germany; along her sea coasts. Finally, the successive annexations of Czechoslovakia confirmed her course.

Turkey was gradually moving from her earlier position of national solitude. The Balkan Entente of 1934 followed the appearance of Nazis as a potential menace in the Danube basin. Three years later Turkey linked herself by treaty with the countries lying to the east—lrak, Iran, and Afghanistan. In 1938 came a special treaty of mutual assistance with Greece, and. finally, the pact with Great Britain, followed by that with France. Her Own Conditions Still bent on the regeneration of Asia Minor in a world of peace, Turkey has in some degree imposed her own conditions upon.the West. Her quid pro quo for supporting Great Britain during the sanctions period was the return of the Dardenelles to full Turkish sovereignty and their opening to the navies of the Black Sea Powers. The present treaty with ‘ Britain was preceded by a substantial credit of £16.000,000, and is to be followed by another, and possibly larger one. France, on her part, has had to agree to the return of the Hatay, the old Sanjak of Alexandretta. At the same time the safeguarding of peace and the status quo has not been lost sight of. Her independent negotiations with Egypt recall the ancient bonds uniting the two countries in the task of internal consolidation. Her Balkan problem is found in the recent rumours that Turkey was completing fortifications on the Bulgarian frontier.

In war. the gain to the Peace Front is negative rather than positive, but significant in a very real sense. A German break through in Rumania to the Black Sea, or through Greece to the would lose much of its terror when the Bospherus. the Dardanelles and the whole of Asia Minor could be mobilised in the Allie?’ plan of campaign. Anatolia would be practically impregnable. But the Turkish difficulties in any plan of co-operation are those of an unindustrialised country. Turkey’s vast mineral resources have hardly been exploited. There are assembling plants, but no native armament industry. The big iron works at Karabuk are to open this autumn, but the iron ore deposits are 1000 kilometres away along a singletrack railway. Turkish railways are mainly of single-track construction, and few roads exist for heavy military traffic. Highly-trained Army About 250 machines represent the front-line strength of the Turkish Air Force. Turkey’s highly-trained army is her strength. She could probably put into the field 30 or 40 divisions, well supplied with light equipment. British and Turkish missions have been deciding how best Turkey could be armed with heavy equipmenttanks, anti-tank guns and artillery. Re-equipped, the Turks could hold the Thracian front alone, and immobilise in the Balkans a considerable proportion of the enemy’s forces. But from the naval point of view the chief advantage of the AngloTurkish alliance is the fact that the British Navy could use the harbours of Asia Minor and operate from an assured base in the Aigean. The Turkish Navy could do little rnoie than patrol its own coasts, although_ Turkey s submarines—which are still, ironically enough, being delivered by Germany —could do useful work around her own shores.