THREAT TO EUROPE

Otago Daily Times, Issue 23505, 20 May 1938, Page 9

THREAT TO EUROPE

MUSSOLINI’S POLICY ANGLO-ITALIAN AGREEMENT IMPERILLED FRANCE IN A DILEMMA RELATIONS WITH BRITAIN (United Press Association) (By Electric Telegraph—Copyright) LONDON, May 19. (Received May 20, at 0.30 a.m.) The diplomatic correspondent of the Associated Press says that the anxiety over the course of ItaloFrench relations is based on the conviction that II Duce is attempting to drive a wedge between Britain and France. Under such a threat Britain cannot remain passive. It is considered that, _ if Britain joins the French against the dictators, the Anglo-Italian agreement will be rendered not worth the paper on which it is written, and Mr Chamberlain will have to face an outcry to the effect that Mr Anthony Eden was right. This might prove a fatal blow to the Government. France’s dilemma Is equally serious. Her Government is not strong and cannot close the frontier because of pressure from the “ Left, ’ while pressure from the "Right” prevents increased intervention. Moreover, if the Government attempts to close the' frontier, this action will be followed by street disturbances and stay-in strikes. Meanwhile, arms and aeroplanes are now reaching General Franco in such a way that it is impossible for the non-intervention officials to check them. Reasons for Irritation Signor Mussolini’s irritation is ascribed to four reasons: — The Italian public’s lack of enthusiasm at Herr Hitler’s visit to Rome. He feels that, despite the AngloItalian agreement, sections of the British press are still antagonistic to Italy. He is angry because the Spanish Government has not yet fallen. He is annoyed at the United States War Secretary’s speech against the dictators. The diplomatic correspondent of the Manchester Guardian says that Signor Mussolini’s speech at Genoa was one of the most menacing he has yet delivered. “He threatens the Western Powers with disaster, not only in his attempt to place a wedge between Britain and France, but in his demonstration of renewed Ger-man-Italian solidarity in the firm resolve to secure victory for General Franco and establish themselves permanently in Spain. The speech imperils the Anglo-Italian agreement, which is meaningless unless the Italians withdraw from Spain. Certain British quarters attempt to excuse II Duce’s action, saying that he must be certain of a Franco victory before he can dissolve the Ber-lin-Rome axis. This is entirely disingenuous, but there is reason to fear that he will continue not only to justify his speech, but to cover intensified Italo-German intervention, which may even become quite open.”