APPRENTICES’ ACT.

Otago Daily Times, Issue 20501, 31 August 1928, Page 2

APPRENTICES’ ACT.

BREACH OF CONTRACT.

The judgment of Mr Justice Ostler in the case in the Supreme Court in which an apprentice named Kenneth James Riddle sued Chas. Begg and Co. for £502 special damages and £75 for general damages, on a claim arising out of an apprenticeship agreement, has been given. Plaintiff was awarded £5. At the hearing Mr R. S. M. Sinclair appeared for the plaintiff and Mr W. G. HAy for the defendant. After reviewing the evidence, lus Honor said that the first cause ot action was an allegation that the defendant company broke the contract by putting it out of their power to perform it. The third cause was based on an allegation of wrongful dismissal, and an agreement to compensate for such dismissal. The third cause was based on an allegation or agreements by the defendants to terminate the contract and to pay compensation. With regard to the second and third causes of action, his Honor said that he would say without hesitation that they had not been proved. They depended entirely on Mr Baylee’s recollection of the telephone conversation with Mr Ritchie on March 7. He was satisfied that Mr Ritchie never intended to give notice of dismissal, and never made any agreement that the contract should be determined at the end of 14 days, and that compensation should be paid. He merely said that they had only another 14 days of work in the trade, and if it eame to determining the contract he thought it just that compensation should be paid, but that the amount would then have to be fixed by the directors. On these two causes of action the plaintiff's case must fail. Dealing with the first cause of action, tht first question which arose was whether the defendant company committed a breach of contract. In his Honors opinion they did. The defendant company itself realised' that it was unable to perform its contractual obligation, because it made strenuous endeavours to find some other employer to take over its liabilities under the contract, even going so far as being prepared to pay for the service. It was impossible to determine from the evidence the exact date of the breach, but in his opinion it took place when the unfinished work left by the dismissed journeymen was completed, and when, after a reasonable time, the defendant company failed to get gome other employer to take the plaintiff. The next question was whether the breach was an essential breach:—one which went to the root of the contract —and give the plaintiff the right to treat the contract as void. He held that the breach was an essential breach. But the breach of an essential term of contract did not of itself void the contract. It merely renderered it void at the option of the injured party. That party could, if he liked, notwithstanding the breach, elect to keep the contract alive. But in that case he kept it alive for the benefit of the other party as well as his own. He remained liable to all his own obligations under it, ahd if while the contract remained in force the breach was effectively remedied, then the injured party had lost his right of voiding the contract, and had no other remedy but an action for such damages as he could prove lie had suffered by reason of the past breach. That is what happened in this case.

Another question which arose was whether the plaintiff could sue in a civil court for damages for the breach of a contract. At common law an apprentice could apparently sue for damages for wrongful dismissal, though in that case the‘measure of damages was his actual loss down to the date of bringing the action, and no more. His Honor could find no case in which an apprentice had sued his master for damages for failure to teach, though there were instances of actions by an apprentice’s father on this ground. There were, however, authorities to show that if a muster relinquished a branch of his trade that amounted to the discharge of the apprentice, though if the business was simply diminished in extent, provided that the master remained able to carry out his obligations to teach, the apprentice was hot discharged. His Honor could sec no reason in principle why an apprentice, if ne could sue for damages for wrongful diemissal, could not also sue for damages for failure of the master to teach him for a limited time. He thought that right must have existed at common law The question was whether the fight had been taken away by “ The Apprentices Act.” 1923.”

After reviewing the Apprentices Act at length his Honor said he was doubtful about the matter, and therefore must hold that those rights had not been taken away, and the plaintiff therefore retained his common law right to sue for a breach of this contract.

Concerning the question of damages, ms Honor said that in his opinion plaintiff had suffered very little damage indeed. Such damage as he had suffered was hard to estimate, and he was unable to see any satisfactory basis upon which he could award him more than nominal damages. His Honor fixed the damages i}t and gave judgment for plaintiff lor that amount, with costs.