THE LAW OF LIBEL.

Otago Daily Times, Issue 20086, 30 April 1927, Page 10

THE LAW OF LIBEL.

Thb jury’s decision in a libel action that was hoard in tho Supreme Court at Christchurch this week was strictly in accordance with a principle which has been laid down in the English courts and which can hardly fail to commend itself to tho judgment of reasonable minds. The action was brought by the engineer of the Lyttelton Harbour Board, who claimed damages in respect of the contents of certain letters published by the defendants, the Christchurch Press Company. These letters were alleged to be defamatory and to be detrimental to the professional reputation of the plaintiff. Tho defence to the claim mainly consisted in tho plea that the criticism contained in tho letters was directed against tho policy of the Harbour Board, and that tho plaintiff was only indirectly implicated in tho necessary course of statement and argument. The criticisms, it was contended, were of tho nature of fair comment and free from malicious intent and unjust imputation. Mr Justice Adams, in summing up, drew attention to the clear distinction between those matters of libel which relate to the public interest and those which are devoid of general import. More latitude is allowed m the discussion of public affairs than is permissible when personal considerations are exclusively involved. His Honor pointed out that the right of comment on public subjects, common to every individual and newspaper in the British Erapiie, carries with it the right of comment on the action of officials engaged in such a capacity as that occupied by the plaintiff in this particular libel action. It is a sine qua non, however, that the comment shall be honest and free from malice. Everything turns on the issue of “fair comment.” In tho case against the Press Company the jury decided that the condition of fair comment had been fulfilled, and judgment was entered for tho defendant. Without concerning ourselves with the mass of complicated and technical details involved in the suit we may remark that the general principle enunciated by the judge and followed by the jury is obviously sound. It would nut be in conformity either with common justice or witli the interests of the community if newspapers were to bo subjected to such restrictions a.s would be imposed on them if it were held that the publication, without malice, of a criticism of the policy of a public body, based on the recommendations of its executive officers, exposed a journal to the liability of being mulcted in damages.