THE IMPERISHABLE STORY.

Otago Daily Times, Issue 19013, 8 November 1923, Page 8

THE IMPERISHABLE STORY.

LORD FISHER’S CHANGE OF VIEW. LEAVES THE WAR COUNCIL. THE SECOND VOLUME OF WINSTON CHURCHILL’S MEMOIRS. Copyright. Rights of Production Acquired by the Otago Daily Times. IV. I had now become deeply interested in the Gallipoli enterprise, and nothing hut new facts and reasons, the merit of which might convince me, would turn mo from pressing it forward. At the same time, while giving decided orders and allowing no doubt or uncertainty to appear in the Admiralty attitude. I was careful to preserve tho means of breaking off the operation, if it began to miscarry. First Lord to Lord Kitchener. January 20, 1915. Until the bombardment of the Dardanelles forts has actually begun, we cannot ’ tell how things will go. We must guard against the appearance of a serious rebuff ; and we shall therefore at the outset only use the battleships needed for the initial stage, keeping the rest of the fleet, spread between Malta. Alexandria, ■ and Alexandretta, whence they can concentrate very quickly. It is also very desirable that the Alexandrctta operation should be so timed as to be practically simultaneous with tho attack on the Dardanelles so that if we are checked at the Dardanelles wo can represent that operation as a mere demonstration to cover the seizure of Alexandrctta. I believe that aspect is important from an Oriental point of view. Could you. therefore, arrange this, and let me have your Alexandrctta dates? We aro aiming at February 15 for opening fire on the Dardanelles. , , PS.—I am sending a copy of this to ~ the Prime Minister to keep him informed. It will be seen that the genesis of this plan and its elaboration were purely naval and professional in their character. It was Admiral Carden and his staff gunnery officers who proposed the gradual method of piecemeal reduction by Jong-rnngo bombardment. It was Sir Henry Jnckfbn and tho Admiralty staff who embraced this idea and studied and ’approved its detail. Right or wrong, it was a Service plan. Similarly tho Admiralty orders were prepared ex olusively hy the Chief of the Staff and his • assistants. I outlined the resources at ’our disposal in the old battleships. But ‘f was the Staff who proposed the addition of the Queen Elizabeth, with ail the possibilities that that ship opened out. .It ’was the First Sea Lorcf who added the ’ other two most powerful vessels, the Lord Nelson, and the Agamemnon, to the Dar danelles fleet. At no point did lay or civilian interference mingle with or mar the integrity of a professional conception. I write this not tin the slightest degree to minimise or shift my own responsibility. But this was not where it. lay. I did not and I could not make the plan. But when it’had been made by the naval authorities, and fashioned and endorsed by high technical authorities and approved by the First Sea Lord, I seized upon it and set it on the path of action; and thereafter •espoused it with all my resources. When others weakened or changed th°!r opinion without adducing new reasons. I held them sfronglv to their previous decisions; and so. iii view of the general interest of the Allies. thrust the business steadily forward into actual experiment. FISHER BECOMES ANXIOUS. Up to about January 20 there seemed to be unanimous agreement in favour of the naval enterprise against tho Dardanelles. War Office, Foreign Office. Admiralty seemed by their representatives to be equally in earnest. The War Council had taken its decision. Meanwhile the possibilities of a British naval offensive or of amphibious action in northern waters were becoming continually more remote. This made me only the more anxious to act in the Mediterranean.- It was only direction in which we had a practical plan, properly worked pvt by the Staff, and supported” by a powerful consensus of naval and political opinion. As soon, however, as the Commander-in- , Chfef realised that the Queen Elizabeth, a battle-cruiser, and other powerful ships were fo he assigned to the Mediterranean theatre, lie began to dwell again upon the weakness of his fleet and the insufficiency of his margins. And now for the first time he found a ready listener in the First Sea Lord. Lord Fisher’s sudden dislike of the Dardanelles project seemed to arise at this time largely and even primarily from his reluctance to undertake the bombardment and blocking in of Zeebrugge. This operation appeared all the more necessary now that the army had abandoned their intention of the coastal advance. It was strongly urged by the War Council, by the Adtnfralt- Staff, and especially by Sir Arthur Wilson.. The First Sea Lord, finding himself entirely alone on the question, became very much disturbed. His dislike of the Zeebrugge operation was extended not only to the Dardanelles plan, but to all plans of naval attack on hostile coasts which ’were not combined with large land forces, and ultimately he expressed opinions which seemed opposed to any form of naval intervention in any quarterj This was a . great change, at variance both with his earlier and later attitudes, and I was concerned to, observe it. The First Sea Lord could not in his heart feel at all anxious about the Grand Fleet margin. He knew* that I knew his real convictions about it. He did not attempt to continue the discussion on a false basis, but he expressed an intention of not attending the War Council, which was fixed for the next day—the 28th. This was, of course, impossible. I insisted that he should he present, and arranged for a private meeting for both of us with the Prime Minister before the council. To this Lord Fisher consented. SILENCE OR RESIGNATION.” . We repaired accordingly to Mr Asquith's rbom 20 minutes before the War Council was to hieet. No written record of this discussion has been preserved, but there is no dispute about it. Lord Fisher indicated very briefly his objections to both the Zeebrugge and Dardanelles schemes, and indicated his preference lor a great operation ia ..the Baltic or for a general iltlvance of the army along the Belgian coast, with strong naval support. Lord Fisher, say the Dardanelles Commissioners, “did nor criticise the attack on the Gallipoli Peninsula on its own merits. Neither did he mention lo the Prime Minister that be had any thought of resigning if • his opinion were overruled.” Phis is quite true. 1 contended that both Zeebrugge and the Dardanelles schemes should be undertaken, but that if either were to be dropped it would be Zeebrugge, to which tho First Sea Lord seemed more particularly opposed. The Prime Minister, after hearing both sides, expressed his concurrence with my views, and decided that Zeebrugge should but that tho Dardanelles should go' forward. Lord Fisher seemed ou the whole content, and I went downstairs with biin under tire impression that all was well. . /The. council was already waiting. Colonel Hankey's record of the discussion which followed has already been made public in the Report of the Dardanelles Commission. This record does not, however, complete file story. During the council an incident occurred which has subsequently obtained tntich publicity. Here is Lord Fisher’s own account: — Ninth Meeting of War Council, January 28, 1915, 11.50 a.m. (Note.—Before this meeting the Prime ■ Minister discussed with Mr Churchill and Lord Fisher the proposed Dardanelles ■ operations and decided in favour of con- : sidering the project.in opposition to Lord Fisher’s opinion.) i " ’ Mu Churchill asked if the War Council attached importance to the proposed 1 ‘Dardanelles operations, which undoubtedly involved risks. Lord Fisher said 1 - had understood that this question was not to bo raised at this meeting. The Prime Ministof knew his (Lord Fisher’s) views on .the subject. • ' The Prime Minister said that, in view Of’what had already been done the question could not he left in abeyance, c-' (Note. —Thereupon la rd Fisher left the, Council table. He was followed by Lord ’Kitchener, who asked him what he intended to do. Lord Fisher replied to Lord Kitchener that he would not return to the Council table, and would rcsbnr his office as First Sea Lord. Lord Kitchener then pointed out to Lord Fisher ;h»t he (Lord Fisher) was the only dia-