THE FAILURE OF GENOA

Otago Daily Times, Issue 18592, 28 June 1922, Page 8

THE FAILURE OF GENOA

GLADNESS IN THE UNITED STATES.

Written for the Otago Daily Times

By Frank 11. Siuonds. WASHINGTON, May 19 The refusal of the American Government to attend the Conference at The Hague is a logical and natural expression of the attitude both of the Administration and of the country in the matter of Red Russia. Any other course would have been a reversal of all previous action and would have provoked wide-spread criticism in the country at large. Before Genoa the feeling was strongly against participation in any European Conference and particularly in any conference having the Russia problem as its main topic. The failure of Genoa only further fortified this nationwide feeling. Since the failure was not only expected but foretold by the Secretary of State in his refusal to participate, American opinion was little stirred by the collapse. Actually, our view was a curious combination of two things. In the first place, as a consequence of the Washington Conference, the American opinion was overwhelmingly critical of France. In any other circumstance our support would have been for the Lloyd George proposals because they were opposed by the French. But in the case of the Russians, wo thought substantially as did the French. The position taken by the Belgians and defended by the French was quite in accord with -official and unofficial views in this country. From the start to the finish the mass of the American opinion was dead against any concessions to the Soviets unless the Soviet representatives were prepared to forswear the principal articles in the Communistic faith. Fortunately for us, we are able to view the whole Russian question in the abstract. We do not need Russian trade. If it is true that not a few financial interests would like to participate in the exploitation of Russia and share in the bestowal of concessionsAit is equally true that there is no public iSitiment in the matter. Wo have, for example, no /demand on the part of Labour or Liberals such as there is in England, first because Labour does not exist politically, and second because there are no Liberals. In the main, we feel that the Soviet system is' a challenge to our whole economic and'political life, - and the bulk of the country would like to see the thing fought out, not with arms, to be sure, but by every other method. Unless the Russians are ready to come in and accept capitalistic principles, the United States believes that all dealings with them are futile and even dangerous. In general, there is the feeling that if no money is now lent to the Soviets and no credits extended, sooner or later the whole tiling will come down with a crash. Now, given that general state of mind, most Americans viewed with regret, and even displeasure, the enormous efforts of Mr Lloyd George to bring about some arrangement between the Reds and the other European nations predicated upon great concessions to the Reds. A certain impatience was to be detected in many places at what seemed, if not a betrayal of principle, at least a consent to dangerous expediency. When, in the face of vast concessions, the Russians became more and more exigent, declined to recognise property rights, while demanding billions of largess, most Americans remarked, “I told you so,” and felt that their Government had' been well inspired in staying away, and that the best thing Europe could do would be to follow our example and let the Reds stow in their own juice. Unmistakably that opinion remains dominant to-day. We are essentially reactionary. Economically, our views are pretty close to those of France. We have no radical party, no labour politically strong; we feel that the whole Russian revolution is -a fundamental menace; arid we are under no real temptation to risk much to get a little trade or a few concessions. Actually we don’t believe in the trade, and believe even less in the concessions. So you see, we believe that Mr Lloyft George was wrong about Russia in hfe whole Genoa performance. We are also satisfied that M. Poincare was wrong about all else, and, while we sympathise with the Poincare position as .to Russia, we are prone to suspect that he took it for tactical purposes We are then frankly sorry that M. Poincare won, and disappointed that Mr Lloyd George was beaten, but we think Mr Lloyd George deserved defeat by getting down on hie knees to the Reds. The British and Italian insistence upon the necessity of getting Russia back leaves us cold, because ws think everything depends on the way Russia comes back. In any event, we are not going to help to raise money to buy Red assent to . economic programmes in which property rights are left out. To put the thing bluntly, most Americans feel that the Reds are indulging in a familiar form of blackmail, and the Italian and British domestic political conditions help them. My friend Sir Philip Gibbs eagerly inquires in his American articles whether the United States is going to assist Europe in restraining France. The answer is in the negative. Genoa has done much to prevent, this. We are out of sympathy with French ideas, but we are almost as much out of sympathy with British ideas as expressed in the Russian negotiations. Above and be yond all else, wo are determined not to assist in restraining anybody. For a quarter of a century, at least, we are quite cured of European adventures. Genoa, following the Anglo-French fighting in Washington, and confirming all tho impressions derived from Paris, has had a profound influence upon the mass of American opinion. The whole European affair seems inexplicable, irrational, and profoundly foreign to all our own ideas. To us the spectacle of great nations, which are facing life and death problems of food and employment, squabbling over Issues we do not understand and therefore ignore, suggests collective madfiess and imposes complete isolation. You will be mistaken if you attach to the words of our bankers now in Europe any representative significance. A few bankers in New York do think internationally; their livelihood is as much concerned in Europe as in America; but this is true of only a few, and it has no wider meaning. Above all, they have no political influence, they cannot control executive or legislative action, and they find it extremely difficult to obtain a hearing. To sum up, the mass of Americana are glad, that Genoa failed, not because of any personal interest or partisanship, but because they believe that the underlying conception was totally mistaken. They loathe Lenin and Trotsky, and they detest all the Soviet gospel. They believe that, as long as, these loaders and these principles prevail in Russia, all negotiation is folly and all hope of trade is. nonsense. To speak frankly, the whole Lloyd George performance seems a political manoeuvre, an effort to meet a domestic situation, and a carefully and wisely-planned attempt to deal with an enormous problem in a fashion promising to yield permanent results. You summarise it all if you say that we disapprove of Franco but. agree with, her main contentions at Genoa, that wo sympathise with British ideas generally, hut deplore Mr Lloyd George’s Genoa course.