CONSTANTINOPLE

Otago Daily Times, Issue 17902, 6 April 1920, Page 6

CONSTANTINOPLE

, WHAT ITS FUTURE MEANS TO GKJSAX JJRiIAIN.. Ono of the most perplexing and delicate problems now belore the Paris Conference is that relating to the future of Turkey (says a speoiai representative of the London bunday limes). In one sense the problem may be said to bo of a more restricted nature, and to refer principally to the future of Constantinople. "Vet, by a curious paradox, as an AngloIndjan official of high authority pointed out, this restriction is regarded in certain circles as giving a much wider significance and importance to the point at issue. It involves considerations of vital niomemt to the tranquillity of India, and, indeed, of the Islamic world. "So far as Turkey in Europe is concerned," said this official, "there are two policies before the Paris Conference. The first may be described as the 'bag-and-bag-gage' policy. By this, of course, is meant that the Turk should be bundled out of Europe, and that Constantinople and tho Dardanelles should be internationalised or, at anyrate, removed absolutely and for all time beyond the control of what remains of the Ottoman Power. "The second policy is not so drastic. Its advocates, while favouring the partition of l\irkey-in-Europe, urge that Constantinople should be respected as the recognised centre of the Moslem faith.. They urge also that the Sultan, as the recognised head of that ftuth, should be allowed to remain in the ancient capital, but be shorn of all temporal power so far as the old territorial possessions of the Turkish Empire in Europe are concerned. "His position, in fact, according to their plea and reasoning, should be somewhat analogous to that of the Pope of Rome. Constantinople would correspond to the Vatican. "What the Paris Conference—and Great Britain in partioular—have to consider is the probable effect on the Moslem mind, not merely of the disruption of tlie Ottoman Empire, but of any. real or fancied insult to_ the heart and head, of the Mohammedan faith as represented by Constantinople and tho Sultan respectively. OUR MOSLEM SUBJECTS. "In this connection it is important to remember that tho so-called historical argument—in other words, that Moslems as a whole are not deeply interested or concerned in the future cither .of Constantinople or of the Sultan—does not now apply. Certainly it does not aoply with anything like the force it did 20, 10, or even five years ago. "Within the last few years a most significant and momentous change has occurred in this respect _ throughout the followers of Islam, especially in India. How far a similar change has taken place, or might take place, among the millions of Mohammedians in other parts of the world, but more particularly within the British Empire or the spheres of our influence—as, for example, Egypt and the Sudan—it is difficult to say. BOLSHEVIST INFLUENCE. "What is the cause of this remarkable chango in tho attitude of Islam towarck Constantinople? Are its effects likely to be grave and far-reaching?" With, reference to these questions, it was remarked: "While various causes have been operative, so far as India i 9 concerned I am strongly of opinion that the main cause ol Moslem unrest is directly attributable to tho influence of Bolshesvist propaganda. It is a great and a very serious error to suppose that Bolshevist propaganda is always of the same colour. "Rather should it be likened to a chameleon. It adapts its colour to its environment. In other words, it disseminates one doctrine, one codo of principles, in the West, but another and widely different doctrine or code in the East. "So far as one can judge the aim of Bolshevist propaganda in tho past has teen and is to imbuo tho Moslem mind with the idea that the Allies, and Britain, in parkular, contemplate tho perpetration of a great and .lasting insult to their creed and to tho titular chief of their faith. If matters come to a crisis the Moslems might prove more loyal to the Caliph tlian to tn" British Government or tbo Allies. "The Turks, as we know, are astute diplomatists. They are not likely to be blind to the advantages to them of the unrest among the Moslems in India. They may be hoping that India's danger-factual or imaginary—may prove to bo Turkey's salvation.

Anyway, in deciding finally upon the terms to be imposed upon Turkey—and' in 110 J loaty the future of Constantinople and Win spiritual as well as tho temporal status of the SJultan, as Caliph, will bo an integral ami most inorncntous part—tho three Groat 1 overs— v \ntain, France, and Italy—with whom tho final decision will rest, will (loi.;.)tlpßa be extremely careful to avoid taking , lny g U , p wlfich m j^ it preGJpitaj . 0 ft clanpjrous enais in the Far as well as the Middle. East, TJI.K SOLUTION. "The most satisfactory and, in the circumstances, tho safest solution of tho problem, would appear to lx> the adoption of the second polxy, , ; ith«r in its entirety or with shght modifications. A third policy, urged by a few extremists, is hardly likely to commend itself to tho Ooaiferonce. " It postulates tho maintenance of the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. That is clearly impossible. As Mr Ijioytj George said, we do not wish to d'smember Turkey simply for the sake of diememberment. Di-membermcnr, is imperative tor the sake of the safety of Enrope, especially of the Middle East. " After all, there is nothing inconsistent with President Wilson's Fourteen Points and the undertakings of the Allies, as expressed in the terms of tho armistice, involved in the adoption of the second policy I have indicated. The rights of minorities mil bo amply safeguarded; an important waterway will be controlled internationally; and, if properly handled, what has hitherto been a source of constant unrest will be eliminated."