NOTES ON THE WAR CABLES.

Otago Daily Times, Volume 17149, Issue 17149, 31 October 1917, Page 5

NOTES ON THE WAR CABLES.

By Siiuapnel. THE ATTACK AGAINST ITALY. It is now stated that tho Italians are checking tho AuslrorGerman advance, mid that General (.'-adorna will inako a stand on tho Tagliaiuunto, 6U milts west of the Jsonzo. It .seems that the Italians wore panio-strickeii by the tactics employed by the Germans, and it is & peculiarity that trusted <uid controlled by their oilicers panic is contagious. Where tho troops are wholesouled in their patriotism and are well trusted and controled by their officers panic can bo prevented. Something went very seriously wrong, however, with a corps of the Second Italian Army. The excuse is made for them that they were- surprised through tho Germans using a new variety of gas, and through a turning movement being carried out in a fog, and that treachery and poltroonery were afoot. Excuses are always ma<Jo on such occasions, and treachery is generally alleged against some one or other of the units and tueir commanders. Probably all these three factors contributed) to the defeat of ,tho Italians, but it is also probable that the Germans frightened tho Italians by their leaping and ruahing tactics. Part of German tactics in attack is to produce psychological effects—that is, to produce a state of nerves amongst their opponents by tho instrumentality of noise and density of numbers in the first line or column of those attacking. All the soldiers are ordered to roar, yell, and shout crios of victory, and to fire their rifles from tho hip, and rounds from every gun brought as close as possible behind tho advancing forces aro fired with as much rapidity as is possible. Tho trick was worked in France when the Germans were advancing on Paris, and in some places with effect. It was tried against the British, but did not impress the soldiers oE the incomparable "First Hundred Thousand."

It has been said that the staying power of tho soldiers of tho British Expeditionary Forces did-a great deal to free the French from the impression of the invincibility of the German attack—an impression which it is believed, lingered in France since 1870. In tho early days of the war, it should also be mentioned, tho Germans used masses of cavalry in some such manner as to produce a deep impressive kind of thundering tread of great masses. Apart from the well-devised Gorman plan of turning the Italian line from • the north, tho fact that, as is now known, the Italian forces are ■still more numerous than those of the enemy, suggests that something other than tho pressure of tho enemy forces must be set down as the cause of the Italian debacle on the Middle Isonzo.

Pressure and the psychology of noise do not supply the whole explanation, and it is probable that the excuse of treachery will be found to hold good. Sinister underhand methods are being actively employed by Germany in all the allied countries. Tho instruments are to be found in the social and religious elements that constitute all states. Those influences have- been worked, and are being worked, in Italy, France, Ireland, Quebec, South Africa, and even in Australia. What Germany is insidiously, unscrupulously, and even boldly trying to produce is social and religious disintegration in the very midst of the Allied States. From what she has engineered amongst the ignorant masses of Russia, thrown off their mental balance by their freedom from the bonds of autocratic tyranny, Germany has learned a new and even moro dangerous way of defeating the Allies than by the number of guns and tho weight of her masses.

GENERAL CADORNA'S OPPORTUNITY

'lliere should be no need for tho ltuhans to withdraw so far west of tho Isonzo us the Ta-gliamcnto if tho Italian commanders can heal tho breach and if tho morale of the Italian soldiers has noi. been sapped by the blows the Austro-Germans have dealt them. The Italians iiave sufficient men to meet any forces the Central Powers can throw against them. What they now require is a largo number of guns and munitions from France. Tho Allies can spare them. After they have been put on the railways they can be carried to tho Italian front in less than a day. It is known that Parmeso violets have been put on a train one day, carried through France, and sold in London the next day. To set down behind tho fighting lino in Italy gains from once they aro on the train, should therefore' not take more than a day.

If thcro is any valid reason why General Cadorna should retiro to tho Tagliamento line it can only bo because of a sad lack of guns and munitions. Matters should however not be as bad as that. By their hurry and rushing tactics the Germans may have overrun tho constablo and may have to pause until their heavier metal, munitions, and food supplies are brought up, and their new communications are organised and depots oro established. By retiring to the Tagliamento General Cadorna is abandoning a lateral railway which will be of great strategical importance to the Germans, and would be of great value to tho Italians tactically if they held it. Certainly, if General Cadorna can completely rely upon the leadership of his generals and upon the bravery of his troops, it would be good strategy to draw tho enemy as far as possible into the plains, if only they would continue their rushing tactics, and then turn upon them with all his forces and overwhelm them on tho Italian side, where they- could be caught like rats in a trap. In that case it would bo a good plan to infect tho enemy with the idea that his weakness compels him to retire to the Tagliamento ; but to do that he would require to have a very largo army in the northern corner to watch for a chance of cutting tho Austro-German communications at the Pontebba, Plocken, Predil, and Tarvis passes.

It would have been a good plan on General Cadorna's part if, when ho., suspected that tbe Germans and the Austrians were concentrating east of the Julian Alps, he had, as the French did at Paris, prepared a fresh army to strike at tho flank of the advancing forces. It is possible for him to attempt that now, before the enemy can direct forces in that direction. With courage and enterprise tho Italians could give the enemy a ''quid pro quo," for the communications of tho Italians are good, while those of the enemy aro much inferior, and the Austro-Germans are at the present time far from good bases of supply.

Before the enemy can push much farther into Italian territory new and well-equipped bases will have to be established. It would have a serious effect upon the invading forces of the enemy if tho Allies would combine aerially to raid tho two railways and tho narrow valley which constitute the main and few communications of tho enemy. Theso railways and roads must now bo highly congested with munition and food convoys. Tho bridges over tho Isonzo could also bo attacked by airmen. It will be surprising if tho Italians are not endeavouring , to use this means of defence. THE YPRES FRONTS. Sir Douglas Haig's latest report seems to convey the hint that operations in Flanders may shortly be abandoned on account of the weather conditions in Flanders. If so tho enemy will rejoice, for the position of tho French and British is not n. good one. Possibly, however, Sir Douglas communication is meant to deceive the enemy. An ordinary map, showing tho physical features of tho country, would load one to conclude that it is impossible for the Allies to settle down where they aro. Tho French have made a bad salient on water-logged ground, and north of Ypres tho British occupy bad country. To tho east and! south-east of Ypres the Germans occupy certain vantage points which taetically,:.thoy must not bo allowed to retain. Retilars is tho logical iwd stratcg-tcal objective '•> bo attained on tho north-oast, and tho Honthulst Forest must be cleared and Stadon and Clerckcm reached. Above all. the Germans v/ill have to bo given no rest on tho west front during winter.