NOTES ON THE CABLES.

Otago Daily Times, Issue 16673, 19 April 1916, Page 5

NOTES ON THE CABLES.

Br Shbapnkl. THE GERMANS STILL ATTACKING VERDUN. There has been a heavy attack on the French positions north of Verdun, the lino of battle extending from the Meuse to Douaumont, This seems to contradict the hints which German papers have given of the abandonment of the attempts to take Verdun, but it is to bo noticed that, in view of the Allied offensive, Verdun is a very useful position 'for launching attacks on the. direct communications with Germany. It is an ideal place from which to launch air raids against the railway stations, bridges, and junctions between Verdun and Belgium. Whilo the Frenoh hold such a strong and dominating* " point d'appui," the Germans taking the offensive in the Champagne, or being compelled to moot a strong offensive on tho part of General Joffre, would bo in a continual state of distraction and trepidation about their linos of service north of Verdun. To attack in the Champagne or bo compelled to meet a 6trong attack there the Germans would have to deplete their forces north and east of Verdun, and as tho French, thanks to the British extension of their lines to Arras, now have amplo reserves to leave a strong force, at Verdun as a threat against the flank of any German forces engaged in a deo.sive' battle further west. Tho last attacks havo been severely defeated. All that the Germans have got fof their pains is a few yards of trenches somewhere near ChafTour Wood. It now appears that tho French are defending their lines more with multiplied machine guns and quickfirers than with numbers of men. That is the correct answer to the intensive bombardments with heavy artillery. A. few machine guns and mitrailleuses well placed can effect the destruction that whole b.utalions with rifles , might do. Tho intervals between tho positions oan be so considerable -as to leave plenty of room for the heavy shells of the enemy to explode harmlessly as far as life is concerned. A recent French communique says that the French positions round Verdun are defended by innumerable machine guns, and that the supply of ammunition is ample, and has been always sufficient. That has been General Petain's policy throughout, and the greatness of the German losses and the disproport.onato losses of the French are explained by such tactics. There seems to be a tendency on tho part of the Germans to develop somo heavy assaults to the south of Verdun. As was pointed out previously, it would be a sound military plan if the Germans were to widen tho St. Mihiel salient' 1 at the expense of the French south of Verdun. In to-day's cables it is reported that there have been attacks by the enemy upon the Frenoh positions at Moulainville, Haudiomont, and Les Eparges. All these points are close to the St Mihiel positions on the northern arm of the German salient. Les Eparges is a position on that arm. About the end of 1914 it was gallantly wrested from the Germans, but at considerable cost. The value of the position may be judged from the repeated attempts the Germans have made to dislodge the French. Ite value lies in its altitude. From it the. heavy French guns can bombard the railway and road communications in the immediate rear of the village of St. Mihiel. Tho French positions south of Verdun are very strong. To attack the French lines the Germans would havo to climb the steep escarpments of the Woevre Heights and push their way up deep narrow gorges that havo been cut into the chalky formation of the hoights, On tho spurs abovo the French could, with machine guns, block the watercourses with German dead. Such an episode has already taken place. The Germans must still place very high importance on the taking of Verdun, if they are preparing attacks from the 6outh. . Their losses will be tremendous if they undertake such attacks, whik toe French losses, owing to the topography of the positions that they occupy will be very light. All that can be surmised from the continuance of the attacks on Verdun is that the German forces must still 'be ample for their offensive, and that they are determined so to narrow the Verdun salient that tho position will have to bo abandoned by tho Frenoh. Another conclusion is possible, and that is that the Germans are not yet certain what part of the Frenoh line constitutes General Joffre's centre, and that they are trying to make him disclose his hand. At the same time it is the Gorman hope that, while they are preparing for a sudden attack elsewhere, failing an attack by General Joffre, a very large part of the French forces may be pinned down on the Meuse. For a successful threat against Paris or the great concentration camps and supplies of the French, however, the Germans must obtain possession of all the lines of the Upper Meuse. If experts have not been sadly astray in their calculation of the German reserve forces, such an attempt will be impossible to the enemy.

THE COMING STRUGGLE WITH RUSSIA.

Judged by tho anticipations of military critics in Petrograd, and by references in the cables, a gigantic struggle is in the course of development along the Dwina. Spring rapidly scize6 the land in Russia, and tho effects of the .heavy thaws should now be diminishing. Rain showers come from the North Sea during this month and during May, but 60uth-west winds also prevail, whioh blow from the heights of Southern Germany. These winds are dry, and soon reduce the extent of the marshes. From now onwards the ground under foot should be becoming favourable for traffic. The wind and the heat of the Russian late spring and summer soon dries the light, porous soil, just aa heavy showers soon convert it into a spongy quagmire. Luckily, the dry weather in the late spring and summer are continuous for long spells, and if the Russian arrnies are as well equipped as frequent I advices have informed the world, General | von Hindonburg will have some considerable trouble in forcing the passage of the Dwina. His purpose is to capture Dvinsk and turn the pos.tion of the Russians at Riga. The Russians, who seem to bo well advised of his, intentions, are striving to clear the country south and west of Dvinsk. It is not unlikely that a German Baltic squadron will co-operate with the left flank of the Germans in their attempt to capture Riga. These fleet preparations have been made by the Germans during the winter, and the Russians will havo some difficulty in combatting the combined attaok of the German navy and von Hindenburg's loft flank. The netting of the in v tornational waterway between Denmark and Sweden is part of tho scheme connected with tho future operations of the German Baltic fleet, or of that portion of it which is apportioned to assist von- Hindenburg. The object of the net is more to prevent British submarines entering the Baltic to assist the Russians than for the protecting of freighters between Sweden and Germany, though if effective, it will well serve both purposes. The Russians, having such a danger thrr-ntpnin? their right flank, will strongly reinforce their positions between Riga and Dl.c will Jaunch their main efforts in the regions of Lake Nartoch.' The Germans are aware that their weakness lies between Dvinsk and the Pinsk marshes, and have been constructing railways and roads to enable them quickly to transmit extra support to these sectors. If the Russians can hold their own in tho north, and give most of their attention to tho left centre and their left flank attacks, any great success obtained in Volhynia or Galicia would have greater and far reaching effects. In the summer both the Italians and the Russians will be attacking strongly and simultaneously, and it is difficult to see how Austria can sustain the strain on both 'fronts. If the Aijstrians are thrown out of Eastern Galicia, tho Russians may yet get the assistance of Rumania, and the destruction of the Polish

salient will follow. Should that happen, tho Germans will be compelled to fall back from Polesia to the. Vistula, and further defeats of tho Austrians in Northern Galicia will turn the Vistula line and compel the Germans in the Baltic provinces to retreat. Very bitter fighting may, therefore, bo presently in operation from Bukowina along the Sltrypa and down tho Styr towards Chartorysk. THE CAUCASUS CAMPAIGN. Whatever causes led. to the withdrawal of the Grand Duke Nicholas from tho German front, from his past accomplishments and his present successful strategy in tho Caucasus regions, it cannot have been a lack of strategical ability. Ho is still the great outstanding figure amongst the Russians. In most difficult country traversed by a maze of mountain ranges almost all as high as tho New /Zealand Alps, he has accomplished what was never expected of him, and that at a time when Russia was said to bo crippled through want of munitions. All his work —whether in the west of Russia or in the Caucasus —proclaims him the equal of any general that Germany has produced. His misfortunes were tho result of those behind Jiim and not the result of want of military ability. Besides tho nature of tb» country in Armenia, tho climatic conditions under which ho has been moving and fighting aro similar to those that exist in winter in tho Alps of Switzerland and worse than those in tho greater part of the Carpathians. How ho maintains his supplies ,in such a badly-roaded country is almost past understanding. Tho advance of the Russians along the Black Sea ooaet towards Trebizond, although only about 40 miles as tho crow flies, is equal to an advance of 200. miles in ordinary country, and that advance bids fair to become a olassio in military undertakings. The Russians are now within 16 mile 6 of Trebizond, and another column advancing up the Ohorok Valley is pushing forward to junction with a force" advancing from Erzerum upon Baiburt, on the Trebizond road. When Baiburt is in the Russian hands the road over the Paryadrcs Mountains is open, but the pass will have to be I forced, and tho Turks will defend it desperately.

Everywhere else the Turkish fosses, though fighting bravely, have W.n broken and dispersed by the Russians, who are pursuing the "elements." The defeat south of Bitlis should open the road to either of the important centres of Diarbekir or Mosul, and the straits of the Turkish forces should compel a withdrawal from the Bagdad regions; but as the operations thero are against the British, and the Persian Gulf is tho goal of long-cherished Gorman ambitions, it will be found that the German officers in command at Bagdad will hold the Turks to their work there in epit© of the Turkish necessities nearer home. News of the Russian successes should, however, if known, have a greatly disheartening effect on the Turks in Mesopotamia.