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NOTES ON THE GABLES.

B? Shhapnel. THE ATTACK ON VERDUN. From Paris comes the statement that tho impression exists that the German offensive at Verdun is finished. Tho tapering off process has been in evidence for some time. Ono of the boasts of the Imperial Chancellor was that Verdun would show tho enemy whether tho German strength was becoming exhausted. If thfe opinion of the Daily Chroniolo's Paris correspondent be correct, and if tho signs deduciblo from the nows cabled during the last four weeks have been rightly read, then, inasmuch as tho German attacks upon Verdun were, according to the Imperial Chancellor, to b&a proof of German ability to carry things through to a successful issue, and it is a fact that tho attack has failed in its ostensible purpose, the statement . that Germany's strength is failing must be true. Again, if tho considerations which led to tho initiation of the attack were dynastic and internally and externally political, they were of great moment, and the failure must be admitted to bo a proof that the prognostications of Hilaire Belloc and the French were near the mark. These critics argued that at the normal rate of wastage of from 200,000 to 250,000 a month Germany's reserves would bo exhausted before next September. During one month only did tho rate fall below this figure, and that was in January, when the German losses were between 30,000 and 35,000. In February and March to the normal rate must be added the enormous losses round Verdun. The decline of the attack into a desultory mode of warfare, therefore, unless there is something behind the minds of the' German strategists beyond what has been stated, must be an unfortunate augury for the power of Germany to resist defeat at the hands of the Allies when they strike with all the energy they have been accumulating for the past year. Against these considerations may be put tho theory that the attack upon Verdun lias been made to draw the Allies and to force General Joffre to show his hand. As is known, both General Joffre and Earl Kitchendr are military mathematicians who will do nothing that savours of guesswork or rashness, and there is little doubt that they both anticipated the German attack upon Europe and that the plan they are now working upon was thought out ■ long before the war broke out. If any persons knew that Britain would be drawn into the war, and that the whole complex plan of the Germans was aimed at the destruction of the British power, Lords Roberts and Kitchener were tho men. Whatever the British Government might do while shortsighted persons were in political control, the leading military authorities of the Entente were not caught unawares. The German General Staff would give much to know when and where the allied blow will fall most heavily. It may be that, knowing the inflexibility of the two great military leaders of the western Allies, the German staff elected to accept at Verdun the sacrifices which they deemed would be well spent if the plans of the Allies were unmasked. Failing the realisation of their hopes in that respect, there would still be a chance of obtaining the advantages that accrue from a sudden and sharp offensive— tho traditional method of the Prussian.. ,By surprise attacks on a heavy scale and by ejecting the Allies from certain valuable points of advantage, the Germans may also have hoped to confuse the schemes which have been carefully worked out by the Allies for taking the offensive. In to-day's cables accounts are given of fighting west of the Meuse. Those attacks by tho Germans, judged by their intensity! and the description given of them in the French communiques, would eeem to disprove the impressions that the offensive at Verdun has terminated; but it is not unlikely that these severe and heavy attacks are the last despairing test 3 of the French power of resistance. Germany can__stiH strike heavily, but she has left it somewhat late to do so now. To strike at France, as she did at Russia, is an impossibility. The Allies on the west are now too well supplied with artillery, munitions, and men.

■ A STRAW IN THE WIND.. You moist not believe all you read in the German Press. Things! are' better than stated in England. There have been no disturbances, except small butter riots. The police are very watchful. The people are angry thjit good food is supplied to the prisoners .at Ruhlebon, and threatened to attack the camp. The police were provided with machine-gun protection. Such is a portion of a letter written from Berlin, and published in the London Times on the 6th. In the cablegram it appears insignificant Read carefully it smaoks of an attempt to suppress idiomatic German composition, and it attempts to express in a subtle, but "really a clumsy manner that tho British prisoners are being better looked after and better fed than the German people. At the same time it pretende to give the good advioe which tells the British not to rely too much on stories about food riots; but the writer contradiote himself when he says the police are very watchful, and that tho people are angry, etc. Why should the police bo very watchful if the riots are unimportant? It is known that butter and milk are very scarce, and that potatoes are much less plentiful than they ought to be owing to the greed of the producers. Hugb quantities that were stored in order to get high prices became unfit for consumption. It is also known that tho crop was not as good as was expected. There are also enforced , upon the people two fatless and two meatlesa days in the week, but it ie probable only the' artisan class that are severely restricted in that. respect. Still it is probably true that it is chiefly the quality of the food, rather than the quantify, that is affecting the lower orders of Germany. The iwliee were supplied with machinegun protection, th'j inference being that the machine guns were to preront the populace from attacking the prisoners. The people must be becoming fairly wolfish, if they were reduced to such an unnatural state of ferocity that would goad them to attack prisoners. If that letter be, as suspected, a German production, it is a sign of fear of reprisals for the brutal usage that the world knows has been meted out to the unfortunate British prisoners, and it is also probably an inspired letter, and betrays a fear of the results of the coming offensive on the east and west fronts.

PRUSSIAN DIPLOMATIC CUNNING. The Times's correspondent at Bucharest states that Bulgarian-Rumanian relations have become strained, and telk a tale about Count Tisza (the Hungarian Premier) trying to provoke a conflict between Bulgaria and Rumania. The story is hardly credible. King Ferdinand of Bulgaria is said to have interviewed the Kaiser in regard to tho project of Bulgaria retaking the lost portion of the Dobrudja, but failed to gain tho Kaiser's favour. It seems to be a elim Prussian diplomatic scheme to curry favour with the Rumanian people. Count Tisza is not a fool. It would bo an act of folly for the Hungarians to provoke a conflict between Rumania and Austria's ally Bulgaria. It would suit the policy of the Allies admirably if ho did so,

THE CAUCASUS. The Russians are within 20 mOes of Trebizond, and on the Trebizond-Erzeroum road in the Upper Chorok basin. Tho Turks aro fiercely trying to 6tem the Russian advance from tho sooth over the mountains towards the port. Reinforcements from Gallipoli have arrived, and with them, German officers. Tho attacks of tho Turks aro part of the German policy of taking the offensive as the best means of defence. It is to be hoped that tho Russians .are of sufficient strength to renow tho offensive along tho coast, where they aro apparently held up. It is to bo hoped that the advance of the Russians in tho Chorok district will be

maintained. Once tJie Rnasians have oamplete command of the road, tho fall of ( '! Trobizond will soon foDow, as the defences A 1 of the port will be compelled to fall back .. '1 to protect their communications. The tall of ' ' a Trebizond will releaee Russian troops fojr ;> I operations against Erzmgun, and a threat :.;\ in that direction after the capture of such a useful port as Trebizond will help to -j relievo tho pressure of the Turks againet ' ' \j the British in Mesopotamia. ' 'j

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Bibliographic details

Otago Daily Times, Issue 16666, 11 April 1916, Page 5

Word Count
1,434

NOTES ON THE GABLES. Otago Daily Times, Issue 16666, 11 April 1916, Page 5

NOTES ON THE GABLES. Otago Daily Times, Issue 16666, 11 April 1916, Page 5

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