NOTES ON THE CABLES.

Otago Daily Times, Issue 16591, 14 January 1916, Page 6

NOTES ON THE CABLES.

By Shrafnel. f> MONTENEGRO'S FATE. l: After Serbia was conquered the opinion put forward in these notes was that the Austro-Gormans would undertake the con- 1 quest o£ Montenegro, in order to round up 1the outlines and defences of the Central J Empires. Tlie occupation of Serbia and Montenegro is part of the Austro-Gorman ® strategy to defend the plains of Hungary by placing the mountains of Serbia and Mon- | tenogro between Austro-Hurigary and any possible attack from the Adriatic and /Egean Sens. The plains of Hungary will be much more easily defended in the mountains, and narrow passes of the Balkans than along tho Save and tho Danube. ' With plenty of mountain guns and heavy artillery, the Central Powers will easily bo able now to do- 1 fend Austria from attack where formerly she was more open to invasion. A terrible and costly mistake has been made in not realising that Serbia should have been defen- ' ded at all hazards. The failure to recognise , the strategical value of Sei'bia has given the Turks a victory in Oallipoli, and lost the Allies the active assistance of Greece and Rumania. Bulgaria could have done nothing to assist tho Germans to find a road to Turkey if Serbia had been strongly reinforced. An army of 200,000 men thrown into Serbia through Montenegro and Albania would have influenced Bulgaria in a different direction. i The failure to save Serbia has, it is apparently and quickly being proved, increased the Turkish menace from Syria. The effect is already being felt in Mesopotamia, and it is not unlikely that it will soon be felt by the Russians operating in Armenia and Persia. iSuch are the effects of being too late in Serbia, and on tho look of things our gallant and staunch little ally, Montenegro, is going to suffer tho fate of Serbia, either because the Allies look upon Montenegro as a oomered and useless pawn, or it is a case of "too late" again to render assistanoe. Tho most sensible course for the Montenegrins to take, unless they are assured that large and sufficient forces are coming to their assistance, would be to arrange terms of peace as favourably as possible. If she cannot get suitalble terms, or sufficient assistance, all she can do is to resist as long a 6 possible, and in tlio meantime send her women and children to Italy. What chance has Montenegro alone against the Austrians with their numbers and their great weight of heavy artillery? None! The total population of Montenegro is not moro than 516,000, and a small portion of that population was formerly Albanian. The greatest number of men "she could put in the field before the first Balkan war was a littlo over 40,000. In that war, and especially in the siege of Scutari, she lost many of her effective fighters. Since the beginning of the present war her army has been fighting continuously, and to-day Montenegro is short of guns and ammunition, and can scarcely muster more than 30,000 men. She may not have* that number at the present moment, as since the beginning of the invasion of Serbia her troops have been continuously and heavily engaged, and after tho conquest of Serbia much more heavily on all sides except on tho Albanian border and on her little picce of coast line. The capture of Mount Lovtchen, south of Cattaro, and the loss of guns, is a very serious blow to the Montenegrins, and an exceedingly valuable gain to the Austrians, as it rounds off the defences of the town of Cattaro and its splendid land-locked harbour, which is being used by the Austrians as a submarine and destroyer base. From tho heights of' Mount Lovtchen, the Austrian guns can render Cettinje, the capital of Montenegro, untenable. Already the Government is abandoning the town, the population of which is about 6000 souls. Podgoritza, tho town to which the Government has retired, is the largest town in Montenegro, its population being 14,000. It is only 20 miles inland from Cettinje, and about 25 miles south-east of Mount Lovtchen. Montenegro is a pastoral country, and its cattle, sheep, goats, and horses at the present juncture would form a pleasant addition to the diminished and empty lardere of Austria. Italy is not assisting Montenegro. She has no interests there sucii as she has in Albania. Whefa the Montenegrins captured Scutari from the Turks, both Austria, and Italy forbade the Montenegrins to hold the fruits of their victory. If Italy does not assist Montenegro, which she could do quicker than any other of the Allies, • she "will pay dearly for her neglect. With Cattaro in the unmolested possession of the A us trians, the Italian fleet and tho Italian coast will always be menaced; and if the Aus trians gain possession of the Montenegrin coast, they will have .some very convenient points for making attacks on the Italian sea communications with Albania. GALLIPOLI AJjD BAGDAD. General Monro's report of the evacuation of Cape Helles shows that the work of 1 withdrawing such considerable forocs was, owing to various accidental difficulties, a more hazardous task than that of the withdrawal from Suvla and Anzac. Tho Turks, had they 'been alive to tho situation, oould have bombarded tho Anglo-French forces ' from both the Gallipoli side and the Asia- , tic shore of tho Dardanelles. In face of the fact that a, considerable sea, due to a breeze of 35 miles an hour, was running, ' and the constricted amount of workable coastline that was loft, together with the difficulties of gettirig on board the vessels in a rough sea, tho re-embarkation without loss of life must be accepted as a cleverer and more marvellous piece of work than the embarkation of tho Suvla Bay ' and Anzac troops. In Constantinople thero have been great rejoicings at the defeat of the British project for opening a road to the Sea of Marmora, and the German press is jeering at the failure of Mr Winston Churchill's magnificent scheme. Thero can bo 1 little doubt that the success of the Turkish resistance will greatly raise the morale of the Turkish Army, and affect disastrously the British prestige amongst the Arab tribes in Asia and Africa. The German and Turkish agjrts will take all manner of pains to make the result, known and to garnish their tale of victory with details of slaughter and captures. An immediate result of the release of largo Turkish forces from Gallipoli will be the strengthening of the reinforcements on tho way to Bagdad. Machine guns and artillery will already bo on the railways to be carried to Aleppo, and thence by a . branch line to Tel-Abisa, from which place i they will bo forwarded by camel, horse, and motor transport to Mosul. New and largo bases will -be established at Diarbekic and Mosul, tho former being used as a base from which to work against the Russians, and the latter for moving against both the Russians and the British. The strong resistance offered to Generals Alymer and Kemball on both sides of the Tigris shows that this opposition of the - Turks from Bagdad is assuming serious proportions. It may bo now taken for s granted that the capture of Bagdad is a prospect that is receding from view. THE ALLIES MUST ATTACK BULGARIA. - Against the balance in favour of tho Turks s may be put the release of the British forces s for operations against the Bulgarians, and also the release of cruisers, destroyers, and 1 torpedo boats for work elsewhere in the B yJTgean or tho Mediterranean. These ves--5 sels will now bo able to assist in convoying • troops to Thrace and Macedonia and in hunting down enemy submarines. Tho enj trance to the Dardanelles will, however, re- - quire close watching to prevent the ogress of , submarines, as the Germans will now be 1 able to put together submarines in Con- " stantinoplc—a most convenient and safe ' place for tho purpose. More submarines in r tho Black Sea and tho eastern part of the

Mediterranean may 90011 bo in evidence. Certainly Germany will give groat attention to infesting tho Block Sea with such vessels, so as to prevent the Russians landing forces in Bulgaria. Taking a general view of tho situation in Asia Minor and Bulgaria, if tho Allies are not considering tho question of an offensive against Bulgaria, and t.hat us soon as possible, all that can be said is that there is not a single man amongst them in authority that has the great directive foresight that is necessary for grand strategy. Hie saving of General Townshend, tho success of tho Anglo-Indian operations, and the defence of Egypt, can be best effected from Salonika. ,