FAR EAST PROBLEMS AFTER PEACE.

Otago Daily Times, Issue 13386, 12 September 1905, Page 2

FAR EAST PROBLEMS AFTER PEACE.

PROBABLE DIPLOMATIC REARRANGEMENTS AND. lIOW THEY WILL REACT ON EUROPE, REGROUPING OF THE POWERS. AN ANQLO-FRANCO-HUSSIAN ENTENTE OR A GERMAN-FRANCO-RUSSIAN ENTENTE. Br M. Paw, Desohakf.l. 1 President of the French Parliamentary Committee on Foreign and Colonial Affairs. Prcsidont of the Chamber of Deputies 1893-1902. (Written for "Potcntia." Copyright in Great Britain and tlio United' States, 1905.)

Monsieur lo Diroctour,—You avo good enough to ask my opinion upon "the diplomats coirecquriipss of tlw RussoJapanese war.'' You do not expect of me, I think, an essay in political guesswork, or hypothetical, views upon tho arrangements that will follow tho war. These will vary with tho parts played by the Powers. I-Icro is not a question nieroiy of the struggle between tho white and tho yellow races, whero both liavo shown equal bravery; it is not a question merely of tho fate of Korea and Manchuria, of tho control of China and the Pacific'. Tho affaire of tho Far East and thoso of Europe, the Near East and Africa, act and react upon one another. Tho direotion that each of tho Great Powers gives to its policy in the Far East can change-tho European situation and the balance of power in the whole world. It is- this action of the various St-ates that the attentive observer may without; undue temerity try to ascertain in accordance - with their previous policy and their,, prevailing- interests.

You will find it natural that a French-. lnim should concern himself most, with tho interests of France, a conccrn that is all tho "moro justiiiablo when tho interests of Franco involvo thoso of civilisation in general.

In order to studj' the cftiiseqtienccs of the war, it is first of all indispensable to recall its causes. When Hussia, Franco, and Germany intervened in 1895 between China and Japan, tho principlo of their intervention was "tho integrity o! China." We-know how that principle was observed. Tho coup of Germany at Kiao-chau (November; 1897) was soon followed by the occupation of Port Arthur by tho Russians. Europe had only driven tho Japaneso from their spoils to instal herself in their place. From that moment the outbreak between Russia and Japan bccamo imminent. History will one day show who were, uinong the good servants of France, tho Rothans and the SloiFcls of this war. At tho samo time it i« not t-ruo to say that, the struggle could not liavo been postponed, aud consequently engaged in under totally.dift'erent conditions. Repeatedly—it is not in recrimination wo must recall this, but to avoid falling into analogous crrors-tho clear-sightedness of Europe, our clear-sightedness, was at fault; repeatedly tho opportunity offered itself and \vo failed to seize it, In 1898 Russia occupied. Manchuria and Port Arthur without firing a shot;' she realised her dream from tho days of Peter tho Great—an icc-freo port- on tho shores of tho Pacific, the port which tho Congress of Rerlin had denied her in the Near Hast, which tho jealousy of England had denied her in the Indian Ocean. By means of her railways she was assured of a largo sliaro of tho profitable commerce of China. On tho other hand, if Russia needs an outlet in the Pacific, Japan requires teritory for emigration and colonisation, Formosa, with its restricted fertilo area, cannot snffico; tho commercial interests o! Japan are linked by their very nature with thoso of Korea.

.Tapan conld not renounec the leading role in that peninsula; slio wishen at least to be assured. that no other Power would bo established there. Korea, besides, bulked much less largely in tho eyes oE the Kussians sinco they had rounded it, in installing themselves at Port -Arthur. Tho most influential politicians of Tokio ultimately let it ho known that their country would not take up arms for Manohuria, biit everyone knew—everyone said—that Japan would never compromise on the question of Korea, aiid that the slightest interference of Russia in that peninsula would bo the signal for a rupture. ' What was required,' then, was to aim at an' agreement which assured to Japan •unfettered commercial expansion. Even at St. Petersburg. this solution had powerful advocates. The Czar desired peace. , All that was necessary was to ciirb tho appetites of the middlemen, who ' there as elsewhere pervert national policy and involvo it in corruption.

It fell to Franco to advocato this-rota-tion. A striking opportunity, presented itself. In November, -1901, .tli-e Marquis Ito came to Paris. The Japaneso statesman dreaded a war,.cverva. victorious war, which would arrest the coonomic impetus of his country.-'Ho had always 'shown himself an advocate of an * understanding ' between Francs and Russia. Franco was admirably situated for addressing at once St. Peters* burff and.Tokio. Wo .had helped Hussia in 1895;; had-.been called away too long, leaving a free field for her rivals in Europe and the -heat,' East- and losing the cianco of settling there questions vital for her own future. It was essential for us, to see that Japan expanded in tho North of China and not elsewhere. AVc could try at least to riiainfain peace' by, bringing honie. to the Russians that, ready as we were to aid them in economic enternrise, wo'' 1 could never lend a hand in any dangerous policy. There-is. no'occasion .to tell mo this is history' reu-ritfon - too lato- in -the day in tho light of subsequent events, - No j this line; of action was ieeommended to our Government at .tho ' fime . by politicians, diplomats, and piiblioislis. :■ Thero.wiis room in Asia lor-Russia, rivals: . Through cur shortsightedness wo shall .7)6! ,driven when : : tod' late', to' avoid vthe' catastrophe to

defend the principles o£ equity that should havo prevented it. From Paris tho MarquisIto betook himself to St. l 3 et-crsburg, and, linking equally failed there to find any support, ho loft for London, whero somo days later—on January SO, 1902—h0 si,gned the treaty of tho Anglo-Japancso alliance. That is tho history of tho past, with its Fins of commission. Lot us try at least to benefit from tho lesson.

Germany will support Russia, and that for three reasons. Tho first is that sho has an interest in maintaining Russia in tho Far East in order to havo all the voice in tho Near East; the second is that she sees a means of causing a broach between us and England in forcing her to choose between the Anglo-Japanese alliance and tho "entente cordialo "; the third is that thus she will drive Franco into ''Collaborating with her to help our allies. Ever sinoo tho conclusion of the' Franco-Russian alliance German)' has pursued alternately two different politics: whilo trying to draw clowr Id England, and to divoroo Paris and London, sho has set herself to unite'against England the thrco Continental Powers. The former of those two policies having miscarried [at tho end of 1900 in China, and at tho beginning of 1901, and in tho Venezuelan affair), she devoted herself to the second (the inauguration of tho Kiel Canal, tho treaty of Shiinonoseki, the Chinese expedition under tho leadership of Field-marshal Waldersec). In intervening in the same sense I,hat we do, sho will try to restore tho triple entenfco of 1895. It is to Germany's interest that Russia should ho kept occupied in Asia-. Russia iu the Far East means Germany mistress in tho Near East and arbiter ol Europe. The military disorganisation of Russia distinctly increases tho military power of Germany. If Russia and England remain estranged the Baltic is at tho mercy of the German fleet. In tho Chinese seas tho Japancso merchant marine will jirove a ruinous competitor to the German coasting trade, and Germany, which at- Kiao-chau is only 12 -hours at sea. from t.he Japanese arsenal of-Sascbo, must long to keep Russia as a lmtfer. For all these reasons, then, Germany, desiring at once her friendship and her cxilo, must support Russia. The Foreign' Offioe, ill the Japanese. alliance, wished to keep tho Russians in check, hut, far from driving them to war, tried to hold tlicin back, to tho point even of arousing the complaints of tho Japanese proa, which saw in the 'allianc-o rather an obstaclo than a help in action against Russia. After tho openiug of hostilities a Vancouver newspaper oxpressctl its fours: "If Japan," it said, "is victorious,. will that be a good thing for British Columbia, which has already so many subjects of tho Mikado; and what will happen if victorious Japan makes pretensions to pre-eminence in the southern archipelago commanding Australia? Certain consequences may arise which have not been anticipated by the authors of tho treaty." .Tho English -in India, ttlio at first had seen in Japan nothing but a valuable ally engaged in holding Ruf.-.jYs attention whilo they did their business in Thibet, Afghanistan, and Persia, are beginning to reflect, and Lord Ctirzon is driven to talto severe measures against the influence exercised by Hie Japanese upon the Hindus. It is realised even in India tlmt. there is room in Ae.ia for Russia- and for England—a view that Lord Salisbury held, and that Mr Balfour and M. Witt? hold. Finally, tho inpst important English newspapers of Japan, the Kobe Chronicle and the Daily Mail, liavo put tho Japanese on their guard against'the temptation they incur of failing to .keep th eir pledges, oven iu what concerns tho independence of Korea. On tho other hand, Germany aspires to be mistress of the sea, and Knelaud cannot sulfer that loss without herself being lost. Tho naval programme of Germany, as has been repeatedly stated officially in tho Reichs-taj?, fs openly directed against Hugland. The European .foe that England has to fear is not at St. Petersburg. . Tho Englishmen who direct their energy at one and the same time against Russia and ajrainst Germany resemble the Frenchmen who shako their fists at once in the faces of Germany and England. The Englishmen who only the other day woro urging us to drop Russia in order to have a single base of support in London ought now to see that any of the double alliance would bo a bad service to British diplomacy. England has no interest either in weakening Ruraia excessively or in cutting us adrift, from her.

It is' Britain's interest not to drive Russia Jo join, hands with Germany. An entente between these two powers would lie fatal to her. In emphasising her .Tapaneso policy she would rislc, on the 0110 hand, assuring •japan of the predominating influence at J own, and, on tho other, of causing the resujjjitation of tho Oontinontol triple entente of 1895. Her alliance with Japan, which she proposes to renew, and, it is eaid, .'0 oxtcncl, ought, in her own interest, to remain a restraining fpotor. As for the United States, whioh showed Wiomseira at tlif" beginning of the war ardently pro-Jnnatiose, because tlioy feared thf effect of Russian development upon tlicu' economic expansion in China, they begin to change their point of view. Tho conqueror of the Philippines, the aspirant to the position of mistress of the Paeiflo -tho future mistress, indeed, (hanks to tho Panama Canal —America* sees clearly now that her real rival will not bo the land

power which. can employ in.tho For East ODly 'a feoble portion of its energies and which will bo inovitably recalled some day to Europe and ■ tho Near East, but tho triumphant, sea powor. working and fighting 6n tlio spot witli nil ita energies. The $otto of American i)oli(y ih that region Is tho open door. The Japanese who posed as the champions of that principle in China have: made a preferential market of their oanquist of ; F6rmo.'a. They havo cstabr lished a 10.per cent, ad valorem.duty, upon all imports, niado a 'monopoly of the ;oj,mphor harvest,' and prohibited tho salo of opiihii (.6" that several' English houses have already had to. quit tho field. • There is something tij reflect upon for tlio Americans and the English who will not divorco their causo'..from..that of thoir cousins of tho Now World.

Tho exposition Of 'some of the terms of the problem (it will-bo; "understood that wo cannot eriuhishto theni all) will siiffico to show thtf important i\j|o that European diplomacy, anil lii particular Fronch diplomacy, will bo called upon to play in tho immediate future. It is right that Japan should havo free scope to devolop economically; it is good (hat she should find at her door tho colonies sho requires; it would ho dangerous if sho had to go elsewhere in search qf,lhbm< Count Oku.-na said, on December 25, 1903: "After tho intervention of Russia, Gormany, and Franco ■in 1895, tho order of tlio day was 'no chango in the north, ; go south.' Japan abandoning tho idea of installing' herself on tho mainland was already prepared to go south. In tho south wero thp .Philippines, Hgjvaii, further south woro Oceania and Australia. Tho neighbouring countries began to fidget. I do not know if my recollection is exact. In August or Scptombeiylß9s, a treaty was passed between Japan and Spain by which tho tm>. countries pledged thomsolvos to respect their possesssions. ..." In returri, it is natural that Riissia should desiro access to tho sea. But her oricinnl programmo, as cononived by M. Witto, was one of commercial expansion, not of wnr and conquest, That those principles may prevail, • and that the legitimate aims of the states may bo reconciled, it is essential that Europe should- close her ranks and curb her covctousness.. To have China respected by Japan, Europe must first show respect herself, and not bogin over again the aggressive tactics of 1897 and 1898. Sho must guarantee the economic advanco of tlio country—public works, railways, ports, schools/businesses; if she dees not renounce tlio spirit of conqucst, if sho does not moderate her appetite, if sho does not put down with a firm hand the era of spoliation, her ovorbearing will infallibly return tipon herself. That will bo not only the "awakoning of Asia," but the revolt of Asia beside which the Boxer insurrection will havo. been but child's play. China, insulted, dismembered, betrayed— China, enlightened by her misfortunes, has begun to organise and to arm. She is reforming her system of civil and military education; sho has 2500 students studying abroad,- and 3000 officers instructed on the European model. We have so far overreached ourselves that to-day she sees in Japan the conqueror and the only possible champion of her independence. What wc must do, -then, is to safeguard the osscntial rights and interests of tho Asiatics, while securing a guaranteo against all aggression on their part, to establish •moil; tho Eurepco-Amerioan Powers a certain equilibrium along with tlio indispensable solidarity to aid them .by treaties and guarantees conceived 011 such lines that no singlo State,may 1)2 able to infringe them without raising at once the opposition of the others. May the Governments adopt at. Joiigth this a3 their future policy, a policy superior to individual ambition and selfish rivalry. If Europe does not recognise this, she lays up long and terrible trials for herself. To" be a good Frenchman, a good Englishman, a good German, or a good Russian you have to bo first of all a good European., The whole policy of Europe has been misdirected by this undue pre-occupation of .Russia. France found herself between tho rivals England and Germany. Now, to let Germany suppose that our entente with England could havo-been directed against her was to exposo us at once to tho risk of seeming to ret lip against- England every understanding with Germany. We must not lose touch with any of the Powers; wc must continue to work* with all as wo havo dono for the past 30 years. We can ex plain ourselves frankly to everybody because wo harbour no ulterior'motive against any. Whoever comes, it is time that Russia, having made tho necessary sacrifices in tho Far East and received guarantees for her future commercial development, should pick up the threads of her traditional' policy. It is timo that Franco should play in the Franco-Russian aliianco the role that 3ho ought to havo played, sooner for the benefit of both peoples. It is time, in short, that our colonial policy should bo subordinated to our general policy. We ought to bring ourselves to maintain in Europe,' aa iu Asia, that balaneo of power whioh is tho fccsf guaranteo of tho in'dependencq of nations and of tho psnce.of the world. , .