NOTES ON THE WAR.

Otago Daily Times, Issue 11643, 29 January 1900, Page 5

NOTES ON THE WAR.

By Major Kennedy.

The capture of Spion Kop from a weak force of tlie enemy and its abandonment after a brief tenure lasting 24 hours fully explains the result of the enemy's artillery fire during last Wednesday, and probably there is no incident that has occurred' during the war that so forcibly tells the tale of our inferiority in the range of our guns to those of the enemy as does the evacuation of Spion Kop. It is very plain, qven to the average civilian, that the efforts of the divisions under Generals Warren and Clery and the operations of the cavalry division under Colonel Dundonald have been directed since the troops crossed the river at Trichart's Drift on the 17th inst. for the purpose of crushing the enemy's right and the capture of Spion Kop, as the position certainly commands the whole right Hank of the enemy's line; but it is evident that after the advance of our troops on Tuesday in the evening, and the hasty retreat of the small force of the enemy that held the kop, General Warren found the position untenable, as the enemy evidently controlled all the approaches to the position they so quickly abandoned that General Warren found it impossible to move his guns across the open country controlled by the enemy's fire. In consequence of being unable to do so he withdrew his infantry from the position, as their presence would only give the' enemy a target for artillery practice, and would in no wise be of use in any future attack on the enemy's lines beyond unless it could be occupied by his artillery. The ability of the enemy's artillery to command the approaches to Spion Ivop against four guns plainly tells the soldier that in range the enemy's guns must be superior to the British, for if the Britsh guns were equal to the enemy's there is reason to believe that we could have quickly moved them to the front and finally planted them in position on the hills and ridges commanding the enemy's lines. Unfortunately for us, the range of the enemy's 40-pounders is very much greater than our field guns, and our 4.7 naval guns are not over numerous, and even if they were plentiful they are not of a vary movable character, and could not be brought to bear in any fighting that took place on Wednesday last. I believe, however, that a couple of these guns will be brought up to the advanced positions now held by General Warren, and then will begin an artillery contest for the mastery of Spion Kop and its final possession. The report from Ladysmith that the enemy are erecting new batteries and strengthening their fortifications about Ladysmitli is not reassuring, as it is evident that they are in no way discouraged by their failure to carry the town oil the 6th, and it is equally certain that General Joubsrfc is confident that he is capable of stopping General Buller and defeating any attempts made for the raising of the siege. The report that heavy firing has been heard at Ladysmith on last Monday has given rise to suppositions, but facts are what we need now, and not fancies. We have been flooded with such suppositions of late, and can find quite enough news of that kind without having it cabled. Coupled with the report of the cable comes the pleasing news that the general health j of the garrison is improving. - I can assure my readers that every week from now will improve the climatic conditions, as the rainy season will be over in about sixweeks, and after March 10 only occasional rains will be experienced, and of course the heat will be much less as the weeks go oy. ilus will tend towards improving the'health of our troops, both inside and outside of Ladysmith.

The presence of six large camps in view between Potgieter's Drift and Dewdrop shows that the enemy have massed heavy forces fo;- the purpose of guarding against the possibility of an attempt to surprise them by General Lyttelton's forces, and the fact that such camps are visible plainly tells that the country is comparatively, open between the river and Dewdrop, as the Boers are not in the habit of pitching their camps in exposed places if they can find cover for them anywhere in the vicinity of^the position they are ordered to hold. The statement" from Mr Winston Churchill regarding the heavy losses of the enemy prior to the occupation of the first line of trenches that they evacuated at opion Kop shows the accuracy of cur artillery practice whenever our guns are allowed to reach the enemy. T n "this respect our superiority over the enemy is most marked The Boer report of the encounter in winch the Australian forces suffered so severely near Rendsbiirg gives us some idea 01 the disadvantages our troops have to fight against, for it states that Commandant do Larey received information that our forces were patrolling in that vicinity, and he made his arrangements accordingly. How the enemy obtain information regarding every move our troops make is evident, and if General Gatacre is guilty of having allowed himself to be deceived in the Stormberg affair, ne certainly is to be commended on the steps he has taken to stop the so-called loyal Dutch from giving news of his movements'to the enemy.

The reconnaissance of portions of our iorces to the vicinity of Rooi Pan, just soutli of Beacon sfield, one of the suburbs ot rumberlcy, was a dashing move, as Rooi lan is directly between the enemy's lines around Kimberloy and Cronje's main camp at bpytfontcin. In order to accomplish this raid inside the enemy's lines our mounted forces would have to move to the west from some point well to the south of the Modeler River, and when far enough west to escape observation by the outlying* forces of the enemy, a change of front to the right would be necessary in order to cross the river and advance to the north A crossing could be effected at a drift some 20 miles west of the railway when the river is normal, and even when the rains have raised the stream considerably the drift at this point is not too much for fairly good horses to cross. After crossing the Modeler the forces must have marched at least 12 miles directly north and then turned to the right, in order to reach Rooi x an. Such an expedition must have been very hazardous, as the enemy might have cut the force off by placing a strong body of mounted men between the river and the position where the raiders finally engaged the enemy. The country by the route followed is an open flat, suitable for cavalry, but dangerous to troops that are pursued by superior forces, as the ant heaps and ant bear holes are very numerous, and these are often the cause of bringing even the best of horsemen to grief.