FREEWILL AND DETERMINISM.

Oamaru Mail, Volume XXXIV, Issue 9590, 24 July 1907, Page 4

FREEWILL AND DETERMINISM.

'': ! \' : '■',''. ' To the' 1 Editor. ■ '•';-'■''• "Sir",—lt win seem to be, arid perhaps-is, presumptuous for one so scantily equipped: for the;purpose as I am to venture to. djscuss,'"everi superficially,, 6uch high themes as those above indicated.' Still, -'as the-, mouse may sometimes help the lioii'and,; as no worse'result of my audacity" is likely 'to happen thanan exposure--orf r my. own ■lack of;knowledge or intelligence, I wi11,., with your permission, make the venture. Seine valuable hints on the subject are contained iri-a critique, .by >St. George . Stock in the .Hibbert Journal for'Apfn last, on a book'written by Dr Joseph B-ickaby, S.J:, entitled "Freewill and-.Four. English Philosophers." Our critic,says: "The only freedom we. want, .or ought to -want; is the' freedom ■to do right. For therein lies man's highest goody, and Whatever interferes with that is a'shackle upon his soul." This sounds true,'and if ;it be sort-he only point .worth contending for is that "man is a moral agent either possessing,' or with a power to acquire, freedom to' do right. All else, however interesting as a purely philosophic study, is be'side the question. That man inherently possesses freedom to do right may very Well be doubted, but that he has the power to acquire that freedom seems'to be more 'than probable. Let us then consider freewill froiii this point of view, regarding it as "the power to acquire freedom to do right.'"' Has man that power? I think he ■has. The doctrine of determinism, supposed to-negative'freewill, asserts that in ■morai action as elsewhera the same cause produces the same effect: that in exactly the same circumstances, external and in•ternal; the -sarrie riian would always make ■ the same, choice. Very .well. Without, for the moment, disputing these assertions, let us inquire what is the general nature of the external and internal causes producing any act' of apparent choice; and endeavor to ascertain whether the human. agent, who is apparently choosing, has had. any part in, shaping and moulding, arid thus, in part, creating any of these causes. The causes -are, contemporaneous and antecedent circumstances co-operating with the huriiaii'-agent's own character. Now can it be truthfully said that a man has no" part in the formation of his own character? Aristotle thought he had. He says: "For we are in a certain way co-operating causes in the formation of our own char-' acter, and it is in consequence of that character that we propose to ourselves such and siich an' end."—(E.N. iii., 5 S. 20).' Mill admits "the power of the mind to cooperate in the formation of its own character" as one among the circumstances sur-. Tounding .an action, and adds that it is. "by no means the least influential." Now it seems to me that the possible shaping andmouldirig of character in the direction." of. right may come about in this - way. : .Whether we have or have not the power of -choice in any .particular, instance between good and evil, it -will .not be denied that most man think they have such a power. If, therefore, in cases where.alter- ; native choice between .right and wrong action apparently lies before us we, thinking we have freedom of choice, make moral effort to choose the right, can it be supposed that such moral effort, even though unsuccessful, has no effect' in the direction of self Is moral effort futile? If it is not, each'such effort to choose .the right instead of the wrong gradually ennobles and strengthens the ■ character of the individual making . the effort, and predisposes him in the direction of Tight.-. In this way by degrees Ift acquires, what may weil be called, the.freedom to do right. He acquires within himself a strong pre-disposing cause or motive power for. the production of right doing, so strong as to become the ruling motiv«, the predominant cause. This acquisition is a consequence of,- and proportionate to, the strength arid persistence of the effort to. exercise in favor of right a power of choice which the individual believes himself to possess. Is it- possible that the meaning of the. words "the truth shall make you free" is simply this, namely', that the earnest and persistent effort after truth will gradually enable us to acquire the power 'to do Tight, free from the shackles' of antecedent, and contemporaneous; circumstances?. It must be remembered that I say nothing as to man's freedom of volition beyond suggesting that he has the power to exercise effort to decide upon what he believes to be a right course of action, and that by exercising,that power he shapes his individual character, and, by so much, his destiny. I am not denying that his. actions, in so far as they might affect the cosmic plan, are controlled. On the contrary, I think they are, nor can I see how it could be otherwise I be lieve, there is a plan. Man is free, and he is controlled. Free within certain limits, and beyond those limits controlled. Free within- such a moral area- as affords him space for the moulding of his own character, and developing to its utmost capacity his own individuality. Beyond that area he is controlled, as forming a part of the cosmic plan. Browning shadows forth the idea in "Christmas Eve" : . .' . "God, whose pleasure brought Man into being,- stands away As it were, an hand-breadth off, to give ' Room for the newly-made to live, - And look at him from a place apart, • And use his gifts of brain and heart, Given, indeed, but to keep for ever." I am, etc., HEBER NEWTON. 23rd-July, 1907.