The New Zealand Times. WEDNESDAY, JULY 25, 1917. THE WAR

New Zealand Times, Volume XLII, Issue 9721, 25 July 1917, Page 4

The New Zealand Times. WEDNESDAY, JULY 25, 1917. THE WAR

Germany has decided that her only chance of success in the war depends on a gigantic effort of her arms to secure a rapid decision. Mr Lloyd George stated the point with his Usual clearness when ho described the new Chancellor’s speech as the utterance of a man awaiting a military decision. Tho other day tho main factor of the whole war situation appeared to be the crisis in the German Parliament. The other factors were, as they still are, tho Russian offensive, the submarine campaign of Germany, tho development of tho campaign on the West front and on tho Italian front, and the growing power of tho American intervention, which had opened with” a declaration of war. Tho Gorman crisis was for the moment the chief of these factors. The crisis was caused by the suspicion throughout Germany that the German armies had failed and that the submarine campaign was no longer to be relied on, the apparent certainty that the Russian offensive was inflicting irretrievable disaster on the East front, and the absolute certainty, that the weight of the American forces which had touched th o campaign will be before many months overwhelming. It was the task of the German War party to dispel the suspicions, to place a new construction on the German offensive, and to discount the value of the American certainty. The aim of the suddenly concentrated opposition was to stop the war on the best terms obtainable, and at the same’time secure sufficient constitutional concessions to safeguard the country against plunges into war by autocracy as irresponsible as aggressive. The crisis led to a struggle arduous and complicated, and the opposition succeeded in ousting the Chancellor and certain Ministers, both Federal and Prussian, practically a strong vote of censure on the Kaiser which has probably inflicted permanent injury on his prestige. But fortune, favoured the War party by tho inherent weakness of the opposition, which hesitated before the brandished sword, and a.s it began to go to pieces

tho collapse of tho Russian offensive gave the finishing stroke._ That, together with tho vigour of tho offensive maintained against the French front, and the plausible explanation of the Chancellor that the submarine campaign had not failed, the only failure being the failure of irresponsible prediction of the date of its success. The War party triumphed, installed its nominee as Chancellor, and he announced that Germany would conquer an honourable peace. The great as- | ■saultfi that followed in Galicia (suddenly pushed because of tiio mutinies of the defence), and on the French front, and the report of a further levy of two million men, sufficiently show the design of trying to force a decision before the Anieric-.il weight gets near overwhelming strength. In the fierce glamour of tins demonstration of war, the Chancellors defiant statement of the only possible terms of peace has all the force of a challenge. It is the challenge of a champion who, by immediate destruction of tho Russian armies, is going to release nearly a million trained soldiers held as prisoners of war, for service against, the West, in addition to the large forces set free' by the Russian collapse. It is the challenge of a champion who threatens to overwhelm the Western Allies before America can materialise in overwhelming strength. It is tho challenge of a champion who threatens to throw into his own stores food enough tor years, and military material enough to sustain anf effort he may think of. This is what the decisive defeat of Russia means in German eyes. The War party had once thought to secure these advantages by a separate peace. Foiled in that hope they determined on a great assault upon tlie undecided Revolution. Their purpose was hurried by the sivifb development of the Reichstag crisis. Nevertheless, they moved in time to •settle the crisis, sending forward their offensive with a savage declaration of revenge for the treachery of peace offers made to conceal the attack Brusiloff was preparing. It was a dramatic and utterly false pretence, hut it fixed the character of the German offensive. This was apparently needed to overcome the suspicious of the opposition. It was attended by tho risk of closing up tho Russian ranks. Pctrograd has claimed that this is exactly what the offensive has done. So far, however, there is not much evidence of the closing up. Wc may have to interpret the report as meaning that if anything could close tho Russian ranks it would bo a great German offensive,, adding that, oven if that failed wc "I 1 ?™ t 0 W this, for even as we write, bad news keeps coming in. Iho situation is the gravest possible, Wo of tho West may discuss it, nursing hopes, feeding them with analyses of reports, events, arguments. IJieio may oven bo considerable hope tor betterment, sufficient t 0 repel tho German invasion. But tho only safe iv ay of considering this Russian problem is to consider it in the light of the worst passible happening. Shall we West, if Russia is down, and out, and tho onemy gets his million old soldiers and the vast Russian corn supplies, and great military stores and arms, shall w D bo able to hold off the enemy til] the American stirength fully materialises at our side? To that question the British Government has , by the mouths of two of its members, given a strong affirmative answer. , Sir Edward Carson has told the challenger to get back to the Rhine before ho can’ think of talking peace. Prime Minister has told him that his peace terms are a sham, concealing projects of unbounded ambition. and really rampant with aggression.- What else is meant fay the security of the German frontiers but the annexation of Belgium—tho one country which ought to have been mentioned by the challenger and was conspicuously ignored? What else is meant by “our Continental interests” than the realisation of the German Empire from Hamburg to Baghdad ? What greater shams can there be than Germany’s insistence on tho freedom of commerce and the freedom of the seas? The whole speech is, as the Prime Minister has described it, a sham. Moreover, it referred to a sham democracy, and with that sham tho head of tho British Empire informed the challenger the Allies will never treat. The Alfies are a | league of democracies, and will recognise nothing different. A logical attitude, for, as the wars of to-day are national, in the most modern sense that armies are whole nations in the fighting line, it follows that the making of war and peace must also he national, in tho hands, that is to say, of real representatives of nations, not in the pijwcr of irresponsible autocrats with swelled heads. A man who speaks like that is sure of his ground.’ His reply to the challenge of the German War Party is proof of his opinion that even if Russia fails, tho Allies will succeed. Mr Lloyd George stated his firm belief that Russia will not fail, and this ho did with full knowledge of what ds happening in the field. In any case, however, he has no fear of the issue, and fights on, and. the Empire will be with him in that great resolution.