The New Zealand Times. FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 3, 1915. THE EASTERN FRONT

New Zealand Times, Volume XL, Issue 9139, 3 September 1915, Page 4

The New Zealand Times. FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 3, 1915. THE EASTERN FRONT

Has the long-expected Russian recovery arrived at last? It is the question eagerly asked everywhere on the publication o£ the checks inflicted on the armies of von Mackensen and von Pflanzer. And everyone bo wishing that those defeats are the first signs of the definite stoppage of the Russian retreat. That retreat has harried the so'uls of men in all the countries allied with Russia, and has raised the public opinion of Germany to great heights of extravagant exaltation. Naturally enough, too. For such a “drive” as tho victorious German armies made of tho enemy—from Cracow to BrestLitovsk—is unparalleled in the annals of war. When that tremendous drive began, no one for a moment thought it was going to attain the dimensions we are all familiar, with. The Russian retreat was divided into stages, at the end of each of which tho recovery of Russia was expected. There were many of these stages; Przemysl and the line of tho San was tho boundary of the first of them ; Grodek and Rawa Ruska bounded tlie second; Lemberg came third; Lublin, Cholm, and Ivangorod wore fourth; the Vistula and Warsaw gave us hope for the fifth line; the new line, Kovno to Brest-Litovsk, gave tho sixth assurance; and the naval victory of Riga, together with tho fighting in the last corner of Galicia, provided the seventh heaven of hope. Through all these stages ran the theory that the Russian armies, suffering from the inferiority of heavy artillery, were retiring on new positions, specially prepared to await the new supplies wherewith tho reorganised industries of Russia were about to supply them. But the thread of this theory snapped at the end of each stage. To the inferiority in heavy artillery was added the lack of rifles and other munitions, until the march of the Russian armies picked up great masses of reasons for defeat, just as a horse’s hoofs pick up increasing snowballs in winter plodding through a white country. Tho Germans added gatherings of another sort. The Russian explanations of causes for tho great retreat were followed by Gorman catalogues of the effects. These reach to hundreds of thousands of men, many thousands of guns, and much booty. As for the fortresses —all the great fortresses, of tho Russian frontiers, and all thd important strategic centres have passed into the enemy’s hands. Every strong place in which the Russian power trusted is occupied now by Gorman armies. The depth, width, and height of the desolation on 1000 miles of front, growing daily wider in tho wake of the conquering armies, are beyond anything in human records. But throughout this history of black disaster and monotonous regularity of defeat, and colossal human suffering, there ran side by side with the theory of tho ultimate recovery of tho Russian arms, the evidence of tho stout endurance and unconquerable spirit of tho Russian armies. From each stage of the retreat those armies emerged, strong, compact, co-ordinated. They suffered losses, for no army can retreat for hundreds upon hundreds of miles without suffering losses. Whether these are as groat as the German measure assigns we may doubt. One can hardly realise that in the four months of this terrible “drive,” tho Germans have captured a million of men. Indeed such a statement is incredible. It certainly cannot be believed without some trustworthy corroboration of tho German reports, which are, not always flamboyant, but flamboyant wherever flamboyancy is required. But the point is not of the losses. It is that throughout all the stages of the retreat tho Russian armies remained unbroken, that they kept their line coordinated, that they drew off out of the most dangerous positions without disaster, that they made it impossible for tho enemy to detach a single man for service elsewhere of the enormous concentrations ho had assembled for this great “drive.” The length of the retreat is unexampled in history with armies so consistently unbroken. Napoleon’s retreat was as long, possibly even longer, but when it finished there was no army unless a few thousand ragged starvelings who were not allowed to be seen over tho German borders lest, their appearance proclaimed the extent of their disaster could be called an army.

These Russians are to-day reported as not only standing up against the enemy, but actually beat-

ing him seriously. The German plan has been discussed all over the world on the basis of a boastful German message, purporting to describe the strategy which the Germans are actually carrying out. In the southern section, the Bre.st-Litovsk section, the Bieiostock section and the Grodno section, the Vilna section —in all the sections of their great line of retreat,— the Russian armies were, according to this unofficial but vehement trumpeter, being pierced, preparatory to a vast destruction or surrender of surrounded sections. The day’s messages dealing with the German attacks on all these sections of the Russian retreat show that there has been no enveloping and no piercing. They show, on tho contrary, that these tactics of the pursuit have been stopped or baffled, and that in places serious disaster has befallen the attack. Von Mackensen has been, according to tho Petrograd icport, entirely foiled in his attempt to pierce tho Russian line and wrench it from the Moscow railway, while his Austrian colleague has been badly smashed in front of tho Galician borders ; that further north all the attempts of the enemy have been met with firm resistance. The details are not clear, and cannot be for some days, for the operations cover enormous distances. The' enemy’s reports clash with tho Petrograd messages here and there. But on the whole the balance appears to be in favour of the Russians. The mere frustration of Maokensen’s and Pflanzer’s tactics would in itself bo a victory. That tho German pursuit has received tho most serious rebuff of its career, we may rest assured. But the question of whether this is the first step in the Russian recovery we must leave to time to determine.