THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE

New Zealand Mail, Issue 1732, 10 May 1905, Page 15

THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE

(From “The Times” Correspondent.) TOKIO, February 10. The fact that on January 30 the third year of the existence of the An-glo-Japanese alliance expired, and that within, another twelvemonth the question of continuing or abandoning tie compact will enter the field of practical politics, would nave attracted earnest attention in Japan even enough tile forceful remarks of “The Times on the subject had not been telegraphed throughout the world. There are three journals in Japan to which leieienee is always made for expressions of influential and independent opinion. they are the “Jiji Snimpo,” which may be called “The Times” of Tokio ; the “Asahi Shimbun,” which corresponds to the “Standard”; and the “Jxenzai Zasshi,” which fills the role of the “Economist.” Recently the. “Nichi JNiciii Shimbun, always a classic among Japanese newspapers, passed into the possession and under the editorship of Mr Kate T'akaaki, formerly his country s representative in London, and has become a poiverftil unit of the fourth estate. B-ut Mr Kato is in the Opposition, and the trend of his politics is not without effect- on the tone of his organ. In point of absolute independence and impartiality, the three journals named above take the lead. Some months ago ‘“The Times” published a translation of an article which appeared in the “Jiji Shimpo.” wun reference to the alliance. It was an article expressing at once DISAPPOINTMENT AND HOPE. The welcome given by the Japanese nation to the alliance had reflected, before everything their confidence in it as an instrument of peace-preservation. I speak from observation too extended ■and too* intimate to be mistaken. “For five years, at any rate, a tranquil era is now assured to the Far East”—that was the universal comment, the general forecast. It proved delusive, and thereafter quickly the question began to he asked, “How can this alliance be converted into a guarantee of peaces” The “Jiji Shimpo” answered, and its answer embodied the view of the thoughtful section of its country men: — Extend the scope of the alliance. Make it an agreement binding absolutely each of the contracting parties to come to the assistance of the other in the event of war. Then, with Lfreat Britain’s Navy holding tne command of Far Eastern seas and with a Japanese army ready to land at any point on the Asiatic continent, a combination would exist such as no nation or clique of nations might venture to defy. f rom that time there would cease to he danger of wholesale aggression at the expense of China, or ol menace against India, or of the closing of the commercial door in the Far East. The situation would be controlled by Anglo-Sax-ondom with Japan.

That, in brief, was the “Jiji Shimpo’s” programme. After it w r as formulated, hoAvever, event® occurred which might perhaps have exercised A MODIFYING INFLUENCE. There was first the progress, or the Baltic Squadron eastAvard and the incidents connected with it. Some of the journals o-f Continental Europe have stated that Japan expected England to manufacture out o-f the North Sea outrage a pretext for detaining the Russian ships. At no time Avas there the slightest expectation in Japan that England would do anything of the kina. One comment and only one Avas made — made in the soberest circles —-namely, that the detention of four junior and irresponsible officers scarcely met the situation. The Japanese are about as free from the fault of unreason as any people in the Avorid, and, besides, they never feared the Baltic Squadron. it could not have been expected, hoAvever, that the contrivances for coaling the squadron would produce no bad impression. England’s share in this matter has not caused public comment, but in private there are Japanese who wonder whether -chivalry towards an ally can be reconciled Avith the doings at Cardiff and with the procedure of the British ships which carry coal for the Russians. On the other hand, the East has learned that sentiment is never suffered to obtrude upon the sphere of business in the West, and that feAv things are too valuable there not to -be sacrificed on the altar of money-getting. Moreover, England’s action m this respect is altogether overshadoAved by the singular indifference of other PoAA r ers to their lieutral obligations; indifference which induces them to grant the free use or their harbours and territorial Avaters to vessels forming as essential a part of the Baltic Squadron as the Avarships themselves —namely, tho coaling steamers. The Japanese arc not. protesting hotly. That would be like “spitting against the wind,” as their oavh proverb puts it. But I ansiver for it that they are thinking deeply. THE POPULARITY OF THE! ALLIANCE,

however, is not affected by these things; England, indeed, is little concerned. But an influence of an altogether an Wont land projected, itself into the

matter when Port Arthur fell. It was the sentiment that naturally inclines a brave man towards a stout foe. For just a few moments after the capitulation and after the publication of the Mikado’s instruction as to honourable terms in recognition of a gallant defence the Russians were quite popular in Japan. If in that brief interval peace had been restored, the two nations might have joined hands in a grasp of lasting friendship. But the revelations and experiences that soon loilowed dispelled this transient emotion. The glamour of Port Arthur’s endurance did not survive the light of hard facts, and the conduct of the Russian officers, their apparent indifference to their country’s losses, their luxurious liabits and their mutual recriminations, produced quite a revulsion of feeling in Japan. It cannot lie said that there ever was any turning away from the English alliance, but probably it may be said that for an instant there was a, disposition to include Russia. Since that time the unrest throughout the Czar’s dominions, and the terrible episodes connected with it, have exercised a newly deterrent influence, and when the third anniversary of the alliance came it found' a mood well reflected by an article m the “Asahi Shimbun,” which I now translate: — On January 30 the Anglo-Japanese alliance completed its third year. The telegraphic extract from “The Times” which wo published in our last issue was part of an article in commemoration of that anniversary. “The Times” called, the Anglo-Japanese alliance the pivot of

GREAT BRITAIN’S WORLD-POLICY,

and attributed to it the very great result of having limited the war to the two Poivers directly interested. We desire to adopt the same language in estimating tne value of the alliance from our own point of view and in appraising its results. In very truth Japan’s world-policy pivots on the alliance. She formed that alliance primarily to preserve the peace of the Far East, and, as a secondary object, to contribute to the tranquility of the world. By means of the alliance we for the first time obtained position and power to give effect to our world-policy. Unfortunately, the alliance did not fulfil the expectations of the Governments and peoples of the allied countries as a peace-preserving instrument. War finally broke out 'between Japan and Russia. Yet we have no hesitation in affirming that if Japan, risking her national existence for the sake og carrying out to the full her policy in China and Korea, adopted the resolution of going to war, it was largely because of the confidence she reposed in the AngloJapanese alliance. And the war itself has brought into clear relief the good influence of the alliance, for, as “The Times,” say® 2 it is owing to the alliance that the combat has been confined to two Powers, and that the world’s tranquility has been saved from the risk of any third Power taking part, whether of choice or of necessity. At the outset of the war Russia’s ally, France, seems to have felt much anxiety on that score, but she has now recovered her equanimity. As for Japan, she is virtually guaranteed against the danger of being robbed of the just fruits of her victory by the arbitrary and forceful interference of outside Powers. What “The Times” says is what we wish to say. This nation’s just interpretation of the value and of the results of the alliance may surpass, hut certainly does not fall short of, that of “The Times.” When the alliance was formed some Englishmen argued that, whereas the benefits it conferred on Japan were great, those it conferred upon England were small. We have reason to believe that even these persons have at last changed their opinion. England’s firm resolve to stand by the alliance and ner preparations for doing so have already met with some rewards. Without explaining these in detail, we desire to say a word about the most important and the most conspicuous. We allude to the fact already mentioned —namely, that this nation justly anoreeiates the value and the results of the alliance. It is true that from the moment when the alliance was formed THE! JAPANESE PEOPLE well understood it® worth and its influence. But the war, by affording a practical and visible measure, has largely increased their appreciation and has reinforced their confidence in the alliance and their gratitude for it. Thus it has come about that- the Japanese regard the English precisely as though they were their brothers. We Japanese rejoice greatly that i should be so, and we think that the English, too, feel glad. W hat is more, since the Japanese people entertain these ieeluigs of gratitude towards the alliance, of reliance on it, and of .satisfaction in it, we believe that our allies will not think our language presumptuous when wo say that the benefits hereafter accruing to them from the alliance will be such as the section of publicists alluded to above were not at all able to foresee. The policy of the present British Cabinet is the policy of the British nation; and, whether the Cabinet changes or does not change, the policy of the nation will not alter. We are grateful that, on the anniversary of the alliance’s formation, “The Times” directed the attention of the Opposition to the magnitude of the results ah-

tained, and we have taken the opportunity of giving some expression to the sentiments that our own people entertain towards the alliance. If we turn now to the “Keizai Zasehi,” we find there the opinion held in Japanese business circles —an opinion specially interesting since it deals with the doctrine of the- very narrow clique which has always attached more importance to pacifying

A POTENTIAL ENEMY than to cultivating a useful friend: — Though tile war is still raging we occasionally hear of people in Russia who talk of a Russo-Japanese alliance by-•and-by, and even in our own country such persons, tiiougn rare, are not wholly wanting. The line of argument taken is this: —“lt is not to be expected that Russia’s power in the Far East- can ever be wholly shattered, though she be expelled from Manchuria she cannot be expelled from Siberia, and thus the ineffaceable nature of her tenure in the Far East becomes clear. Therefore by force of arms nothing more can be effected than to compel ner to- abandon her designs upon the sovereignty of Manchuria and Korea. Any attempt- to efface her totally would be merely to lay the foundations of subsequent. Doubles. For these reasons a Russo-Japan-ese alliance should be cemented after the war as most conducive to the peace of East Asia.”

In considering the value of this contention note must be taken of the relations of other Powers with Eastern. Asia. Failing a Russo-Japanese alliance, would it be impossible to check Russia’s Far Eastern ambition permanently ? That is the question we have bo ponder. Of course Japan cannot oust Russia from -Siberia. But does that make it necessary that the two should become allies? Assuming that the occasion for an alliance arrived; assuming that a time came when Russia, bowing her Head, to Japan, offered practical evidence that her Far Eastern ambition had disappeared, is it the ideathat such an opportunity should be grasped to the exclusion of England? Granting .that the military issue of the present war were decided and that we could not immediately discern what Russia’s subsequent policy towards our country would be, should England and Japan be then divided? Ur should Russia be included in the Anglo-Japan-e&a alliance? One of these alternatives would have to be chosen. If Japan and England cannot be separated, then an Angle-Japanese-Russian alliance must be looked for. But in every sphere

ENGLAND AND RUSSIA

are mutually unfriendly. There is nothing in the past to suggest an entente between them. To-day, when the interests of the two Powers clash at so many points, it is certain that to bring them together would be most difficult. Are we, then, to- break with England and join hands with Russia ? Considering England’s immense navy and our own insular position, to enter the list® against her would -be incomparably more arduous than to enter the- lists against Russia. We have a navy, it is true, and Russia has an army, but England has the command of the seas. This policy M ould end in the extinction or our foreign commerce and would condemn our empire to the existence of an isolated island. Therefore, to breaiv with England for the sane of joining AVitii Russia would be the worst of mistakes. In Germany there are many ivho dislike England and avlio cherish the dream of driving her out into the cold, they hold that a Russo-German-Japan-ese alliance Avo-uld compel England to clasp hands Avitli France and America. That is a mere phantasy. Do not the Germans themselves declare that there is no room for their country and Japan in the markets of China? O'ur view, then, is that the Anglo-Japanese alliance must be continued as before. Not oniy is it essential to Japan in her present Avar Avith Russia, but aa'€ also> believe it to be even more essential to England’s future. “The Times” recently argued that this -alliance is the pivot of England’s Avorld-policy, and that it had exercised very great influence in limiting the arena of the Avar. “The Times” further insisted upon the importance of maintaining the alliance firmly. The “Morning Post,” too, said that if Great Britain fully and unreservedly recognised the neAV position Avon by her ally, her political influence' in Asia would attain a degree never before reached by it, and no single-handed country need be apprehended as a foe, for the poAver of Trance and Germany in the East is too email to be formidable. So, then, cur policy should be to continue the Anglo-Japanese alliance as before and to conclude a commercial alliance Avitli America. Some may contend that such a course Avouid have the disadvantage of leaving Russia a prey to the desire of revenge. But Russia will have no naval base in the Tar East and her military prestige avill have disappeared, Avliile, also, her own domestic embarrassments AA'iil occupy her sufficiently. Her power may diminish in the future, but is not likely to increase suddenly. We do not desire to be Russia’s fee to the bitter end, but it is cur conviction that an alliance Avitli her Avouid be had policy. Such a thing aa mild be seasonable only in the event- of England’® might declining beyond all hope of recovery, and of Russia’s Government changing completely, divesting itself thoroughly of aggressive tendencies,

and becoming truly pacific and progressive. With These articles before him, and with the assurance that their language is representative, a reader may ask whether from a Japanese point or vievv anything can threaten the stability or the alliance. There is, I believe, only one thing—namely, the contingency of England's self-effacement when the day comes for Japan’s settlement Avith Russia. The alliance lias hitherto prevented any third PoAver from taking partin the combat. Will it be equally e? fective in averting the interference of any third Power at the moment of discussing terms of peace ? That is A*ital. The value of the alliance Avill then be subjected to a crucial test in Japan’s estimation.