SUPREME COURT

New Zealand Mail, Issue 1536, 7 August 1901, Page 37

SUPREME COURT

TRACTION ENGINE BY-LAW.

In the Suprem© Court on the 31st ult. the Chief Justice delivered, judgment in th© case McPhee, appellant, and Walters, respondent. By this appeal there was raised the question of the valiiitv of a traction engine by-law passed by the Wairarapa South County Council. His Honor said the difficulty he found in upholding the. by-law was in the interpretation of the provision in the statute that a b;y law might be made for “providing for’ a yearly license on any vehicle or machine engaged on heavy traffic, provided in the case of a by-law made by a local authority that no other charge is levied thereon by the local radii-* ority.” -This provision was obviously mad© as an equivalent for tolls wffich might be levied under a by-law. The doubt that arose in his mind was created by the words, “yearly license fee.” What was done under the by-law was to create a license fee that, whilst it was a fee for a year, yet the license© might only have the use of the road for seven or less months, and that, though lie paid a yearly license fee, there was a fixed period for which the license was to issue. Any rebate on the license fee was left entirely to the discretion of the Council. A law should be certain, and not leave anything, especially * regarding rates or license fees, to the discretion of the Council. If the by-law had fixed a rebate in accordance with the time the license had to run, the by-law might have been held valid; but it seemed to his Honor that when the owner of a machine paid his license fee, lie was supposed by the statute to have a license to use the roads for a year. That was not granted to him by the by-law, and his Honor thought, therefore, that the statutory authority had not been followed, and the by-law was bad. The conviction was quashed, with £6 Os costi. HEAVY TRAFFIC BY-LAW. Judgment was also given by the Chief Justice in the case, Harding, appellant, and Eketahuna County Council, respondent. This appeal raised the question of the validity of a by-law in regard to heavy traffic. His Honor said the difficulty in this case was the same as in the case of McPhee and Wolters. The license was, whenever applied for, for a stated period, namely, from March to March. The license was to terminate on the first Monday in March. The result, was that an owner of a vehicle would have to pay a yearly license fee, though he might only have permission to use the roads for a month or two. There was no provision for only a proportionate part of the license fee being charged. In certain cases the Council might, “in its discretion,” refund a part. That was all. In his Honor’s opinion th© statute meant to give the user of the roads —not closed to heavy.traffic for certain months —the use of the roads for twelve months on payment of a license fee, and that was what was meant by substituting a yearly license fee for toils and charges. This the by-law aid not provide for, and, therefore, in his Honor’s opinion, the Council had exceeded if a .jurisdict on by making it. The conviction was quashed with £6 6s costs, A STAMP DUTY CASE. Mr Jus f ice Edwards heard argument in the cas© Ernest Rudolph Miers, of Raumai, creamery manager, appellant (plaintiff in the Court below), and John Belt, of Palmerston North, ooachbuiider, respondent (defendant below). Mr Young appeared for the appellant and Mr C. A. Loughnan for the respondent. The appellant had advanced the sum of £ls to one Farmer upon receipt from him of the following document:—“Palmerston N., 7/6/97. Mr M. Miers.—Please to advance Mr A. Farmer the sum of £ls, and I will be answerable for the repayment of same after six months—Yours, etc., John Bett.” The appellant had no funds of Farmer or of the respondent in his hands, and neither Farmer nor the respondent was entitled to draw upon the appellant for any sum of money. Th© money ihad not been repaid either by th© respondent or,, Farmer. It \vas not proved that the appellant had given time to Farmer in which to pay the money. In the District Court, Judge Kettle decided that th© document was stampabl© under the Stamp Act, 1882. The question for the Supreme Court was whether this decision was erroneous in point of law. Judgment was reserved.

ACTION ON A PROMISSORY NOTE.

Argument was heard by Mr Justice Edwards in another Palmerston North case, A. E. Ericssen, appellant, and F. W. Bunting and O. Louisson, junr., respondents. In this case the respondents sold certain stock on terms that the purchase-money, amounting to £SO, should be paid in twelve months by a

by a responsible person. The respondents delivered a promissory note, made payable to themselves, to the Awdrys, who took it away* The appellant endorsed it, intending to guarantee its payment. Tli© Awdrys then signed it, and took it to the respondents, who endorsed it above the signature of the appellant, adding, “ Without recourse ” to their signature. The matter went before th© District Court, and the Judge decided that he was bound by the case of Cook and Fenton (11 N.Z.L.R., 505), and gave judgment for the respondents, the sellers of the stock. The appellant now appealed, contending that th© case of Jenkins and Son v. Coomber (L.R., 2 Q. 8., 1898, 168), decided after the case of Cook and Fenton, destroyed the authority of the latter case, and that since th© not© was not signed by the payees at the time when the appellant endorsed it, he was not responsible. Mr C. A. Loughnan appeared for th© appellant, and Mr Dalziell for th© respondents. Judgment was reserved.