BOMBER COMMAND

New Zealand Herald, Volume 78, Issue 24133, 27 November 1941, Page 12

BOMBER COMMAND

DAMAGE IN GERMANY HEAVY PERSISTENT RAIDS ASSESSMENT OF RESULTS Damage done to Germany in the first year and a-half of war by the machines of the Bomber Command of the Royal Air Force is described in Bomber Command, an Air Ministry publication. It is frankly admitted that full and accurate knowledge of the damage caused by bombing attacks on the great variety of targets cannot, except in rare circumstances, be obtained while the war is in progress, and it is stated it would be as absurd to conclude that the material consequences of the raids are small, as it would be to pretend that they have already had a decisive effect. "The fog of war, as thick as the industrial haze which our pilots so often report) over their targets in the Ruhr, wraps the results of raids in a shroud of mystery," Bomber Command says. "To penetrate it much skill and patience are needed. The main sources of information about damage are photographs and reports of all kinds, from statements made in the enemy and neutral press and radio, to the tales of returned travellers. Repairs Made Rapidly "Although it is said that the camera cannot lie, it often does not reveal the whole truth. A bomb may wreak havoc in a building, but may make only a small hole in its roof, and this is all that appears on the photograph. The enemy has shown himself to be very skilful in covering up damage; his repair squads are often at work almost before the 'all clear' lias sounded. "After one attack on Bremen in December last year, for example, he transformed a large block of dwelling houses, which had been demolished, into an open square in which two days later Christmas trees were being sold. He makes great uso of camouflage netting, specially over ships in docks. The Scharnhorst and Gneisenau have been festooned with it for months." Details are given in the booklet of the manner in which photographs taken after raids are interpreted, reports are sifted bv the Air Ministry, and the most reliable passed to Intelligence, Bomber Command. There they are compared with the reports on the opera- | tions, to discover whether the evidence fits together and forms an intelligible I pattern. Direct Hit on Express "Every now and again in the long, continuous process of cheeking reports, details come to light which, like the pieces of a jigsaw puzzle fallen suddenly into place, reveal something unexpected and unsuspected," Bomber Command says. "In March of this year, for instance, a report was received stating that early in the month the night express from The Hague to Berlin had received a direct hit when in motion and that heavy casualties had been caused. "It so happened that on ono night, and on one night only, in that month a solitary Hampden,' groping its way back in "thick weather from Berlin, where it had failed to find its primary target, dropped its bombs on a railway junction. The time and place o_f this attack were, of course, given in its report. The stations through which the express had passed that night were ascertained, and it was found to have been duo at that particular junction at the precise moment at which the Hampden had dropped its bombs. "Again, it was learned that on the morning of March 17 the Bremen had been on fire for some time and was practically burned out. Four nights before a Hampden reported that it had dropped bombs, one of, them a heavy one, on the Bremcrhavcn docks, but that it had been unable to observe the results. Here the evidence that it had hit the Bremen is not conclusive, but it is certainly very strong. Need lor Many Attacks "These examples may serve to show how the system adopted for the assessment of damage works. On the whole it may be said that it makes for conservative conclusions. The damage is under and not over-estimated. The fact that much of the material destruction caused is not permanent and can be repaired in a period of time must over bo borne in mind. The Germans are at least our equals, possibly our superiors, in repair work." The booklet answers a frequent question: "Why are so many objectives in Germany attacked several nights running, especially when it is reported that the attack has been severe? ' It gives the reply "Because they are so large." "Marshalling yards, docks, shipbuilding yards, aircraft factories and other military objectives _ cover as a rule so wide an area that it is not possible to put them out of action in any one attack," it says. "In all such areas there is a large amount of space on which a bomb can fall and do no damage. The weight of bombs the Royal Air Force has been able to drop on them during any one night has not been heavy enough—so far. They have had to he dealt with piecemeal. More Severe Punishment "Those who in the last war saw an artillery barrage put down oil a village or built-up area will know why. To destroy such a target completely a shell every yard was necessary. While the modern bomb is heavier and the number needed to effect the same purpose is not therefore so large, it is still very large indeed. One example will suffice. The Germans had to put over an enormous force of bombers in order to obliterate a part only of Rotterdam. "There are other reasons for visiting the same targets frequently. Constant bombing interferes with the work of repair and may prevent it. The workers engaged on war production are subjected to constant strain, which slows down their output and encourages them to desert, if they can, an occupation which has become so dangerous. "By June 18, 1941, a total of 1066 attacks by six aircraft or more had been made on German territory. The attacks are increasing in severity. Between Juno 15 and July 12, 1941, aircraft of the Bomber Command were I over Germany on 26 out of 28 nights. They ranged the length and breadth of the industrial areas, from Kiel to Frankfurt-on-Main, from Aachen to Magdeburg, Cologne, Diisseldorf, liremen, Wilhelmshaven, Emden, Kiel, Minister, Osnabruek, Duisburg—those names recur again and again in the communiques."