NAVY AT WORK

New Zealand Herald, Volume 78, Issue 24083, 30 September 1941, Page 8

NAVY AT WORK

PROTECTION OF TRADE THREE METHODS USED EFFICIENCY DISCUSSED Means used to protect British sea communications were explained yesterday by Captain R. H. Bevan, , during an address to members of the Auckland Rotary Club at their weekly luncheon gathering in Milne and Ciioyce's Reception Hali. On the protection" of these communications, said Captain Bevan, depended ultimate vicThree methods by which trade and communications were protected were used. They were Cover, Convoy and Cruising. Cover meant the maintenance of forces in such a position that they could intercept and bring to action any enemy force which might venture out to attack trade. Convoy meant the escorting and protection of the constant flow of materials 4 and food needed by Britain to supply industry and feed her population. Cruising implied the use of cruisers patrolling the high seas to attack any enemy ship that might manage to escape the covering forces. _ Use of Covering Forces Dealing with the first of these means, Captain Bevan said that so far this cover had been successful. Evidence of this was to be found in the interception and destruction of the Bismarck; the location of the pocket battleship by the Rawalpindi, because, while she herself was destroyed by the enemy, the certainty that, having been located, superior forces would bring the German to action caused hei to abandon her programme; the bottling up of the Gneisenau and Scharnhorst in Brest by the R.A.1.; and in the effectiveness of the naval forces in the Mediterranean in providing cover against the "gallant and enterprising foe" in that part of the world. Cover was achieved by the mam fleet, assisted .by surface, submarine and air patrols. .. . , After emphasising the immensity or the Navy's task in providing protection for trade. Captain Bevan described how each Home-bound collection of merchant shipping was delivered at the edge of the zone where submarines could operate by what was called an "ocean escort." At the submarine zone, which extended about 500 miles west of Ireland, the ocean escort handed over the convoy to the anti-submarine vessels, which took them through the submarine area. Effectiveness of Convoy Because of the shortage of ships which confronted the Royal Navy at the beginning of the war, it was very rare that the ocean escort was powerful enough to protect their charges against attack by surface raiders of warship type. Troop convoys were another matter. However, they were adequate to meet the attack of armed merchant raiders, and their effectiveness was shown by the fact that, although such raiders were operating, they had never yet dared to approach a convoy. "At the beginning of the war we were also very short of anti-submarine vessels," continued Captain Bevan, "and the first winter of the war, which was also one of the worst liver experienced, imposed a very severe strain on ships and manpower, many of the ships being old destroyers brought out of the Reserve Fleet. Now, however, as the war building programme comes to fruition, as the Navy receives increasing help from the Royal Air Force, and finally because of American aid, the outlook is very much more hopeful than it was. "The situation was further complicated by the fall of France, which allowed the enemy to operate from bases in easy distance of the Western Approaches, "which lie to the south and west of Ireland. As a result, these waters became unusable, and the flow of shipping was forced further to the north and further out to sea. Absence of Irish Bases

"In this direction, we are feeling the absence of the Irish bases, which we had at our disposal in the last war. Their absence throws a tremendous handicap and a tremendous extra strain on the anti-submarine vessels. From this, we can appreciate the enormous benefit which we will derive from American help. Although exactly how this will be applied has not been ! revealed, there can be no doubt that it is a matter of supreme importance ! and of supreme urgency." Dealing with the use of cruising patrols, Captain Bevan emphasised the difficulties imposed by the vastness of the ocean spaces over which they had to operate. He illustrated this by saying that, if the Pacific Ocean were reduced to a map 40ft. square, visibility would be about the size of a sixpenny piece. Therefore, cruising had to be carried out at the focal and terminal points. A focal point was such as the Gulf of Aden, through which all the Suez Canal traffic had to pass, and a terminal point was to be found at the approaches to the River Plate. Opinions Summarised Summarising his address, Captain Bevan said that, so far as cover was concerned, he was sure it would continue to be efficient. He could see no reason why Britain would have any difficulty in maintaining sufficient forces to maintain this efficiency. "So far as convoy is concerned, although it is impossible to say that we are ever going to win the Battle of the Atlantic in an absolute sense —that is, that submarine and aircraft attacks will cease to hava any importance—l feel certain that we will continue to be able to restrict losses to a reasonable and acceptable limit. "As for cruising, the disguised merchant raider will always be with us. However, if we continue our strategy of concentrating our forces in the important areas, its menace will never be serious, unless the Admiralty, because of some special_ reason, is forced to depart from this well-established and proven principle of naval strategy."