THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 1940 AIMS OF THE ALLIES

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXXVII, Issue 23592, 28 February 1940, Page 10

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 1940 AIMS OF THE ALLIES

A suggestion that the Allies, should issue a memorandum defining their joint peace aims has been made by a French writer .long held in high respect on both sides of the English Channel for his accurate knowledge of international affairs and his shrewd comments upon them. He has declared that there are differences of expression between the recent speeches of M. Daladier and Mr. Chamberlain, and that these differences may sow seeds of misunderstanding. Even if this writer be wrong, he has performed a needed service in calling attention to the desirability of having an unmistakably clear definition of the Allies' aims; if he be right, this desirability is greater still. They cannot afford to continue this fight if their ultimate objectives are to lead them apart, either before the end of it is reached or when the end is reached. A victory that left them divided in policy as to what should be done when the enemy is beaten would scarcely be a victory at all. That is an outcome to be avoided, in their own interests and in the interests of the whole world. Their agreement on the immediate task is complete and firm. Mr. Chamberlain has once more used plain words about this: "Until we are satisfied freedom is safe, we shall continue to fight to the utmost of our strength and of the strength of the whole Empire." In so saying, he has spoken also for the Allies as a united body. M. Dajadier is absolutely at one with him in this. Mr. Chamberlain lifts further expounded this purpose. "We are fighting," he said in his recent speech at Birmingham, "to make sure that the small nations of Europe shall henceforth live in security, free from the constant threat of aggression against their independence .and of extermination of their people . . . We are fighting to right the wrongs Germany has inflicted on. people who once were free. We are fighting for the freedom of the individual conscience and for freedom in religion. We are fighting against persecution wherever it may be found. We are fighting to abolish the spirit of militarism and the accumulation of armaments which is pauperising all Europe." Again, when these general terms are considered, M. Daladier is in full agreement. However, it is when these general terms are given precise and concrete form that the risk of misunderstanding is realised. Mr. Chamberlain is explicit in naming the restored independence of the Poles and the Czechs as among the Allies' " aims, and- this is a matter for action after victory is won. M. Daladier has been equally explicit and determined upon it. But the danger of cleavage is met when the method of action after victory is forecast. Mr. Chamberlain has insisted that France and Britain shall be joined by othersincluding Germany, "when she is ready to give reliable proofs of her goodwill"—in the planning of a new Europe; he has mentioned disarmament and economic co-operation as essential. At this point the commentator quoted in to-day s news notes a serious difference between the British and the French approaches to peacemaking: "Mr. Chamberlain perhaps reserved too much space for the hypothesis of a Germany devoted to peace." This critic, speaking for France particularly, expresses a hope that this changed Germany will emerge, but he believes that any treaty that leaves Germany her army, with its organisation and power, will be precarious ; consequently, he prefers M. Daladier's demand, for material and positive guarantees of peace, to Mr. Chamberlain's asking for "tangible evidence that will satisfy us that any pledges or assurances given will be fulfilled." The difference is not one of words merely: it is one concerning the nature of the basis upon which the new Europe is to be built. Precautions must be taken, in the French view, that the aggressor, while encouraged to assist in undoing the wrongs committed, shall be dissuaded by practical measures from attempting the like again. M. Daladier's pronouncement of a few weeks ago left no room for doubt of the French attitude. "T.ie Franco-British union," he . said, is open to all, but I state categorically that, without material and political guarantees, trance will not lay down her arms." There is more than a touch of realism in this. It can be understood perfectly in terms of French geography and history. Ihis is the third time in much less than a century that France has had to defend herself from German militarism. Little wonder that she has an almost innate fear of at least a fourth experience of the kind, notwithstanding expectation of victory ; and she cherishes, as essential to, her future safety, a hope that in the new Europe she will enjoy guarantees of sustained help in resisting possible renewal o:li German onslaught, "I am confident," M. Daladier said in the utterance already quoted, "that we shall obtain material guarantees against the renewal of events," his reference being obviously to the events that have brought the present conflict. He added that he felt "the new Europe should receive a far broader organisation than that which now exists." fn other words, he looks for a thoroughgoing British commitment to European politics as a condition precedent of the reconstructed Europe, just as much as would be a material (not merely moral) assurance of Germany's honouring of a peace agreement. To resolve the difference between Mr. Chamberlain's idealism and M. Dala- | dier's realism is the next necessity in the defining of peace aims.