THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS TUESDAY, AUGUST 22, 1939 NOT PREPARED

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXXVI, Issue 23431, 22 August 1939, Page 8

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS TUESDAY, AUGUST 22, 1939 NOT PREPARED

The most arresting part of the Defence Minister's statement published yesterday is the disclosure that he is banking on sew,.Zealand being given time after the outbreak of war to make good her defences against an invasion. Citizens should seriously ask themselves whether Mr. Jones is justified in basing their security and the country's on his assumption that invasion "will not come until many months, not days, after the onset of war." These are the days of the "lightning war" and blows will be struck without warning and without declaration. They may also be expected to be directed at vulnerable spots and Mr. Jones obliges with the information that "the Territorial Army with its present strength and training is not intended to cope with the fantastic bqgey of invasion." But apparently the bogey is not entirely fantastic because Mr. Jones says that "during the period of waiting," the Territorials will be built up in numbers, organisation and equipment to meet it. Here, then, is an official admission that the land forces are not fitted by training or numbers to withstand an invasion. Mr. Jones does assert, however, that existing forces are "sufficiently trained" to repel raiders. A moment's "balanced thought" suggests that at least an equally high standard of efficiency, if smaller numbers, would be necessary to parry swift thrusts from the sea. It follows that, if the Territorials are not sufficiently trained to resist invaders, neither are they to repel raiders, a thsk for which finishod organisation, close cohesion and the utmost mobility will be required. In dismissing the idea of an invasion until New Zealand has employed "many months" in making ready to meet the invader, Mr. Jones places his trust on British naval and air forces based on Singapore. Certainly Singapore represents a potential threat lying on the flank of any enemy movement from the North into the South Pacific. But the potential threat cannot become real until Singapore possesses an effective striking force. A battle fleet is needed but cannot at present be spared from European waters. If it could, the course of current events in China would be very different. Mr. Chamberlain made British naval weakness in the Ear East depressingly plain in a speech in the Commons so recently as August 4. He reminded members of "the limits of what we can do at this particular time." Previously he had placed the defence of outlying parts of the Empire third on

the British list of urgency, giving priority to covering the Empire's heart and keeping open its trade arteries. Without Mr. Chamberlain's statements, it is known that Britain cannot afford to detach a battle fleet for service based on Singapore until 1942 at earliest. Hence the stopping power of the base is severely limited. It may not be capable of doing more than hold the gateway from the Far East into the Indian Ocean, with the possible addition of sorties eastward to harass enemy communications from north to south. Such unhappily being, the case, has Mr. Jones any right or sound reason to bank on Singapore delaying invasion for "many months" —while we make ready? He may argue that no invader would dare penetrate into the South Pacific without first reducing Singapore, a task demanding time. But if Singapore shelters light naval forces only, sufficient enemy forces could be detached by a considerable naval Power to mask it, leaving the main expedition to proceed unmolested to its destination on a line far to the east.

Unfortunately Mr. Jones is not alone in imagining that Singapore represents the Dominion's first line of defence. Actually it is not a line at all, but a small fixed point on the westernmost rim of the Pacific. Even if a battle fleet were based on it, its effective range is estimated at 1500 miles. But the line of an advance from, say, - Yokosuka to Auckland would by-pass Singapore by 2500 to 3000 miles, the width of the North Atlantic. As far south as the Equator, the expedition would be moving within the natural screen of Micronesia, the Japanese mandated islands, of which the Marshalls lie just north of the Equator and 2800 miles east of Singapore. If these geographical facts be considered, the limits of Singapore will be better appreciated, as they should be by every New Zealander. The base cannot be counted on as a first line of defence or as a. "sure shield" by the Dominion. While it remains without a striking force to extend its range of influence, its efficacy in deterring an enemy by-passing it to the east must be seriously doubted. Yet that is what Mr. Jones, relies on. He thinks the base may preclude the idea of invasion altogether and, at the very least, delay the attempt "until many months, not days, after the onset of war." He frames New Zealand's defence scheme on that confident assumption. Ho admits that the Territorials at their present strength and with their present training could not cope with an invasion, thereby conceding the Herald's contention that the Dominion is not prepared, but puts his trust in the stopping power of Singapore. Citizens can judge for themselves whether his confidence is well founded and of tho adequacy of the provision for national security,.