THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS THURSDAY, APRIL 13, 1939 DANGER POINT IN SPAIN

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXXVI, Issue 23320, 13 April 1939, Page 10

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS THURSDAY, APRIL 13, 1939 DANGER POINT IN SPAIN

Naval and military movements continue in every quarter of the Mediterranean —north and south, east and west—but so far no overt act has occurred carrying the risk of general war. That fact in itself contains an. element of hope. The reluctance of any nation to go to war represents a powerful factor for peace until fighting actually begins. At the same time, too much reliance cannot be placed on this factor so long as conditions exist that are almost certain to produce war. The chief and most dangerous of these is the continued presence in Spain of considerable Italian forces. Neither Britain nor France can afford to ignore their presence and the threat it offers to their vital interests. The situation is not one that can be allowed to remain ] it has to be cleared up. At the moment, however, not only is there no reliable indication of Italian intentions to evacuate Spain, but there are also repeated reports, said to be confirmed, that Italy is adding to her forces there. Britain has particular cause to take issue on this matter because she holds Oount Ciano s written undertaking, incorporated in the Anglo-Italian agreement, that "at the moment of the termination of the Spanish civil war all remaining Italian volunteers will forthwith leave Spanish territory and all Italian war material will simultaneously be withdrawn." The pledge includes Spanish Morocco, the Balearic Islands, and Spanish colonial possessions, as well as Spain itself. It has been reaffirmed verbally as recently as January by Signor Mussolini to Mr. Chamberlain. The practical repudiation up to the present of so explicit an agreement carries grave risks to good relations, apart from the maintenance and reported reinforcement of a military position that Britain and France cannot accept.

How deeply the disposition of Spain affects the vital interests of both should be generally understood. Spanish ports look out on the Bay of Biscay and the Atlantic, as well as on the Mediterranean. They could threaten the Atlantic trade routes to the Cape and South America from Cape Finisfcerre to the Gulf of Guinea. The route through the Mediterranean might be compromised at the very outset, if Gibraltar's opposite at Ceuta in Spanish Morocco were not masked, or if the Rock had to withstand a land attack. Further on, Spain possesses one of the keys to the Eastern Mediterranean in the Balearic Islands. Majorca, largest of these, is still occupied by Italian forces. The importance of neutralising Spain and her overseas possessions cannot therefore be over-estimated by an oceanic Power like Britain. France is even more closely concerned by the threat a hostile Spain could offer to her vital communications with her vast North African Empire, from which she relies on drawing reserves of man-power, raw materials and food. Spain and her island possessions lie athwart the short Mediterranean route between France and North Africa, and also all along the alternative route by the Atlantic. Finally, France has already to guard two land frontiers against aggressive dictators; she would be sore-pressed if she had to man the Pyrenean frontier against a third dictator, hand in glove with the other two. The Spanish strategic positions were of little account so long as they were held by a weak Spain, whether as friend or neutral. A Spain that may be :in process of revitalisation upon Fascist principles, a Spain that has joined Italy, Germany, Japan and Hungary in the Anti-Comintern Pact, a iSpain reinforced by Italian forces and organised by German technicians —such a Spain presents a problem that cannot be left unsolved. The irruption of would-be Napoleons cannot be accepted any more than the overlordship of old Bonaparte. A first essential in any solution must be the execution by Italy of her signed undertaking to evacuate her troops. Insistence on that is but a continuation of the British and French policy of non-intervention. Spain should be master in her own house, free to work out her destiny, to devise her own constitution, and to frame a foreign policy consistent with her national interest. She cannot be entirely free while two or three Italian army divisions and Italian air squadrons camp on her soil, and while Majorca is held as a hostage in the same hands. Italy is in a position to exercise undue influence and exert material pressure on General Franco. If the integrity and sovereignty of Spain is to be preserved, the present position must be ended. More than that is at stake, however. In defiance of her verbal and written pledges, Italy apparently thinks to have established herself in a position to exercise diplomatic blackmail on France, and probably on Britain as well, since the two democracies stand together. She seems hopeful that she can bargain over her broken word to evacuate Spain. The old method of bluff with displays of force is being tried again, but it has grown brittle with too much use. For one thing, Lord Halifax has issued the warning appropriate to this case: "Halt. Major road ahead." For another, naval power should prove decisive in a Mediterranean struggle, and in that department Britain and France are supreme. Signor Mussolini is acute and should sense the harder atmosphere ; he should realise that, with the civil war over, Italian forces in Spain represent more than a bluff or a bargaining weapon, and that their continuance there can not and will not be : jmf£erecU