THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 18, 1938 THE NEED FOR SINGAPORE

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXXV, Issue 22966, 18 February 1938, Page 8

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 18, 1938 THE NEED FOR SINGAPORE

Ten years ago a few voices in Britain were loudly urging that the naval base at Singapore should be abandoned; this week, after the virtual completion of its planned equipment, the base was formally opened. The chief plea for abandonment was that this would be a reassimng gesture to Japan. Quite illogically, the peace-gesture enthusiasts also argued, in the same breath, that the base was strategically worthless. If so, of what value would have been the gesture? However, these contradictory arguments have both gone by the board. About them a change of opinion soon came, even in the Labour circles given to critical discussion of others' Navy Estimates. It was a Labour Government under Mr. Mac Donald that, beside cutting down replacement' expenditure on cruisers, slowed the developmental work at Singapore ; and it was Mr. Mac Donald, supported by Labour cheers, who not long afterwards declared that onesided disarmament, proved useless and dangerous, ought to give place to defensive precautions. To-day there is satisfaction in all parties with the speedy resumption of work upon the base. Had its retarding been prolonged, the safety of the British Commonwealth would have been seriously jeopardised. The base is of particular service to British territories in the Pacific, but to keep all the long stretches of ocean road secure for Greater Britain's communications and commerce is vital to the whole. Severance of a main artery anywhere is as fatal as the plunging of a sword into the heart. To preserve the mobility of the British Fleet it is absolutely necessary to have naval bases sufficient in number, adequately equipped with facilities for the fuelling and refitting of ships—and strategically placed. That, briefly, has always been the case for Singapore, and current events suggest that the final stages of its equipment have been undertaken not a moment too soon.

Singapore is a synonym for defence. British interest in it has never been prompted by any other motive, and international opinion is convincingly on record to the same effect. At the Washington Conference of 1921-22, when comparative strengths of navies were so carefully and promisingly regulated by voluntary agreement, the question of bases in the Pacific was decisively handled. In the resulting article of the treaty there was expressed, in full detail, a binding obligation to refrain from alteration of the status quo in fortification and naval bases, except in certain places. The Powers concerned were the British Empire, the United States and Japan. In the second clause of the article is set out the restriction accepted by the British Empire; it applied specifically to "Hongkong and the insular possessions which the British Empire now holds or may hereafter acquire in the Pacific Ocean east of the meridian of 110 degrees east longitude, except (a) those adjacent to the coast of Canada, (b) the Commonwealth of Australia and its territories, and (c) New Zealand." This wording, unanimously adopted after frank debate, was expressly phrased to exclude Singapore from the operation of the treaty restriction, for Singapore is outside the specified limits, being situated on meridian 104 degrees east longitude. Lord Balfour, explaining afterwards the terms of the treaty, made this point clear. Mr. Asquith, then in opposition to the Government, said he did not regard the development of Singapore as a breach of the treaty, which "defined geographically the limits within which the self-denying ordinance as to the establishment of naval bases was to be carried out." Mr. Mac Donald, speaking a few months later as Prime Minister, gave emphatic endorsement to this view; he described as quite unsound the argument that the Singapore scheme traversed the agreement reached at Washington. Most important is it to recall Japan's concurrence with the purely defensive nature of the scheme. This concurrence was expressed at Washington, when general acknowledgment was made that development of the base had no bearing on the race in naval armaments. There has not been since then any authoritative Japanese comment to the contrary. The base is 3000 miles from Nagasaki, the southernmost port of Japan, and considerations of naval strategy rule out all reasonable possibility of its being a menace. But its contribution to defence cannot be overrated, and the need for this precaution was palpably increased when Japan, on deciding to withdraw from the League of Nations, proclaimed her determination not to surrender her mandate over the ex-German Pacific islands north of the equator. "If anyone wants Japan's mandates," said her Foreign Minister, General Araki, "they know they must take them." Before he left Geneva, Mr. Matsuoka, chief delegate to the League when the Lytton report on Manchuria was discussed, made comment thus —"If anyone wants these islands they know how to take them—bring gunboats." The terms of the mandate forbid use of these island groups as naval bases, but a Japan waxing lawless is not likely to be scrupulous about that. Hence, at this critical time, the opening of the Singapore Base is especially welcome, and to no country more than to New Zealand, which has contributed since 1927 £1,000,000 to its construction costs. All things considered, this is not a high insurance premium. To have done otherwise would have been to neglect a : duty.