THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS THURSDAY, JANUARY 13, 1938 MEDITERRANEAN RISKS

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXXV, Issue 22935, 13 January 1938, Page 10

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS THURSDAY, JANUARY 13, 1938 MEDITERRANEAN RISKS

Two days ago it was learned that Italy had resolved to make Leros, one of the Dodecanese Islands, her main naval and air base in the Mediterranean, and was proceeding to develop its equipment, already considerable. To-day Britain is reported to be putting the Cape route in a state of defence, partly as an answer to the probable closing of the Suez Canal in a time of emergency. Together these items of news indicate anxieties, on the part of both nations, about freedom of communications in the Mediterranean. To both of them, and to France, this freedom is of considerable importance; to Italy and Britain it is vital, Italy being situated in a land-locked sea and almost surrounded by water, and Britain, especially in relation to the requirements of the ocean-linked Commonwealth, being dependent on it as an essential life-line for commerce and defence. Even a secure Cape route, although useful in emergencies, is now only a secondbest. Briefly put, Italy's needs are access to Libya, an open waterway to the Red Sea and Indian Ocean ports of Italian East Africa, and a guarded air-route from Rome, by way of Benghazi, Egypt, and the Sudan, to Addis Ababa; the fact that Britain controls the west and outlets at Gibraltar and Suez, while Oie third, into the Black Sea, is in the hands of Turkey, adds to Italy's eagerness for maritime security in the Mediterranean. As to Britain, it is clear that, whatever the Cape route may offer as an alternative, a direct sea-road to India and the Orient is of supreme value, this value being enhanced by the fact that it runs parallel to the air-route across Bagdad and the Persian Gulf to Karachi, Singapore, and the British lands in our part of the world.

When the details of the Mediterranean situation are examined, the possibility of a clash between Italy and Britain cannot be overlooked. British interests have been protected by the Royal Navy, based on Gibraltar and Malta, with British troops at these two bases and at Egypt and Palestine. Italy has naval, military and air forces in the mother country, in Libya, in the fortified island of Pantellaria between Sicily and Tunis, in Rhodes and in Leros. Holding the central part of the Mediterranean, Italy has in Pantellaria a strategic focus, not far from Malta. It is therefore evident that in this region, where vital lines of transit intersect, is a point of special danger. But it is not the only one. In the eastern region Rhodes and - the Dodecanese, now to be strengthened by the elevation of Leros to chief Italian base in the Mediterranean, are similarly contiguous to Cyprus. This island has not hitherto played any serious part in the British system of defence, but the new Anglo-Egyptian treaty and the increased necessity to safeguard interests in the eastern region will probably give Cyprus a strategic importance. The obvious value of Rhodes to Italy, because it is halfway to Alexandretta and adjacent to the route to Smyrna and the Dardanelles, explains in part the decision to make Leros the chief base, because of the large trade Italy does with' Turkey; but this decision is related just as plainly to Italy's general policy in the east. British tonnage still heads the list at Suez, but Italian has risen to second place since the Abyssinian campaign and scheme of colonisation were undertaken. It is expected that Italy will demand representation on the board of the Suez Canal Company, as tme of the countries "principally interested" in accordance with the concession and statutes.

Unless an amicable understanding can be reached between Britain and Italy, the risk of hostile rivalry in the Mediterranean will perilously increase. A year ago the text of an Anglo-Italian agreement was published, but its terms were as vague as they were laconic. To contribute to the general cause of peace and security, to respect all rights and interests in the Mediterranean, to recognise the consistent claims of Britain and Italy to freedom of transit, to disclaim any desire to modify existing territorial rights—these were the main clauses of the brief document. On neither side could it be taken very seriously. Italy went on witH the East African plan of sovereignty; Britain remained committed to the Genevan resolve not to recognise that. Friction over the Spanish war intensified enmity. On November 1, Signor Mussolini, referring to the tension in the Mediterranean, said it could be eased only by "a sincere, rapid and complete understanding on the basis of the recognition of mutual interests." Four days later the British Foreign Minister replied: "In years gone by, the interests of the two countries in the Mediterranean have been complementary rather than divergent. On the part of His Majesty's Government there is every desire that those relations should be preserved in the future." The empty agreement in January had no mention. Save for a purely de facto recognition by Britain of Italy's assumption of sovereignty in Abyssinia, the situation has since been left as it was. Peace best serves the interests of both parties, and of France, but until a detailed agreement is concluded by all three the risk of - conflict -will, pergiat.