THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 18, 1936 REORGANISING DEFENCE

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXXIII, Issue 22346, 18 February 1936, Page 10

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 18, 1936 REORGANISING DEFENCE

To subordinate the three fighting services to one Minister of Defence was the aim of a private member's bill whose second reading was taken in the House of Commons last week. The withdrawal of the bill at the Government's suggestion was understood to indicate an early official announcement on the subject. This is now eagerly awaited. The reasons are clear. More than a year ago a White Paper contained an admission of "serious deficiencies" in the system of defence. In the course of subsequent discussion, conducted mainly in the press and shared by many eminent in politics and in the services themselves, the lack of adequate co-ordination, particularly "at the top," was emphasised by some and acknowledged by others. Round this fact—abundant evidence proved it to be a fact interest gathered. Circumstances were impelling thought of co-ordination of control. In the Great War aeroplanes combined with the other forces, most notably the army, and soon afterwards the Washington Conference was significantly dealing with aircraft-carriers as of almost equal importance with battleships. The old order, marked by army and navy as separate entities, united only by the use of ships for transport and assistance, was doomed to disappear. A "growing inseparability of the three spheres," to quote the Times, had to be taken into account. It raised difficult problems for administrators; the more each sphere reacted on the others the more perplexing it became for each ■service to gauge the probable effects of new elements, especially external elements, in its own problem. In the recent debate there was illuminating reference to the vulnerability of warships from the air—a question calling for thought from both s;ervices, and unanswerable by either of them alone.

It ifi agreed that the fighting services, by reason of instinct and tradition, are conservative. When Bleriiot flew the English Channel certain prominent soldiers were urged to consider the adoption of aeroplanes as an auxiliary; one answer doubted the prj&ticability, while another, assuming this, complained that it would ruin the cavalry by banishing one of its traditional functions. When an air force had to be instituted, the Admiralty went to great lengths in asserting its right to maintain absolute command of the air unit associated with ships. So the controversy continued. But eventually something practicable had to be done. The Committee of Imperial Defence was created, with the Prime Minister as its titular head and its other members representing the three services respectively. However, there was still wanting an essential of effective co-ordination, for there were no means to achieve a competent redistribution of forces on a scientific calculation of their relative importance and their consequent needs in finance. Each naturally spoke up for itself alone. So a further step- was taken : a sub-commit-tee composed of Chiefs of Staffs of the three was appointed, and Ministers received the pooled advice of the sab-committee instead of having to reconcile the separate opinions of the technical heads, more or less at variance. Defined as "the Chief of a War Staff in commission," this body had no easy task in reaching unanimity. It is no secret that stormy weather was encountered in the effort; although at length a spirit of give and take enabled recommendations to be made, not much confidence, could be reposed in a finding that grew out of compromise and that conditions of actual warfare might relentlessly demonstrate to be weak and futile. To have a Ministry of Defence, this to absorb the three existing Departments, or a small Ministry superimposed upon them, in order to guide the development of a common policy and apportion expenditure, became attractive by way of remedy. All sorts of alternative proposals were put forward. The magnitude of the task of reconstruction and oversight is obvious. It means much more than a merely judicial reconciliation of competing programmes in the three services. Useful up to a point as the Committee of Imperial Defence with its threefold sub-committee has been, the manifest inability of the presiding Minister to devote himself to technical problems amid the multitude of his other official responsibilities has given ground for dissatisfaction. Besides, continuity is plainly desirable, and a change of Ministry would create an awkward break. To have a civilian at the head has generally been favoured, although whether he should be a Cabinet Minister or someone outside Parliament is still being eagerly discussed. One point has impressively emerged—the task ought to be regarded as a whole-time occupation. Its duties would involve acquaintance with administrative details in all the three services. A capable technical staff, jointly provided by the services, would be indispensable, and hope is expressed that ere long it could be entirely supplied by men, some of them picked officers of the fighting services and others from the Civil Service, who have passed through the Imperial Defence College established nearly ten years ago. Out of the abundant criticism of all the proposals some wisdom can be gleaned, enabling reorganisation, for which there is increasing favour, to be achieved with safety and auccess.