GERMAN HIGH STRATEGY

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXXII, Issue 22191, 19 August 1935, Page 16

GERMAN HIGH STRATEGY

"TERRIBLE RIGHT ARM" 7/ ENCIRCLING THE BRITISH BY DUFF COOPER IN order to appreciate the full significance of the events that were taking place, it is necensary to look at the map of Europe and to understaEid the German plan of campaign. Its author was Count Alfred Sc^iefferi, and in its streng ;h and its simplicity it bears the stump of military (genius. Tie portion 'of France between Switzerland and Belgium was believed, and was later proved, to be impregnable. In order,, therefore, to invade France, neutralitymust be violated ard there could be no hesitation in choosing between the -'Swiss mountains i the Belgian plains. When, therefore, the vast colossus of the German Army, far larger fhi-n the best information had reported it could be, rolled up against the impenetrable hariier olf the Franco-German frontier, theie took place a gesture whi:h curiously enough, had been fore scan by British writers, had been forbtold to the Cabinet by Lord Kitchener, aad been explained as probable in the Staff College for twenty years, but f<<r which the French General Staff was eatirely .unprepared. ' From Thionville, in the nor;h-east comer of France, the Germs n Army suddenly thrust out a terrible rjglt arm. Disturbing Reports With this right arm it sougit to accomplish a vast encircling mrvament, sweeping away in the first lev days the loyal but pitiful resistancn of Belgium, encompassing in its vast stretch a line frqm Ghent through Amiens to the south-west ol: Paris and so encircling the whole of the French Army in d driving it back to its own destruction against its eastern frontier, where it would find the remainder of tie German forces waiting eagerly t) receive it and complete its annihilation. The reports frhich had been c is iurbing Haig all these da>ys, and of which he had thought too little notice was taken at General Headquarters, were th )so which told of German troops still pouiing west l ward and'threatening both the Channel ports and the left flank of Ih<> allied armies. These troops formed, in facl, the extended, and ever-extending, riglt hand of the encircling enemy, and v hun they iWere compelled by the British advance to pause, to contract and to fght, it |wa3 nothing lesu thaa the clei ici led fist of the .hjige German Army that struck the five divisions of the Expeditionary Force full in the face. Nor was it only the strength of that fist and the resserve of force lying behind it that rendered it so fcrriidable. 'A i|raveiiv.danger lay in the fac; that the arm was not yet extended tD its full lergthIt was capable of stretching further, and, in doing so, of turning tie flank of its opponents. An army vdth its flank turned is lost. French Armies Delealed Meanwhile, the French offmsive, of .which Henry Wilson had spoken so optimistically, hs.d already tacea place k while ho was speaking. They had attacked and been defeated ion August 21. They were now n retreat, and it was their retreat, and lh« retreat of the Fifth Army, combinoc] vith the encircling movement of the First and Second German Armies on tbe left of our lino, which had placed t tie British forces i,n such fearful jeopardy when Haig was awakened at two o'c oik in the morning of Monday, August 24, Haig s orders were to retro it at once on Bavai, where a defensive position was to bo taken up. The I? in it Corps was to cover tho retirement of the Second' Corps. As tho Seccnc Corps, against whom tho principal attack of the engmy had been concentrated during tho previous day, u-ere (in the left of the First Corps, it would have been necessary, in order to carry out literally the orderß received, foi the First Corps to execute a flank irisrch in tho face) of /the etfiemy, a danjjeious and possibly a disastrous manoeuvre , similar to ths.t for which French hud given instructions the year before at the Aldersliot manoeuvres, wheii ',*rierson, liis Chief of Staff, had demurred. Haig therefore interpreted , his instructions in tho light of his oyn knowledge, and lost no time in carrying iihem out. • "I decide: "(a|i To organise a renrgiard under jSeneril Horne, consisting i>f Fifth . Ipavaliry Brigade, two ba;te lions of ilnfanlfry. • . . Two brigades II.F.'A. to j concentrate near the crose-i bids south

! of Le Bonnet, and to take the offensive at daybreak, with the object of delaying and misleading the enemy's leading troops. " (b) Under cover of this attack, Second Division to move to a position N.W. of Le Bonnet, while the First Division withdraws westwards and holds the Villers-Sire-Nicole position (as arranged by mo on the 22nd, but orders from G.H.Q. upset this). " (c) Meantime trains, divisional ammunition column, ambulance, etc., to move off by two roads to Bavai. Forward Movement Cancelled "Thanks to the motor I was able to give personal orders to all the chief commanders concerned in the operation in the space of an hour, and enable them to cancel the order which their troops were on the point of carrying out for a forward movement. "Thanksi to the offensive action of the cavalry and artillery, the enemy's pursuit was delayed and the Second Division was thus enabled to reach the Bonnet position unmolested. The First Division passed in the rear of it and the Second Division then gradually withdrew on Bavai. "Meanwhile the Sixth Brigade (Davies), which I had at first withdrawn • into reserve near Quevy, was ordered to take up an outpost line on the Longueville-Bavai position. These measures for withdrawal proved completely successful. "At 11.10 a.m. Brigadier-General Horne was able to report that the special responsibility of his rearguard seemed to be at an end, and that he was returning his infantry and field artillery to the Second Division. Our retreat thus began smoothly and in good order and continued like 'a peace march' a French officer said to me. " I spent the morning at Le Bonnet. Sir John French came to see me there, evidently very anxious, but was reassured at seeing the orderly way in w'hich the retreat of my troops was proceeding. I took him to some rising ground about half-mile N.W. of Le Bonnet, whence the enemy"s shelling was plainly visible. The attack to the north seemed also very heavy. Risk ot Being Surrounded ",T reached Bavai about 4 p.m., and at once reported personally to Sir John French at the Mairie. 1 called his attention to the strong outflanking movement, which the enemy was evidently making toward the> west, and I told him •in the presence of his C.G.S. (Murray) that, in my opinion, if our comparatively small force halted.as proposed at Bavai we ran great risk of being surrounded by the enemy. "To this the Field-Marshal replied that 'S:mith-Dorrien had just stated that his troops could march no farther; that they could not march on the following day, but must halt for rest.' "The Field-Marshal, however, agreed with me as to the grave risk we would incur if we were to halt, and decided to march next day. I was accordingly directed to leavß the direct route from Bavai to Le Cateau to Smith-Dorrien and to arrange to march by roads on the south of the Second Corps. By General Murray's request I went off and worked out the details of the movement of the First Corps for the next day, giving the direct route to Le Cateau to the Second Corps. "It was now 6 p.m. I rode on to Vieux Mesnil. It was dark before we got there. I was billeted in an indifferent farm. When I got to my room I turned very sick and continued in this condition for two hours. I then went to sleep." Strain on Commander Haig had every reason to feel satisfied with the manner in which he had been able to carry out his orders during this, the first day of the retreat, but it was little wonder that his exhausted constitution revolted under the strain that had been placed upon it. After barely two hours' sleep he had risen at 2aa.mr. r and had been constantly on the move ever since, giving orders to officers even mor© weary than himself, orders upon the exact performance of which depended the salvation of his whole command. The next morning the retreat continued. Haig was feeling hotter, but decided to travel by motor-car. It now became necessary for the First and Second Corps temporarily to lose touch with one another, as the Forest of Mormal, which lay on their lino of march, contained no -good roads running from north to south. The Second! Corps therefore proceed to the west of the forest in the direction of Lb Cateau, while the First .Corps renamed .tA the east of it, crossing the Samh.re near Maubeugo and heading for Landrecios. To-morrow's instalment relates how the small' British Army was cut in two, and how the retreat continued.