EMPIRES STORM CENTRE.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LVII, Issue 17428, 25 March 1920, Page 5

EMPIRES STORM CENTRE.

1 - OUTLOOK IK MIDDLE EAST. FUTURE-' OF MESOPOTAMIA. PEOBLEM FOB STATECRAFT. IB* Teleeraoh—Press Association— ■*■': .-. I/ONIKJN, March 23. i '■'.-. In tha House-of, Commons, Mr. "Winston Churchill, Secretary of State for -War,. said that the situation in the Middle -Kast was fraught with but was so far not so formidable in practice as it seemed .in prospect. Nevertheless the situation was acute. As regards Mesopotamia these were three causes for anxiety—-first, the Turkish Nationalist 'movement Tinder Mustapha Kemal; secondly, the. Arabs "who had been disturbed by the occupation of Syria and were now inclined, for the first time, in many ways to make,, common cause with the Turkish Nationalists; and thirdly, there were the Bolsheviks. The destruction of the anti-Bolshevik forces was proceeding to a very marked' extent, and very soon the Bolshevik military power would extend over the whole of those great regions north of Caucasus and beyond the Caspian quite unchecked by any Russian force. _ ..■ ' With the passing of the Caspian Sea into the control of the Bolsheviks, which must occur when the ice- of 4 the Ewer Volga melted and the Bolsheviks couM< descend' the river, the Bolsheviks would; be in close touch with, the doubtful Bepublic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Georgia, also with the hostile forces under Mustapha Kemal. On military Sounds this junction was formidable. He thought it probable that the Bolsheviks would use : their advantage to-spread their propaganda as widely as possible rather then follow it up in a strictly military, senseIt was therefore obvious that the whole position in the Middle East was causing great anxiety, and would require the maintenance of strong forces there. He hoped, however, it would be possible _to effect economy in that theatre m the course of the year by holding Mesopotamia, primarily through the agency of the air rather than by military forces. We could not continue to hold the country aft cost of from £15,000,00* to "£20;000,000 a year. ' He saw no reason why British Statecraft should be bankrupt in Mesopotamia when so successful in other parts of the world. He instanced the Soudan, where there was only one white battalion He was" not prepared to propose- that we should march about Mesopotamia, holding the people down by military force, nor had' he ever pretended that when we received a mandate we should immediately occupy and dominate every square mile of the country on the first day. Other methods must be devised if we were to continue to keep Mesopotamia. . _ He instanced the process m West Africa, where Saltish political' influence had gradually permeated the whole country and brought groat areas under successful control That was the line which they " ■were woxkaig on now regarding Mesopotamia. Reierring to Germany and the state off affairs there, ha said they were causing the greatest anxiety from a military standpoint. It ought to be the policy of the jdritish Government, by all means in its sower, to enable a moderate Gorman Government to maintain itself as a living entity, enabling, under its *&a, the productive activity and prosperity of the Izerman people to revive.

IMPERIAL DEFENCE. NEED FOR CO-ORDINATION. Sxeea Association. liOKDOH. March. 23. * Speaking mi a© Army Estimates in the House oJ Commons in the committee stage, several 7 speakers strongly advocated the establishment of. a joint Imperial general stag to deal; with matters relating to the defence of the Empire. Captain "W. G- A. Qrmesuy-Gore, Unionist member for Stafford, si ggssted that in view of our new commitmenis under .-the League of Nations, we ought to have new organisations under the War Office for the purpose of advising, and preparing for the deience of our new territories. Winston Churchill, Secretary of State fox War, in pointing out that the ! Committee of Imperial* Deience was the great instrument by which the Prime Minister asserted his views and exercised responsibility over the whole field of military politics, said that the Committee of Imperial Defence would certainly endure, but it was a mistake to suppose that any committee could bridge the gulf between the services. If the golf were to be bridged between the Army and Navy it could only be done by building up over a number of years a breed or brand of officers, teamed in a common staff college, where 'they acquired a common body of j doctrine dealing with the study of -war as a whole. The development of such a body of officers was 'far more urgent than any question of uniting the Ministries under one head. He intimated that as far as the War Office was concerned they would push forward the idea of a joint staff, with a joint, staff college, with the utmost energy. ,____