GERMAN ADMISSION OF STRENGTH OF ALLIED RESERVES

New Zealand Herald, Volume LV, Issue 16872, 10 June 1918, Page 5

GERMAN ADMISSION OF STRENGTH OF ALLIED RESERVES

FURTHER ATTACKS LIKELY TO ENTAIL HEAVY LOSS. EXPERTS EMPHASISE IMPORTANCE OF AMERICAN FACTOR. United Service. (Received 5 5 p.m.). AMSTERDAM, June 7. The military correspondent of the Vossische Zeitung says that General Foch has been enabled to organise strong resistance owing to a brilliantly constructed railway system. He considers that the German High Command should not attack the newly consolidated French front, richly provided with reserves, and thereby expose the Germans to high losses. Australian and N.Z. Cable Association. LONDON, Jim© 7_ General F. B. Maurice, writing in the Daily Chronicle, commenting on the declaration of the Supreme War Council and M. Clemenceau's speech, says: Speaking bluntly, we are now in the same situation as in 1914, when our allies were obliged to hold on until we threw in our new armies. Now, having failed adequately to prepare for the new situation which resulted by Russia's collapse, we are again holding on until America throws in her weight. The vital question meanwhile is whose effectives are dwindling the quickest. General Maurice details the measures taken, and sums up thus : Apparently we have again let the enemy get a start by allowing him to train fresh drafts before ours are ready. Other war experts are insisting on the far-reaching significance of the appearance of American forces in the battle on the Marne. The Supreme Allied War Council, envisaging the war from the standpoint of a strategic reserve, relies on the American armies to end the struggle and to give the British and French reserve a power which may even enable Russia to throw off the Teuton bondage and participate in the final struggle. It must also be remembered that the German casualties have already far exceeded the number of killed and wounded agreed upon between the pan-German and Socialist leaders when the desirability of the present offensive was mooted. According to information which filtered into Washington from Germany early in April, the price which Hindenburg and his lieutenants were willing to pav for their attempts to achieve victory on the western front amounted to 1,500,000 casualties. It was alleged that before the offensive began tho militarists and Socialist leaders reached an agreement by which no objections of a political nature should be interposed behind the lines against the continuation of the offensive until this number of casualties had been exceeded. The militarists were said to have assured the Socialists at the beginning of the offensive that thejy confidently anticipated reaching their goal—which included the annexation of French territory, the incorporation of the Flanders oast in Germany, and heavy indemnities from the Western Powers at a cost of lives far less than the maximum computation. After the attack started the militarists apparently changed their view, and warned the country that it might be necessary to pay the full price.