BAN AGAINST TREATING

New Zealand Herald, Volume LIII, Issue 16408, 9 December 1916, Page 7

BAN AGAINST TREATING

WISDOM OF REGULATIONS.

NOT A QUESTION FOR COURTS

AUTHORITY OF PARLIAMENT.

A judgment supplementary to that given orally by His Honor Mr. Justice Hoskimr at the Supreme Court oil Thursday was delivered yesterday in connection with the motion brought by Winifred Hackett (.Mr. It. A. Singer) to determine the validity of the regulation providing for the disqualifi- I cation from employment for a, period of six j months of any bar attendant convicted of a breach of tlio " anti-shouting " reguht- ■ tions. His Honor previously affirmed the : validity of the regulation. i Tn his judgment yesterday His Honor 1 said : " It is not because this is war time ' that a more extended interpretation is to I lie given to Acts of Parliament, because! the same interpretation must prevail in; times of war as in times of peace. The ! legislation in question is of a special kind. It is conceived in the interests of the public safety, the defence of New, Zealand, and the effective conduct of the war. Its' unusual and comprehensive terms indicate that Parliament considered that, while it was not in session, there must bo authority somewhere to act as with (lie authority of Parliament to meet the exigencies of the moment. lie ultimate issue at stake is whether we arc to maintain our power as a community to govern ourselves, or to make laws at nil. To the end, and in the ' circumstances mentioned, the powers re- : fcrred to have been given to the Governor-! in-C'ouncil. and on the grounds stated are, ! in my opinion, pre-eminently powers to which that large and liberal interpretation should be given which the Acts Interpretation Act prescribes. " Now, these powers authorise the! (jOvcrnor-in-Council to prohibit acts which in lis opinion are injurious, and in regard to the suppression of "treating"' and other matters, to make such regulations as lie thinks desirable. f l he langaijc removes from the Courts all competence to pronounce upon the advisableness or propriety of any particular regulation. In other words, the Courts cannot test the opinions of the Governor-in-Council, or what he considers advisable. The Court would be competent to declare the regulations ultra vires only in such case where it appeared that the regulations could have nothing to do with the objects for which they were authorised to be made. In my opinion it is impossible to say that a regulation prohibiting a certain class of persons from pursuing the calling of selling liquor, or serving in a publichouse, for .1 given time, is, under the existing conditions, not relevant to the public safety, the effective conduct of the war, or the suppression of treating. The regulation is, on a fair view, not to be regarded as imposing an additional penalty, but as prohibiting a certain class of acts on the part of particular persons. "It is open," concluded His Honor, " by proper means and without awaiting a meeting of Parliament, to seek a repeal or moderation of regulations that may be considered unjust or oppressive, but it is beyond the competency of the Court to interfere with them on those grounds."