BRITAIN'S NAVAL POWER.

New Zealand Herald, Volume XXXIII, Issue 10084, 20 March 1896, Page 3 (Supplement)

BRITAIN'S NAVAL POWER.

DEFENCE OF COLONIAL INTERESTS.

EFFECT OF WAR. INTERVIEW WITH H.E. ADMIRAL BRIDGE. Rkcent eventß, doubtless destined to become historic, caused a wave of Imperial feeling to sweep over the colonies such as perhaps had never existed bofore. And that Imperialist sentiment caused every colonist to turn to the navy in such a way that woald scarcely have been dreamed possible afewmonthsago. But thinking people recognised that there is a danger of that sentiment producing no practical and permanent result. Y\ ith a view, therefore, of obtaining, if possible, the views of the highest naval authority in this part of the world, a New Zealand Herald representative, shortly after the arrival of the fleet in Auckland, sought, and was courteously accorded on the flagship H.M.s. Orlando, an interview with Ilis Excellency Admiral Bridge, in command of the Australasian Squadron. RE-AWAKENED INTEREST IN THE NAVY. Conversation turned, naturally, at first on the intense interest now taken in naval defence. " One of the most favourable symptoms of the re-awakoned interest in naval affairs," said His Excellency, "and in the readiness shown by the British public to submit to all the sacrifices necessary for establishing and maintaining a very powerful navy is, that it gives proof of the fact that the nation in general realises what the true condition of

the British Empire is. In the Mother country it would be quite tho exception to find anyone who regarded the empiro as composed only of the British Islands, with a few outlying dependencies of inconsiderable importance. The immense importance of the trans-marine dominions of the Queen is now fully realised by the mass of the population, of all classes, in tho United Kingdom. And the fact that the position of Groat Britain without these dependencies would be very different from what it is with them, seems now to be fully understood. It is this which explains the readiness shown by the people at home to incur tho very large expense caused by the naval establishment on its preaonb scale."

OBJECTS OF TIIE NAVY. " With the realization of the importance of tho navy, there is too a more complete understanding of its objects, is there not " There is. The first object undoubtedly has been to render it practically impossible for any probable combination of enemies to dismember the Empire by forcible occupation of any portion of it. In my opinion our naval power has already reached « stage of efficiency and number which ensures that the first object has been pained. The next object is undoubtedly to rondor reasonably secure our great ocean trade. Virtually the ocean trade of the British Empire is about 70 per cont. of tho whole world, The immenso importance of this proportion is not fully realisod even by ourselves. But there are symptoms that this much, at all events, is realised—that we should be in a position to secure our great share of the trade of the world against all risks that can bo foreseen. The most recent increase of the navy is no doubt largely due to a desire to ensure tho Becurity of our trade. It is important that these two objects should always be borne in mind, because it shows that the powerful British Navy is in no sense an aggressive force."

PURELY DEFENSIVE. "You look upon it then as dofensivo only ?' "It is as purely defensive in its way as tho batteries and fortifications that aro eroded upon the frontiers of independent States. Tho most recent naval programme has been lately stated by the First Lord of tho Admiralty, to have beon formally drawn up as far back as November 1895. I can answer for it, from personal knowledge, though not formally put on paper, it was virtually decided upon fully two years ago. This will make it quite evident, that no hostility to any particular nation, or nations, was intended by the larce increase to the fleet lately sanctioned by Parliament. It was simply the continuation of a policy, essentially defensivo, adopted at least seven years ago.''

IMPORTANT TO COLONISTS. As you have stated tho objects of the navy, it is cloarly of ail importance to the' colonies unbhought of by very largo numbers " "It seems hardly necessary to draw attention to t,he doep interest, which every colony should take in what has been called the first object, namely, security against forcible occupation by a foreign enemy. That speaks for itself. From remarks that are frequently made by men in public positions, in some of the colonies, and in .-0:110 colonial newspapers, it ii to be inferred that the interest of the colonies in tho maritime trade of the Empire is very inadequately realised." "In what way?"

" It has been elated, in so many words, ,hab it is to the interest of the mother country, and not tho oolo:iie-<, to defend tho trade between those colonies and tho United Kingdom. Tliero could be no more serious mistake. The trade between Australasia and tho rest of tho world is far moro essential to tho prosperity, or even the existence, ov, tho Australasian coloj nies than it is to time of tho mother country. The whole prosperity of these colonies depends ultimately on freedom of access to theso markets for their produce. And these marko's, almost without exception, are separated from the area of production by considerable extents of ocoan. It) is true that tho products are chiefly carried in ships owned in the mother country. But if anything were to happen which would prevent these ships, so owned, transporting the colonial products no other moans would remain of effecting tho transport, This must be obvious when we consider the proportion of trade abovomentioned. If 70 por cent, of the rolling stock of any great carrying organisation wore, for any reason, to bo rendered unavailable, it does nob require to be argued that tho commodities usually conveyed by that organisation would have to lie in the places whore thoy were produced. The fact that tho British Mercantile Marine occupies so large a placo in tho ocean trade of the world, shows that, if it) wero unavailable, there would bo nothing like sufficient material to take its place. If tho trade routes originating in the Australasian colonics wore insecure, owing to imperfect defonce, it would bo an absolute necessity, at all ovents at tho beginning of a war, to give up or largely abandon them, and fall back upon routes originating elsewhere which would be more secure. Thus ib will be seen that it is directly, and greatly to the interests of tho Australasian colonies to have proper defence. This shows that in the second object the importance to tho colonies is very great, and cannot, in fact, bo exaggerated."

COULD OCR MARITIME TRADE BE EASILY RUINED? " What would bo the effect of a war upon our maritime trade?" "It is frequently asserted by foreigners that tho maritimo trade of the British Empiro could be easily assailed, and easily ruined, in war. That is opposed to all historical precedent. British maritime trade has not only nob been destroyed in former wars, bub in the most oxacting wars in which it would be possible for any country to engage, our trado has annually, and regularly, increased. This was never more conspicuously evident than between tho years 1812 and 1815. Our great war with continental Europo had not come to an end when we found ourselves in a deplorable, and altogether unnecessary, war with the United States. The naval activity of the United States largely took the form of privateering attacks upon our commerce, and our Europoan enemies had been practically reduced to tho same form of warfare. Our trade was assailed from all sides by hostile ships of war and privateers. Mobwithstanding that, our trade increased." " That is very significant ?" "It is. You may have seen tho other day that) a well-known American was reported to have said that within three months of our going to war the ocean would be as bare of British commerce as the palm of his hand. Now here j is the case: Between 1794 and 1815 the value of the British import and export I trade increased, on an average, £2,180,000 1 a year. That is the increase, remember, and

of course in those days that sum was in far higher proportion to tho total trade than ib would be now, though ib would not be inconsiderable oven in the present day. During tho great war with France the tonnage increased from 1,643,401 tons in 1793, to 2.081,276 tons in 1815, or at an annual rate of 49,600 tons. Now here comes another very significant fact. In the last four years of the war, when we had an additional enemy in the United States, and depredations by American privateers were very actively carried on, the average annual increase was 41,000 tons. So we went on increasing. And the small reduction of 8600 tons was due, not to tho depredations of tho enemy, but to the cessation of trade with American ports, which then belonged to a hostile State."

" What do you give as the reason for that "The real reason why our trade increased was, because we had au adequate navy, and our maritime defence was based upon propor principles. During the War of American Independence, from 1776 to 1783, oar maritime defenco was based upon principles altogether faulty. The result was, that we lost an average of £284,633 a year of our total import and export trade. The difference in the figures of the war just mentioned and those of the great conflict ending in 1815, was very clearly the improvement due to adequate naval strength and proper naval arrangements. As these two wars have been mentioned, this very interesting fact should be noticed —the increase of trade during the peaco which began in 1783 and lasted till 1794 was less per annum than the increase of trade during the great war which ended in 1815."

BEARING ON THE COLONIES. " The significance of these figures," went on Admiral Bridge, " is comprised in their bearing on the position of these colonies as great producing and exporting communities, so that every inhabitant of Australasia to whom the prosperity of his homo, or even its existence, is dear, should occupy himself without ceasing in perfecting the maritime defences of the ompire. Tho whole principle, which bore such good results in the last great war, was that our defensive arrangements should be so devised that they would tend towards rendering complete our naval efficiency. That general principle was carried out in this way. The navy w-s left to do its own proper workthat of operating on the ocean—while the various localities assumed, and carried out, their proper share of work in providing for the defence, the local defence, of their own particular portions of the empire." " You then would lay upon each locality the work of providing for its own land defences ? 1

" it is a matter of absolute certainty, if history is any guide, that the re-adoption of this principle would remove from us any serious cause of apprehension in futuro hostilities, and that the trade which paesos between any colony—New Zealand, for instance— aud any other country, would be efficiently defended. If the local defences of the colony were well organised, the ships of the navy would be not only free to operate neon the ocean, but could also come, with confidence, to certain ports where they would find their supplies secure, and oven would have tho support of the local defences during replenishment or re-fit."

LOCAL DEFENCE. " Will you suggest anything that could bo done." " Well, the ideas of a naval officer on land defences are not likely to bo of much importance, except when ho looks at it from a naval point of view, which is that of the attacking side. Naval officers havo to consider whatthey would bo likely to meet, and what they would find most formidable, if thoy were called upon to make attacks upon foreign territory. Generally speaking, naval officers regard the human element of local defence as more important than the passive or material element. And though they do not undervalue the importance of fixed fortifications, or cvon of submarine mines, in certain special circumstances, yet they consider generally, that the men who form thedefence forceare more important than any other element. If you take the case of any particular port, and say 'this port is surrounded with batteries ; all its entering channels aro obstructed by submarine mines; but there are no men to work the batteries, or iaj down the mines,' it is plain that that pore cannot offer as effective resistance to an enemy as ono which, without batteries or mines, has a number of sufficiently trained, and properly organised, human defenders."

" What kind of defence would you then consider the —say for Auckland "Tho kind of defence which naval officers would consider the most formidable is that in which a proper proportion is maintained between the human and the material clement, and it does seem to us that throughout tho British Empire, especially in some parts of tho Mother Country, more attention has been paid to the mere erection of passive defences, than to the provision of a proper number of men to meet an enemy if ho appears on the scene."

PROPOSED TRAINING SHIP. " There is some talk about establishing a training ship in the colony, said our representative. " What do you think of thn suggestion ?" "It would largely be a question of money," was the reply. "We have 4601) boys in tho Mother Country under instruclion on training ships, and 5194 others serving in the ileet. We have offered to take boys on this station, but the applications have boon very few. Then the men who have entered here, have with very rare exceptions, availed themselves of the permission, given to any entering from the colonies, to lenvo tho service after six months' trial. So that in spite of the fact that exceptional privileges have been given to youths and men of colonial birth to enter the navy, very few have taken advantage of it." " Would that bo because they don't like the discipline?" " It may be that, and also that they don't think the pay of an able seaman (Is 7d a-day) sufficient. Thoy do not remember the many indirect advantages they getpensions, the amount of leave given, the fact that the pay goes on all the year round sick or well, the pensions to widows, and the compassionate allowances to the children."

" What) do you think the cost of a training ship would bo ?" " That is a difficult question. A training ship is a very costly thing. I once commanded a training ship in England, and at that time it was considered that overy boy cost £54 a-year." " Provision is now made for colonials to enter the regular army as commissioned officers. Could nob something of the same sort be made to apply to the navy ?" " The colonies have special provision already. Each colony has a certain numbor of nominations to naval cadetships allotted to it. and these cadets have great privileges which aro nob given to boys in tho mother country. For instance, if a boy is given a nomination at Home for a naval cadetship, ho has to compete, in a very difficult examination, with other boys. A boy with a colonial nomination has nob to compete. Tho privilege is so marked that people sometimes try to make out they are colonists in order to get colonial nominations." " Could anything in the shape of a naval reserve bo formed hero ?"

" A naval reserve, to bo of any use, must be prepared to go to any port of the world, —and take Is 7d a day. Bub the fact is thoro really is no want of men. We can got as many men as wo want. THE CALLIOPE DOCK. You spoke just now of the advantage of having a secure place, where, in time of war, a ship might replenish and relit. Would the Imperial authorities, do you think, do anything towards perfecting tho Calliope Dock" < "I think not. That would have, I should imagine, to bo a colonial matter. No doubt tho dock would be a great attraction for ships visiting tho place." " What machinery do you think would bo required to properly equip it ?" " I cannot profess to speak about this dock, and could not until I had actually seen a ship docked there. But, as a general rule, my opinion iB that the absence of special machinery from a dock, is given a great deal more importance than is necessary. We are so accustomod nowadays to find machinery made ready to our hand to do anything, that if we do not get a machine just at the momont we want it, tno inclination immediately is to cry out and make a grievance of it. Excopt in the case of very considerable repairs, British seamen, notwithstanding the fact that they are suffering from the inevitable effects of prolonged eervico ia ships entirely worked by

steam, ought still to lmvo sufficient in* genuity and readiness of resource left to be able to devise arrangements for lifting and moving weights-even considerable weights with such material as they would find on the spot. Personally 1 liko to see mechanical appliances kept at the lowest possible level, so as to onconrage our people to exercise their ingenuity, and to develop the readiness of resource which used to be, if it is not now, one of the leading character-

ietics of British seamen. At the same time one has to admit that thcro are heavy repairs to the complicated ehip.<

of the present clay which may require special mechanical appliances. But the question arises whether, when these special appliances become absolutely necessary at a particular place, the repairing resources oi J'' the port would bo sufficient) to carry out ■ the heavy repairs required. For instance, 1 walked underneath the Howe, in dock, when she had tho whole of her bottom taken clean out. The mishap necessitating this had occurred only 600 miles from Home, and they wore ablo to patch her up and send her back. Slio could not have done 13,000 miles, and if the accident happened here 1 do nob think you would have been in a very much better position to patch her up for the voyage than at present. I do not mean to say that when docks are being supplied with machinery it should not bo of the latest and best pattern. But what Ido feel very strongly, is that when somebody suggests tho introduction of some new machine

careful investigation should bo made, if, taking all circumstances into consideration, tho obtaining of this machine is really necessary. I am not saying don't get the latest, but inquire whether it is necessary to get anything at all."

COLONIAL INTERESTS. Judging from your remarks a little while ago, you look upon colonial interests as of supremo importance." " Thero are two facts," said His Excel-

lency in conclusion, " which came out in these two recent crises— Venezuela and the Transvaal crisis—that they were both colonial questions, and that tho foreign policy of tho country is shown to be, what you might expect that of a great maritimo Empire would be—a policy which really means the defenco of colonial interests as being its most important. Ido not know I have a right to say anything of a political bearing, but recent affairs have thrown into very clear relief the immense advantage it is to small communities, like the British colonies, to bo attached to a powerful mother country which has both the desire and the power to defend their interests."