AIR SUPREMACY

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume 80, 13 April 1945, Page 6

AIR SUPREMACY

IMPORTANCE IN BURMA BRITISH CONTROL THE SKIES London, March 26. An Air Ministry spokesman discussing the Burma campaign said: “The change in our fortunes in Burma is due to several causes—better training, better equipment for our armies and more experience in this kind of warfare. But the greatest single factor is the changed air situation and the use we have made of it. At one time we had to expect attacks on Calcutta and on our forces all the way up from the south. But the arrival of better aircraft and more of them changed the balance. We have steadily gained ascendancy and now have air supremacy all over Burma and Thailand opposition is seldom encountered. Against our six to 700 combat sorties daily the Japanese are reduced to occasional small night attacks and a few fighter bomber day attacks on airfields. “The Burma war is largely a war of communications. The Japanese main means of transport are rail and water, road and air transport being negligible. They are no longer able to use big ships and we have forced their supplies increasingly to run the gauntlet of air attack: “(1) By aircraft from China against shipping in the Formosa Channel and southward (U.S.A.F.). “(2) By strategic bombing by SuperFortress raids from Singapore to Kuala Lumpar (U.S.A.F.) “(3) By heavy bombers against the Bangkok-Siam Railway (both). “i 4) By minelaying off Sumatra (R.A.F.). “(5) By Liberator attacks on shipping off the Tenasserim Coast (both). “(6) By Beaufighters, Mosquitoes, and Mustangs in Central Burma attacking road, rail and river transport (R.A.F.'). “(7) By fighter bombers attacking dumps (R.A.F.). “N. 8.: The R.A.F. above included the R.A.A.F., also Canadian and Indian squadrons. “Thus we are imposing ‘the death of a thousand cuts’ on the Japanese, but constant effort over such a vast area is necessary against the indefatigable Japanese repairers. However, the emaciated and diseased Japanese who are falling into our hands and the crumbling of the campaign testify to the effect. EFFECT ON SUPPLIES “As for our own supply position —it is unpleasant to conside'r the results upon us if the enemy had the freedom in the air over our lines of communication. Air supremacy was the first essential in our offensive role. When the Sixth Indian Division was cut off in Araka in February, 1944, supply aircraft kept it serviced until it broke out and with other Indian Divisions routed the Japanese killing 7000; A few weeks later Wingate’s famous expedition was flown into action by air commando gliders and supplied by air for months. Almost at the same time Imphal and Kohima were enabled by air supply to withstand siege for weeks. A whole division (the British Second) and its equipment were flown in to their relief. The Japanese, with their own communications smashed by our planes, saw a stream of carriers pouring in food, fuel, ordinance, ammunition and water.

“Air transport is an essential factor in the campaign. We can use this great transport power just where we like and our land commanders have a strategist’s dream —freedom to fight and manoeuvre indefinitely, independent of lines of communication. We have always used sea power in this way to put a force where we wished on the enemy’s coastline but our air supremacy and air transport system now make it possible to apply that strategic ace of trumps to the whole of the country—never before in history has any commander in the field possessed such an amazing asset. General Slim, Fourteenth Army Commander, has been able to think in terms of 50 miles advances, because he knew that when the objective he had planned had been gained by his troops, Dakotas would be overhead immediately dropping supplies. His lines of communication have been drawn in the sky. Here are some figures of the work accomplished in 1944 by all types of Allied transport aircraft: the total hours flown, more than 300,000; total trips despatched, over 90,000; the weight of freight carried in a combat zone, over 250,000 tons; the number of casualties evacuated, over 60,000. To-day we average over 1200 transport sorties daily. Nothing of this detracts from the magnificent work of the army, but we must not overlook the essential factor of air supremacy without which the campaign could not have developed as it did.