EUROPEAN WATERS

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume 80, 7 April 1945, Page 6

EUROPEAN WATERS

COMMAND OF THE SEA ALLIES NEGLECT CHANCES In an emergency Order of the Day early this year, General Eisenhower called for the destruction of the enemy “on the ground, in v the air, every-where.” That he did not specifically mention the sea. may have been for the good reason that on that element there is hardly anything left to destroy, writes Captain Russell Grenfell, R.N., in the “Sunday Times,” London. True, the U-boats are still about and are even becoming more active with new equipment. Nevertheless, their influence on military operations is likely to remain negligible. But if our sea supremacy is so great if it is at sea that we have the longest lead and the greatest mastery over the Germans, the question seems to arise why we have made so little use of these maritime assets. The advantages inherent in the skilled employment of amphibious warfare are of high promise. PHILIPPINES EXAMPLE The capacity for striking where the enemy does not expect and therefore is not in force to meet the blow confers on a seaborne army several important advantages. Such landings may provide a way of by-passing mud, flood, river, forest and the deadlocks resultant therefrom. It is significant that Japanese resistance on Leyte collapsed within a few days of the Americans’ flank landing near Ormoc, after their frontal advance had been held up for over a month. This very outflanking capacity has. moreover, a valuable by-product in the disturbance it causes to the enemy’s directing mind. Before D Day in Normandy the German commander was undoubtedly racked with uncertainty as to where the landing would come, and even after the invasion he was embarrassed in his movement of reserves by the fear that other landings might be imminent farther along the coast. AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE That.we have made next to no am:phibious use of our command of the sea since D Day may be due to several causes. Over-optimism may have suggested too easy a route into Germany by land. Again the comparative novelty of amphibious warfare to the present-day warrior may have prevented full appreciation of its merits. . At all events, the Allies cannot be said to have given any striking display of amphibious imagination in regard to European seas which have lain for some time at their disposal. It is a matter for speculation what the Germans would have done if the command of the sea had been with them. Certainly, their performance in 1940, in spite of their naval inferiority, in landing at different points on a 1000-mile stretch of Norwegian .coast between Oslo and Narvik provides an example of amphibious enterprise and insight which should make us ponder whether we are not being sorely neglectful of much more favourable chances.