THE NEAR EAST

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume LVI, 12 October 1922, Page 5

THE NEAR EAST

PEACE .OK WAR? (By “Gunnel’.”) When Mr Lloyd George made hi» dramatic appeal to the British Dominions, the military situation in the Near East •was that Mustapha Kcmiil had under his command in and near Smyrna some two or three hundred thousand troops, with probably a strong reserve on ttip < Karahissar-Smyrua line, While the Bri- . tish had but a few thousand troops at the Dardanelles, about one hundred and fifty miles from Smyrna. It was clearly evident that Keraal, by marching on the Straits and on Constantinople simultaneously, could have established himself on the eastern shores of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus, and that by inciting insurrection in Constantinople he could have placed the capital, at his mercy. But the Turkish occupation of Smyrna , had been followed immediately by .massacres of the most atrociou., character, and it needed no prophet, to foretell that 1 atrocities on even a more appalling 1 scale. would ensue if Kemal’s army were to oc- ; cupv Constantinople. Therefore to preserve the live hundred thousand Christians, many of whom are British'-sub-jects, living in and near Constantinople, the British Government insisted on Mustapha Keraal respecting the Sevres Treaty, which placed Constantinople and the Straits under the administration of the Allied Powers. With but' slender military and naval forces on the spot, deserted by her Allies who were equally pledged with , herself to preserve Com stantinople from the fate of Smyrna, Britain nobly resolved to act alone, and to act in no uncertain manner. But to protect Constantinople command of the Dardanelles v. as necessary,, and the key of the Dardanelles is the Narrows, and to command the Narrows from Bernal'S troops tiie occupation of Chanak is im* perative. So the British took theii • stand at Ghanak, and commenced to fqr- ■. tify the position by every means in their ipoweA , , ‘. .. ! j It is an inspiring spectacle: that little force of a few thousand "troops “digging ! in” at Chanak, and putting all to-'the : nazard in order to gain time in which to ■ j receive reinforcements,■■and'to enable the j transports which should bring those reinforcements to proceed, if necessary, to evacuate British subjects from Constant tinople. The appeal of the. Premier of Great Britain to the: Dominions was for ’ them to defend Aiizac, and the* countries of the Anzacs worthily -responded 5 but Mr Lloyd George’s great object was to demonstrate to' Mustapha 'Kemal Britain’s determination to fight if necessary, and to preserve the 'great city df Con--1 stantinople from l the awful fate vVhich had overtaken Smyrna." m ' For some reason the triumphant Turk 1 did not immediately ’ advance from the scene of his victories and of his excesses. Perhaps his unpaid troops were bUsy 1 paying themselves with plunder, per-haps-his military supplies were deficient —especially in the matter of artillery ammunition, of which we know he was short when he began his decisive campaign against tjie Greeks—perhaps it was that his French and Italian advisers told him that they would help him to obtain all the concessions he demanded without the necessity of his fighting Britain, who notoriously has a gift for - winning wars which she may begin with 1 ridiculously inadequate forces.. For whatever cause, Kemal hesitated, has hesitated for three weeks and more, and in the interim Britain has concentrated her naval power on the Dardanelles and Constantinople,, and has raised her military forces at Chanak to some thirty thousand troops, with some sixty : thousand rein--1 forcements on the water or preparing to embark. To these may be added -marines and strong landing-partieS from the warships, which certainly can afford great artillery support against any attack made upon Chanak, It has been suggested that Kernel's objective is not Chanak but Constantinople, and that the assembling of hia forces on the eastern margin of the neutral zone is merely a ruse by means of which he desires to cause the British to' concentrate their military strength at the Dardanelles, and so leave him free to divert a sufficient force with which to capture Constantinople. Certainly his chief objective must be the capital of Turkey and the seat of the Kalipn, but strangely enough the roads which approach the Bosphorus from the east (including the railroad) skirt either the sea of Marmora or the Black Sea, and are easily commanded and destroyed from the water; so that Kemal’s artillery and supply-trains would be exposed to no small difficulty in reaching positions on the eastern shores of the Bosphorus, to cross which strait it would first be necessary for him to check effectually the strong opposition which the British Navy, with its battleships, armoured cruisers, destroyers, and Submarines," would be in a position to create. Moreover,’it is very possible that the presence of a large Turkish force on the eastern side of the’ Bosphorus would cause a rising of the Turkish elements in Constantinople, and that massacres of an appalling kind would'follow, to the prejudicing of the Turkish, cause and hardening of British opposition. Doubtless Keraal takes all thej3e features into consideration, and) balancing one against the other) the more especially since the French are working strenuously for him in the councils of the Allies, we find him agreeable' to arrange a conference with General Harington at’ Mudania, which is the port of Briiasa,: and m the Sea of Marmora. What the result of that iConference will ; be, ’ who can say? Whatever'Komars immediate intentions may be, whether they-be pacific or ag:gressive, it is not- to be expected that he will- abandon the great object for V?hich he has fought, which is‘the possession of Constantinople imd the restoration of Turkish poster. That he will avoid war with Britain, seems to depend not only on his own decision but on the conduct’ of 'the commanders of Turkish troops in contact with British troops inside the neutral zone. It would seem that unless General Harington can arrange at Mudania some understanding which will lead to an armed truce while representatives of the Allies meet those of Tubkey to discuss and revise the Treaty of Sevres, any clash between ' Turks and British before Chanak or elsewhere will precipitate warr" But in no case is it to be expected that , the British will evacuate the strategic positions which they hold in the Dardanelles until the safety of the Christian population of Constantinople is absolutely assured, and satisfactory arrangements have been made for the good government of that great city and the freedom of the Straits. The British attitude has tiedn perfectly correct throughout the crisis. Britain has a perfect right as the guardian of Constantinople and of the Straits to have her sliips and troops whore they are. The same cannot be said of the attitude of Kemal, whose troops have in reality created a state of war by penetrating the neutral zone. If, however, the Turkish leader is willing and able 10 prevent his troops from actually firing on the British, peace may be preserved. The issue rests with Kemal, and it is to he hoped that he realises what war with the British Empire means. [Written October llth.]