THE THREAT IN THE WEST

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume LII, Issue 52, 1 March 1918, Page 7

THE THREAT IN THE WEST

PROBABLE GERMAN GAMBLE

A DISCUSSION ON PROBABILI TIES.

The Germans are declaring that they mean to trw to break the Allied line in the West. Th e elimination of the Russian Army has restored -th e waning military strength of 'both Germany and Austria. It has also confounded those of our experts who present war to us as a page of sums rather than a contest of brains as well as muscle -(writes. Lovat Eraser, in the Daily Mail.) We need not be prematurely alarmed by the threats of the enemy, but it is not wise to ignore them. If the Germans and the Austrian* propose to engage in the most colossal gamble in history, we had better consider their prospects of success.. And first, why does th e alleged intention of the enemy amount to a gamble? Because they are like a gambler who after heavy losses comes into a big legacy and risks the whole of it on a single throw. It is a gamble because up till now the chief military lesson of the war in the West has been that on the whole, and until new devices and methods are found, modern arms confer an advantage on the defence. Both sides have proved two things, at great cost to themselves. The first thing is that the initial stages of an attack almost invariably succeed. The second thing is that hitherto it has been impossible" to develop on a sufficient scale th e advantages won in the first rush. The Germans demonstrated this at Verdun, the French in Champagne in 1915. We need not multiply examples. Ther e is no reason to suppose that the enemy will now succeed in rebutting these conclusions, and that is why their attempt, should' they now make it, will be a gamble on an unprecedented scale. Next, it may be noted that the great amount of drum-fire in the enemy press is very unusual. The German newspapers' have not as a rule announced military plans in advance. Perhaps the enemy "ar e trying to frighten nervous people into joining the ranks of our wobblers. Perhaps they have some entirely different object in view. Perhaps they' are telling the truth for once, and calculate that 'thev mavi not be believed.

- Th e onlv possible course for us is to look at the probabilities. The Germans and Austrians cannot entirely strip •the Russian front, but they can leave is very thinly held. Here I may say that I can se e ro present prospect of an improvement in Russian conditions. I can find nothing in history to show that the Cossacks have ever, exercised a determining influence upon the destinies oi Russia. Thev are only a drop in the ocean of Russian humanity. And may I add that I do not understand the suggestion that we should talk' 'benevolently to th e people -who have seized power "in Russia? Treaty-breakers look alike to me, whether they are "friends' or foes. I can see no moral difference between violating th e treaty about Belgium and breaking the Pact of London. The one act has enslaved a nation, the other has betrayed the W r estern Allies. who are fighting alone to-day for the cause upon which Russia's- future depends. We cannot fight because one treaty ha s been broken and then condone" the breaking of another. 1 know all the specious arguments about throwing Russia into th e arms of Germany, but depend upon it. the simple l'me for cations as well as individuals is to have nothing to do with traitors, lhat way lies the ruin of our cause. To return to our main theme, it is probable that th e enemy will do the obvious thing, which is to concentrate in the West. They can only do so gradually, and though they have already drawn upon their eastern front for heavy drafts and many, guns, it seems extremely unlikely that they will attack so to speak, to-morrow morning. This' is the bigcrest thing thev have <=ver undertaken, and they will r-t I j.-ich their blow until they are f--'-> shall not attempt to quote from thrnianv estimates of their strength which a-e being published. It is enough for us to know that by the spring at the • latest thev can count upon a sufficiently ! formidable, addition to their numbers. The bulk of their reinforcements can ! not b e of the first quality. We need ! not be disturbed about the statement that Austrian divisions may be put into the line in France. The Austrian Army seems to be like the widow's cruse, for it never runs dry; but the Austrian troops to-day are" 'believed to be very , much below what they were m 1914. i In this *.vnr they have never yet had to • face British and- French artillery and -British -and Fiench . infantry in the mass ; and whatever may happen to our line, we nc:d not worry about the sectors where- Austrians' attack. As for the enemy's guns, it ha s to be remembered that, although they will have more 'guns in the West than ever, it is ; by no means clear that they possess i shells in sufficient quantity. Th e availi able evidence -.seems to suggest that the | enemy are probably rather short of maj terial for making shells. ' lam not -belittling th e menace which ' may confront us, hut am trying to reduce it to its correct proportions. T , believe the line in France and Flanders : should resist any attack which may '• now be directed against us. It is true ! that th e German s : broke our line at ' Gouzeaucourt the other day, and that 1 they have since seized two small sectioris of trench near Reincourt and rA ; Polderhoek, as we have don e times withj out number; but when all is said it would' seem that at Gouzeaucourt the enemy did pretty "badly. We talk of a surprise, but nobody seems to have been more surprised than the Germans, who failed- to reap the full profit irora their stroke. I suspect that some searchin"- enquiries ar e in progress on the other side of No Man's Land as well as on our own. I should sav/ that at the moment the real danger spot is Italy rather than France. Our trrn may come, but the highly efficient Germans have an awkward habit of clearintr "* jobs -is they go, which is also our .--, r nracfue on occasion. Having got ; ;l Romania, out of the way for tn» t:y -be-in-c it is'naiural that they should turn next to Italy and endeavour to overwhelm her while she is still ree.ing under a sore blow. The Italian Army lia* foucrht one of the most magnificent fights of the -whole war. and lias stemmed the tide of invasion with marvellous fortitude; but the issue sli-b hancrs in the balance, and we must not deceive ourselves. The long pause v.as dictated -by military necessity. All those masses of Austro-German men and guns on the Platean and between the Erenta and th« Piave are not there for nothing They do not mean to winter amid the hills if the} can help it. Valstagna appears to be

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I the vital point through which they hop e { to debouch into the plains, and if they/ | can dispose of Italy while rehearsingf Armageddon in the West it wijl suit ! them very well. The outlook on the j Italian, front i s hopeful for the Allies, but bv no means certain.

The'best experts assure me that there is no likelihood of a thrust at Salonika until the spring. "When the trees bud-" is an old war motto in the Balkans. The surrender of Jerusalem is a <>reat political and historical event, but from th 0 broad military point of view our force.c. in Palestine cannot now materiallv affect the main course of the war unless they can reach Aleppo, which is more than *3OO miles further north. Fa'.kenhavn is th e mystery of the moment. I think he is in Mesopotamia. r>nd should 'be heard of .won with his two German divisions ; but with the bulk of the Germans and Austrians streaming westward Baghdad has become a side-issue. W e have a toutrh time ahead, yet if we face the facts, ■abstain from adventures, and intern our bell-rineers. we oncrht to pull through. The fate of the Empire may depend noon- the decisions the allocation of the balance of our man-power: but this is a contest of brains as well as men, and both on land and sea. we must not let ourselves -b e beaten in brain-power.