Voting Procedure On Security Council

Northern Advocate, 7 March 1945, Page 3

Voting Procedure On Security Council

LONDON, March 6. The voting procedure in the Security Council of the proposed world organisation, a question which was settled at the Crimea Conference, was necessarily more difficult than the similar problem in the Covenant of the League of Nations, it is stated in London. In the Covenant, all votes, except on a .matter of procedure, had to be unanimous. By the present plan, voting by majority is proposed as the normal method in decisions of highest importance. In the general assembly, voting is ‘by a two-thirds majority without special rights for the Great Powers, except in the admission or expulsion of members and in amendments to the Charter. In the Security Council, decisions are to be taken by a majority of seven of the 11 members, but the five Great Powers, with permanent seats (Britain, United States, Russia, China and France) must be included in the seven that vote. They have a vote just as they had on the Council of the League. They will, however, need the votes of at least two of the six elected members (smaller States) before they can get decisions, but action cannot be prevented by one small State, as It could under the League Covenant. Powers More Extensive The powers of the Security Council will be more extensive than those of the League. By Ihe present proposals, States would undertake to carry out immediately at the request of the Security Council all sanctions short of supplying an annc-d force, and it, is proposed that an armed force should also be immediately placed at the disposal of the Council through special agreements which States would make for that, purpose. In the Covenant, the power of the Council in disputes or in a decision concerning aggression was limited. It could recommend, but not impose solutions. It had no power even to recommend sanctions unless a State refused to carry out the procedure laid down m the Covenant and "resorted to war.” The Security Council is given the power not only to investigate a dispute and make recommendations, but also to decide whether a threat to peace ora breachof peace lias occurred, to impose measures for settlement and to call on other States to sever diplomatic relations, to inflict economic sanctions, and if they have made special agreements, to use armed force against the State in default. It is recognised that if the State in default were a Great Power, actions of this kind would result in a major war, but if a Great Power is a party to a dispute, it does, as in the Covenant, lose its power to veto in certain respects. Sanctions And Great Powers It is precluded from voting on matters dealt with in Chapter VIII., Section A, of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. It therefore cannot prevent Ahje Security Council considering any dispute and determining whether its continuance endangers ihe maintenance of inter-national peace and security. Nor can it prevent the council recommending an appropriate procedure or methods of adjustment in order that the dispute may be settled, nor can it exercise a veto on the question whether a regional agency, constituted in accordance with Chapter VIII., Section C, paragraph 1, shall be asked to concern itself with the dispute. Thus, the United States could not veto the reference of a dispute between itself and a Latin-American State to an organisation set up in the Western Hemisphere for such a purpose. For matters dealt with under Chapter VIII., Section B, however, the Great Power, even if a party to the dispute, would retain the veto. This section deals with sanctions. Sanctions could not, therefore, be inflicted on a Great Power. This has been agreed to because the infliction of such sanctions would mean a major war.

If such a situation ever arose, the States of the world would be lined up against one another, and the machinery for the preservation of world peace would have broken down. It is just this situation that the proposals are meant to prevent. Solemn Obilgaions

The Great Powers, like all the other members, will lake a solemn obligation not to use force or even a threat of force in any manner Inconsistent with the purposes of the organisalion. In the security council, a centre is provided where the Great. Powers can meet to resolve differences by discussion and compromise in conjunction with the representatives of all other States.

Future world peace depends on the Great Powers working together to prevent the outbreak of war. Their armed forces and those of other States will, through the military staff committee, bo made immediately available to deal with any threat from Germany or Japan. It is recognised that these negative measures will not be sufficient by themselves and that only if the measures outlined in Chapter IX. {economic and social co-operation) are also put into practice will the security provisions be able to work. It is believed that peace depends on Suites working together to obtain common benefit, not merely on preventing the use of armed force for national c-nds.

Chapter VIII.. Section B, of the Dumbarton Oak proposals, provides that the Security Council should be empowered to determine what diplomatic or economic sanctions should be applied in cases where a dispute has failed to be settled by pacific means. Should such sanctions be considered inadequate, the Council should be empowered to take whatever action by air, naval or land forces as might he necessary to maintain or restore international peace.