Say Japanese Wide, Open To Attack From Australia

Northern Advocate, 11 June 1942, Page 4

Say Japanese Wide, Open To Attack From Australia

(Special) SYDNEY, June 10. “More aid for General MacArthur,” is the chorus by American war correspondents now in Australia. “The Japanese are wide open to attack from Australia,” declares Joseph Harsch, “Christian Science Monitor” correspondent. “Give General MacArthur the planes and he will roll back the enemy faster than they came.” The first need is a proper realisation by Allied strategists in America and England what can be done from Australia if the materials are provided. Mr. Harsch says that at least until now, General MacArthur has been unable to impress upon those responsible for the flow of war materials, the opportunity Australia offers for an offensive.

“Repeated efforts to convince London and Washington of the offensive potentialities of an Australian front have encountered the unbending conviction that other fronts deserve priority,” he writes. If We Had 2000 More Planes Lack of materials was particularly tragic when the present circumstances rendered an offensive cheaper than defensive action. “If General MacArthur had 2000 extra war planes today, while the Japanese fleet was heavily involved in the north, he could almost certainly retake everything between here and Manila,” says Mr. Harsch. “But if the same planes are doled out to him under the defensive strategy concept, the number would be lost in a short time. The number of planes required to recapture Lae, Salamaua, Rabaul and the Philippines, even the Netherlands East Indies, would be less today than the air losses in six months of attrition are likely to be.” Limited Offensive Now? News commentators here are agreed that the opportunity has occurred for at least a limited offensive against the Japanese—-though weapons in quantity are still lacking. Air power is the primary need and this must be supplemented by substantial naval strength. Lae, Salamaua, Rabaul and Timor are seen as obvious objectives for an Allied sweep. The danger of any longer range attacks until Japan’s sea and air power has been much more heavily punished is that our forces would come into areas where enemy shore-based aircraft could play havoc with our extended lines of communication. Mr. Harsch’s assessment of the scope of an Allied offensive is optimistically generous. While up to half of the enemy’s aircraft-carrier strength may now have been sunk, he has other less vulnerable defensive strategic bases for his planes—many of the Pacific islands under his control. Costly Naval Operations

Naval operations within range of these enemy land and air bases could be made costly. The Japanese discovered that when they attacked Wake Island.

Some observers urge that the repulses in the north will cause the Japanese to make stronger efforts in the South-west Pacific. Certainly Australia has anticipated an intensification of the Japanese submarine campaign. Surface raiders are also expected to be used. But intensified Japanese efforts in this area may be met by a defensive which, from being static, now shows signs of becoming dynamic. Many enemy outposts are lightly garrisoned. Attacks by surprise forces, which would have favourable prospects of success, would be a prelude to the passing of the initiative from the forces of Japan to those of the Allies. Heavier Allied air attacks on Lae and Salamaua are the first move.