London Press Supports Attlee’s Far East Defence

Northern Advocate, 10 January 1942, Page 5

London Press Supports Attlee’s Far East Defence

[British Official Wireless]

(Rec. 12.30 p.m.) RUGBY, Jan 3. The London Press accords strong support to Mr Attlee’s statement on the Far Eastern situation.

“The Times” says Mr Attlee made out a defence that was unchallenged so far as it went. That at the outbreak of war in the new theatre we were unable to confront Japan on equal terms by land, sea and air was not the result of lack of foresight, but of unavoidable deficiency of power. Not having yet surmounted our original handicap of unpreparedness, we still cannot be sufficiently ■ strong at all points simultaneously. Our strength has been concentrated at two vital points, by supplying our Russian allies with munitions and building up an army in the Middle East, and no one will contend that the conquest of Cyrenaica and the hurling back of the German army from the Caucasus foothills and Moscow gates do not fully justify the great risks taken and the great losses that may still be incurred in the defence of our position in the Far East. Empire War Cabinet The “Daily Telegraph” agrees with “The Times” on this point. Discussing the suggestion for an Empire War Cabinet, the “Telegraph” says that everyone in this country would approve the establishment of such a body if the Dominions desired it. But, as Mr. Eden points out, opinion is divided. Any development whirn would closely associate all the Governments of the British Commonwealth with the conduct of the war is sure of approval here. The spirit |f unity gathered strength at Washington, and was moving powerfully throughout the grand alliance of freedom. It had such leadership that we may be confident that practical means of the widest and most effective cooperation will be found. Were the Right Things Done?

“The Times,” after endorsing Mr Attlee's statement “as far as it goes.” says: “What is being asked is whether, after high policy had been decided, what was the maximum force that could be spared for the war in the Pacific, and that the limited force was used to the best advantage. Were the right strategical dispisitions made for the defence of Singapore? Were adequate precautions taken against surprise, especially for advanced aerodromes, a danger distinct from the inevitable loss of aerodromes through general retreat of ground forces? Were the dangers to capital ships un-der-estimated? Did they have stronger air protection, seaborne or landbased, or both? And if it could not have been provided, ought the Prince of Wales and Repulse to have run the risks they did? “No doubt when Parliament assembles Mr Churchill will be in his place and able to give some fuller accounts of events.”