What Does Italy Intend To Do?

Northern Advocate, 30 April 1940, Page 4

What Does Italy Intend To Do?

r T~* HE course Italy intends to pursue in connection with the I war is intriguing public opinion the world over, but A particularly in Allied countries. So faF, Italy has maintained an attitude of neutrality, or, in the language of Mussolini, “non-belligerency,” but statements, supposedly with official knowledge, made during the past few days have created an impression that revision of attitude is under consideration.

At the outbreak of the war, Italy, ostensibly incensed at Germany’s action in effecting an alliance with Russia, threatened to withhold help from Germany. This was understandable in view of the fact that Italy and Germany, and later Japan, had entered into an Axis agreement for the purpose of opposing the spread of Communism.

Germany’s alliance with Russia, the High Priest of Communism, was an action which naturally could not be tolerated by Italy.

With the conclusion of the Russo-Finnish war, however, Russia seemed to withdraw within her own borders and the bond between Bolshevist and Nazi became less apparent. This, it maybe, was the result, of German endeavour to re-establish Axis strength. There has been observable lately a disposition on the part of Italy to look at the war through German spectacles, and the Allies have been watching very closely the change that has become apparent.

From time to time there have been dropped by British statesmen announcements that the Anglo-French navies are sufficiently strong to deal with any developments that might take place in the Mediterranean or elsewhere. These announcements cannot be construed as indicative that if Italy were in need of naval assistance the Allies could provide it without interference with their commitments in the North Sea and the Baltic Sea. What, then, was the purpose of the announcements, which, by the way, were repeated no later than this week?

It is beyond doubt that Britain, as well as France, would be loath to see the development of a spirit in Italy calculated to destroy the friendly relations which existed between the three nations during strenuous years, and, despite press outpourings against Britain, there is good reason to believe that Signor Mussolini is not desirous of any rupture of friendship with the Allies.

He, no doubt, is scrutinising very critically the progress of the war in Norway, and, while perhaps not exactly waiting to “see how the cat jumps,” will nevertheless be influenced materially by the course of events in Norway.

It is therefore unlikely that any immediate sensational move will be made by Italy either in openly espousing the cause of-the Allies or that of Germany. Of course, in a war which has been marked by strange developments from the outset, anything/ may happen in the most unexpected manner, but Italy, despite the difficult position in which she is placed, may be expected to continue her policy of “non-belligerency” as long as possible. As a writer in “Current History” said recently when trying to forecast Fascist policy, “The longer the war goes on, the higher rises Italy’s ‘nuisance value’ to both Germany and the Allies. The more money and human material are wasted by both sets of combatants, the more Italy’s military and naval strength increases in relation to her neighbours. And the longer the conflict goes on, the more certain is the Duce to have a chair near the head of the table at the peace conference.” And Mussolini has a strong liking for a chair at the head of the table. Therefore, he is not likely to take any precipitate step which might place his chair lower down the table.