Unparalleled Situation Reviewed

Northern Advocate, 29 September 1938, Page 8

Unparalleled Situation Reviewed

(Received 3.0 p.m.) RUGBY, September 28,

The Prime Minister, in his speech In the House of Commons, gave a recital of the events in connection with the Sudeten question from July onwards, leading up to the situation today, which Mr Chamberlain described as one with no parallel since 1914.

Referring to the negotiations towards the end of August, Mr Chamberlain said that events then occurred which increased the seriousness ’of the situation. As a result, the British Ambassador was recalled to London for consultation, and a meeting of Ministers was held on August 13.

Britain’s Intentions,

Next day, Sir Neville Henderson returned to Berlin, and gave the State Secretary at the German Foreign Office a strong personal warning regarding the probable attitude of the British Government—already defined, as Mr Chamberlain had reminded the House . in his speech of March 24—in the event of German aggression against Czechoslovakia, particularly if France were compelled to intervene. Two days later Sir Neville Henderson repeated his warning to the German Foreign • Minister. Mr Chamberlain explained that the British Government desired to impress the seriousness of the situation upon the German Government without the risk of further aggravation of the situation by any formal representations which might have been interpreted by the German Government as a public rebuff, as has been the ease in regard to representations made on May 21. The Nuremberg Speech, At the same time, with the Nuremberg Conference in prospect, the British Minister at Prague saw the President of Czechoslovakia, and impressed on him the vital necessity for further concession. Dealing with Herr Hitler’s Nuremberg speech, and an immediate deterioration which followed it, Mr Chamberlain came in turn to the first meeting with Herr Hitler at Berchtesgaden. “At this conversation, which lasted three hours, I very soon became aware that the situation was much more

acute and urgen: vnan r realised. In courteous but perfectly definite terms, Herr Hitler made it plain that he had made up his mind that the Sudeten Germans must have the right of selfdetermination, and returning, if they wished, to the Reich, Invasion Prevented.

“I was, of course, in no position to give there and then such an assurance, but I undertook to return at once to consult my colleagues if he would refrain from active hostilities until I had time to obtain their reply. “That assurance he gave me, provided, he said, that nothing happened in Czechoslovakia of such a nature as to force his hand, and that assurance has remained binding ever since. “I have no doubt now, looking back, that my visit alone prevented invasion, for which everything had been prepared, and it is clear to me that, with the German troops in the positions they then occupied, nothing that anybody could do would prevent that invasion unless the right of selfdetermination was granted, and that quickly, to the Sudeten Germans. That was the sole hope' of a peaceful solution. Discussion With Cabinet. Mr Chamberlain then described his return to London to consult the Cabinet, which received the views of Viscount Runciman, the discussions with the French Ministers and the advice which the French and British Governments tendered at Prague, and which was accepted unconditionally i on September 21. j Tribute To Czechs, I He added that Mr B. C. Newton, British Minister at Prague, was inj structed to inform Czechoslovakia the next day that Britain was profoundly conscious cf the immense sacrifice which Czechoslovakia had agreed to, and the immense public ! spirit they had shown. The Prime Minister described Iris second meeting with Herr Plitler at Godesburg. Depression of Mind. “I thought I had only to discuss quietly with him the various proposals already submitted. I was shocked ! when, at the beginning of these conversations, lie said these proposals were not acceptable, and I learned there were other proposals which I had not contemplated at all. I felt I had to consider what I had to do. Consequently I withdrew with my mind

full of foreboding as to the success of my mission.

After his exchange of letters for the purpose cf clarifying the position, Mr Chamberlain visited the Chancellor to say goodbye, and remained over three hours with him. He received a memorandum of Herr Hitler’s final proposals, and a map for transmission to Prague. Frank Talk to Fuehrer.

For the first time, in the memoranda, I found new proposals, and I spoke very frankly. I dwelt with all the emphasis at my command upon the risks that would be incurred by insisting on such terms. I declared that the language and manner of the document, which I described as an ultimatum rather than a memorandum, would profoundly shock public opinion in neutr'al countries, and I bitterly reproached the Chancellor on his failure to respond in any way to the efforts which I had made to secure peace.

“In spite of these frank words, the conversations were carried on on more friendly terms than those which preceded it. I think I should add that before saying farewell to Herr Hitler, I h'ad a few words with him in private, which I do not think are without importance. Herr Hitler’s Earnest Declaration. “In the first place, he repeated to me, with great earnestness, what he had already said ?.t Berchtesgaden, namely, that this was the last of his territorial ambitions in Europe, and that he had no wish ct have in the Reich people of other races than Germans.”

“In the second place, he said again very earnestly that he wanted to be friends with England, and if only this Sudeten question could be got out of the way he would gladly resume conversations.” The memorandum was communicated to Czechoslovakia and decisively rejected. The French Ministers came to London.

Finally, Mr Chamberlain revealed that in the course of the conversations between the French and British Ministers, the former informed the British that if Czechoslovakia were attacked, France would fulfil her treaty obligations.

“In reply,’’ said Mr Chamberlain, “we said that if, as a result of these obligations, the French forces were actively engaged wo should be pledged to support them.” This announcement was received with cheers, and led on to a description of the Prime Minister's final bid for peace, resulting in the invitation of the Four Power talks at Munich.

The White Paper published this afternoon, to which the Prime Minister made constant reference in his speech, contains the correspondence, including a letter from Lord Runciman to Mr Chamberlain, dated September 21. expressing his final views, which, in general terms, were in accord with the Anglo-French proposals. These proposals arc also printed, along with the subsequent correspondence between Mr Chamberlain and Herr Hitler.