TRANSPORT BOARD

Northern Advocate, 27 June 1935, Page 5

TRANSPORT BOARD

CARRIAGE OF GOODS

CASES BEFORE FULL COURT.

[Per Press Association. — Copyright! WELLINGTON, This Day.

The hearing of two cases brought to test the legality of the Transport (Goods) Order, 1933-34, was continued in the Full Court yesterday. The question, which arose from magisterial decisions at Wanganui and at Dunedin, came first before the Supreme Court as a result of appeals from the magistrate’s decisions, and was brought before the Full Court for argument. In both cases carriers were charged with carrying on goods services without licenses granted under the Transport Licensing Act, 1931, contrary* to Section 20 of the Transport (Goods) Order, 1933-34. In the Wanganui case the carrier was convicted, and it was against this conviction that the appeal Was made to the Supreme Court., In the Dunedin case the charge against the carrier was dismissed, and in this case the appeal was made by the informant.

In the first case, Mr P. L. Dickinson appeared for the appellant, Archie Frederick Wilson, and the Crown Solicitor, Mr A. E. Currie,, with him the Crown Solicitor at Wanganui, Mr N. R. Bain, for the respondent, Ernest Hunter Barrett, traffic officer. In the second case, Mr Currie and Mr Bain appeared for the appellant, Maurice Ordish Fairhurst, informant, and Mr G. T. Baylee for the respondents, Robins and Co., carriers of Dunedin. Mr Baylee concluded argument on behalf of the respondents, Robins and Co., shortly after the court resumed yesterday morning. Mr Currie traversed briefly three classes of subordinate legislation under the Transport Licensing Act —transport controlled areas under Section 45, the Transport (Goods) Order under Section 47, and the Transport Licensing (Goods) Service Regulations under Section 59. Counsel submitted further that the words in Sub-section 1 of Section 47 authorised the application of Section 43 with modifications; but nothing in the Order-in-Council went further than what amounted to modification; as an alternative, and if Section 43 could not be modified, the effect of Section 47 was automatically to apply to Section 43, irrespective of any slip in the Order-in-Council; and that Subsection 4 of Section 47 and Sub-section 5 of Section 60 restricted the power of the court to examine the order. Counsel submitted further that the words in Sub-section (1) of Section 47, “as he thinks fit,” enlarged the powers of the Governor-General and. that if the Order-in-Council was not found by the court to be as good as a whole, then the doctrine of severability would be applicable and the remainder of the Order-in-Council would be good.

Argument was continued in the afternoon by Mr Bain, second counsel for the Licensing Authority. He sub--itted that the doctrine of severability could be applied to-the regulation in the same way as it was applied to bylaws, and that if the court found any part of the regulations ultra vires, that part could be deleted without affecting or vitiating the remainder of the regulations. Mr Baylee was replying when the court adjourned until today.