Public Inquiry Into General’s Escape
Capture of Singapore By Japs Recalled <By Telegraph—Press Assn.—Copyright.) Received Monday, 10.45 p.m. MELBOURNE, Nov. 26. Mr. Justice Ligertrwood today opened the inquiry into the circumstances of Lieutenant-General Gordon Bennett’s escape from Singapore. The Federal Government decided on this inquiry after a report on the circumstances of Lieutenant-General Bennett’s escape had been furnished by the Army Court of Inquiry instituted by General Blarney. At the opening of the inquiry, which is being held in public, LieutenantGeneral Bennett’s counsel, Mr. B. Clancy, K.C., announced that his contention would be that once there had been an unconditional surrender by the Allied G.O.C. in Malaya (LieutenantGeneral Percival), Lieutenant-General Bennett was in the position of being a prisoner of war. By reason of the provisions of the Army Act, repeated in Army Orders, it was his bounden duty to escape if he could.
Mr. W. R. Dovey, K.C., appearing to assist Mr. Justice Ligertwood, said there would be a considerable body of evidence to the effect that at no time was Lieutenant-General Bennett a prisoner of war. Mr. Dovey said he would give the Commission a general picture of the story in the light of material made available following the return to Australia of a great number of those who were prisoners in Japanese hands. The facts were largely covered by a statement made by officers who were members of Lieutenant-General Bennett’s staff. The Eighth Division, of which Lieutenant-General Bennett was commander, went to Malaya in the early part of 1941 and it was to have remained in Malaya until additional Indian troops were available, when it would have gone on to join the other A.I.F. divisions in the Middle East.
Mr. Dovey said they were in no way concerned with the operations in Malaya or Singapore, except insofar as they threw light on the matters referred to the Commission. They were not concerned with how the various actions were fought or lost. The point of time they must discuss commenced approximately at the time when LieutenantGeneral Bennett, with his headquarters, crossed from the mainland to Singapore Island. NOT GOING TO BE CAPTURED Mr. Dovey added that it appeared that Lieutenant-General Bennett had for some time prior to February 8 formed the idea that he was not going to be captured. One witness would say that as early as January 29, at Johore Bahru, he was speaking to the general on the tactical situation and they were both depressed by the prospects. Lieutenant-General Bennett was reported to have said: “I am afraid it is the end. Once we get there, we will be caught like rats in a trap. They claimed they captured me previously, but I am not going to be caught.” Mr. Dovey said Lieutenant-General Bennett’s headquarters were moved to Singapore on February 8. Later discussions took place between the general and other officers on the subject of escape. Although Brigadier C. A. Callaghan (now Major-General), commander of the Royal Artillery of the Eighth Division and the senior brigadier in command, who, on Lieutenant-General Bennett’s leaving the A.1.F., assumed command of the force, and Colonel J. H. Thyer, a staff officer, one of the division, were in almost daily touch with Lieutenant-General Bennett at that time, the evidence would show that the plot was deliberately concealed from both. On February 11, Captain A. A. Curlewis, an intelligence officer, had a conversation with LieutenantGeneral Bennett’s A.D.C., Lieutenant G. Walker, and Major C. J. A. Moses about a scheme “to get the old man out.” Mr. Dovey said he did not think it was proper to give details of this conversation, but he could say that, while those officers were talking, the general himself came into the room and together they all discussed ways and means of escape, with a map spread out in front of them. Colonel Thyer then came into the room and LieutenantGeneral Bennett at once closed up the book of maps and ended the conversation. It was resumed after Colonel Thyer left about one hour later.
Mr. Dovey added that, when Major Moses and iLeutenant Walker were discussing the same subject later, Major Moses had declared: “I am not thinking about the general; I am thinking about myself.” SITUATION HOPELESS
On February 12 or 13—he was not quite certain of the date—General Knappe further discussed witii Lieu-tenant-General Bennett what was to happen. The date was important because it was on February 13 that a conference took place between senior officers of the Command, presided over by Lieutenant Percival.
Lieutenant-General Bennett attended and all were apparently unanimous that the situation was hopeless. A message was sent to General Wavell urging him to agree to capitulation. It was made known at this conference that the Navy would arrange to evacuate a certain number of “key personnel.” They should get back to Australia and give the army here a complete picture of the Malayan situation. General Wavell replied that the fighting should continue, even into the streets of Singapore if necessary. On that day also, Lieutenant-General Bennett told Colonel Broadbent that he (Colonel Broadbent), who was take a party out of Singapore, would be able to give the authorities a better general picture than anyone else. Later the same day, Lieutenant-Gen-eral Bennett said he had no intention of allowing himself to fall into Japanese hands and when things collapsed, he was going to make a break for it. On that day he also instructed the A.I.F. not to withdraw from their then positions under any circumstances.
Having heard of this plan. Major Curlewis discussed with Lieutenant Walker and Major Moses their departure and that of the general. Major Curlewis discussed the ethics of the party escaping and added: “My conscience has been at work and I don’t know about the ethics of getting out and leaving the troops. ’' Major Moses replied: “You don’t seem to understand. The main thing is that we must get the ‘old man’ out. Mayor Curlewis: But is it right that the general should go?
Major Moses: Whatever else happens, I won’t be taken prisoner. Mr. Dovey then quoted a secret signal sent on February 14 in cipher to Army Headquarters, Melbourne, by Lieutenant-General Bennett. This said: “The A.I.F. is now concentrated two miles from the city proper. You can rely on the troops to hold to the last, as ordered. All other fronts are weak. General Wavell has ordered all troops to fight. If the enemy enters the city
behind us, we will take suitable action to avoid unnecessary sacrifices.”
There was incontrovertible evidence, Mr. Dovey said, about Lieutenant-Gen-eral Bennett’s intention to leave the island before this signal had been sent. On February 16, the day of tile surrender, Lieutenant-General Bennett told his officers that all units would remain intact in their present position. Any enemy attack was to be resisted and all officers were to retain their commands. The hearing is unfinished.
Permanent link to this item
https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/MT19451127.2.30
Bibliographic details
Manawatu Times, Volume 70, Issue 280, 27 November 1945, Page 5
Word Count
1,150Public Inquiry Into General’s Escape Manawatu Times, Volume 70, Issue 280, 27 November 1945, Page 5
Using This Item
Stuff Ltd is the copyright owner for the Manawatu Times. You can reproduce in-copyright material from this newspaper for non-commercial use under a Creative Commons BY-NC-SA 3.0 New Zealand licence. This newspaper is not available for commercial use without the consent of Stuff Ltd. For advice on reproduction of out-of-copyright material from this newspaper, please refer to the Copyright guide.